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Summary 
Lean management is a managerial approach widely recognized as powerful in reducing 
waste and continuously improving production processes of a factory. Many manufacturing 
organizations worldwide have implemented it obtaining significant enhancement in 
operational performance. Besides adopting it locally within a single factory, in recent decades 
a growing number of multinational corporations (MNCs) have sought to implement lean 
across their foreign factories. However, several lean projects at both single- and multi-factory 
level encountered problems, and some even failed to achieve such benefits. 
Culture is widely considered to be a critical success factor for lean implementation. There is 
yet a strong debate whether societal culture or organizational culture is most important in 
determining the success of lean implementation projects. Therefore, this thesis aims to 
enhance the understanding of the role of culture – both at societal and organizational level – 
in lean implementation by examining two related topics: 
1. The distinctive characteristics of a successful lean manufacturing unit;  
2. The transferability of successful lean systems across dispersed manufacturing 
factories within MNCs. 
To that purpose, two main research projects have been conducted. The High Performance 
Manufacturing project, involving 317 manufacturing units in 3 sectors and 10 countries, was 
used to explore the first topic according to survey methodology. For what concerns the 
second topic, I studied 7 successful lean transfer projects by mean of a multiple case study 
and an in-depth case study. The projects involved European sources and Chinese and U.S. 
recipients belonging to 4 different multinational corporations; in-depth case study focused on 
one of such project, launched by an Italian MNC towards its subsidiary in China.  
The findings of my research indicate that successful and unsuccessful lean factories differ for 
some organizational culture dimensions and for the extent of adoption of soft lean practices 
(i.e., lean practices concerning people and relations). Therefore, these characteristics are 
likely to make the difference in the successful implementation of lean. 
With regard to transferability of successful lean systems, results from in-depth case study 
stress the influence of cultural differences – in terms of extent of difference between source 
and recipient as well as peculiarities of the latter – on the success of the lean transfer project, 
and the importance of adopting a transfer approach that take into account such differences. 
Moreover, results from the multiple case study suggest that major problems in transferring a 
lean system are context specific – i.e., similar within a context and different between China 
and U.S.. In order to succeed in transferring lean, source should adapt their projects; as 
shown by the cross-case analysis, the level of adaptation can be affected by the socio-
cultural characteristics of a recipient unit and the organizational culture of the source. 
Collectively, these results contribute to the literature by providing a better understanding of 
the role of culture in lean implementation not only within local factories, but also in 
manufacturing subsidiaries overseas. Results can be particularly useful also for practitioners 
that are facing the challenging of implementing lean at international level.  
Riassunto 
Il lean management è un approccio manageriale ampiamente riconosciuto come efficace 
nella lotta alla riduzione degli sprechi aziendali e nel miglioramento continuo dei processi 
produttivi di uno stabilimento. Molte imprese produttive in tutto il mondo hanno implementato 
tale approccio ottenendo significativi miglioramenti delle performance operative. Oltre ad 
adottarlo a livello locale all'interno di un unico stabilimento, negli ultimi decenni un numero 
crescente di imprese multinazionali hanno cercato di implementare il lean nei loro 
stabilimenti stranieri. Tuttavia, molti progetti lean sia a livello di singolo stabilimento che 
coinvolgenti più stabilimenti hanno incontrato difficoltà ed addirittura alcuni non hanno 
garantito i benefici previsti.  
La cultura è ampiamente considerata un fattore critico di successo per l'implementazione del 
lean. In letteratura, però, vi è un forte dibattito riguardo l’importanza dei valori di cultura 
nazionale o di cultura organizzativa nel determinare il successo dei progetti di 
implementazione del lean. Questa tesi si propone quindi di migliorare la conoscenza del 
ruolo della cultura – sia a livello nazionale che organizzativo – nell’implementazione del lean 
esaminando due argomenti strettamente correlati: 
1. Le caratteristiche distintive degli stabilimenti lean di successo; 
2. La trasferibilità di sistemi lean di successo tra stabilimenti produttivi localizzati 
globalmente, nel caso delle imprese multinazionali. 
A tal fine, sono stati condotti due principali progetti di ricerca. Il progetto “High Performance 
Manufacturing”, che coinvolge 317 unità di produzione in 3 settori e 10 paesi, è stato 
utilizzato per esplorare il primo tema secondo il metodo survey. Per quanto riguarda il 
secondo argomento, ho studiato 7 progetti di trasferimento del lean di successo per mezzo di 
un caso studio multiplo e un caso studio singolo approfondito. I progetti sono avvenuti tra 
stabilimenti europei e destinatari cinesi e statunitensi di 4 diverse multinazionali; il caso 
studio singolo riguarda uno di tali progetti, avviato da una multinazionale italiana verso la sua 
filiale Cinese. 
I risultati della mia ricerca indicano che gli stabilimenti lean di successo si differenziano dagli 
stabilimenti lean con basse prestazioni operative per alcune dimensioni della cultura 
organizzativa e per il livello di utilizzo delle pratiche lean soft (i.e., le pratiche lean che 
riguardano la gestione delle persone e delle loro relazioni). Pertanto, queste sembrano 
essere le caratteristiche che fanno la differenza nell’implementazione di successo del lean. 
Per quanto riguarda la trasferibilità dei sistemi di lean di successo, i risultati del caso studio 
singolo sottolineano l'influenza delle differenze culturali – intese sia in termini dell’entità della 
differenza tra gli stabilimenti nonché delle peculiarità dello stabilimento ricevente – sul 
successo di un progetto di trasferimento lean e l'importanza di adottare un approccio di 
trasferimento che tenga conto di tali differenze. 
Inoltre, i risultati del caso studio multiplo suggeriscono che i principali problemi nel 
trasferimento di un sistema snello sono specifici del contesto – cioè, simili in uno stesso 
contesto e diversi tra Cina e Stati Uniti. Al fine di trasferire il lean con successo, i progetti 
dovrebbero essere adattati; come mostrato dall'analisi cross-case, il livello di adattamento 
può essere influenzato dalle caratteristiche socioculturali dell'unità ricevente e dalla cultura 
organizzativa dello stabilimento che gestisce il progetto. 
Collettivamente, questi risultati contribuiscono alla letteratura fornendo una migliore 
comprensione del ruolo della cultura nell’implementazione del lean, non solo all'interno di 
stabilimenti locali, ma anche nelle filiali produttive all'estero. I risultati possono essere 
particolarmente utili anche per i professionisti che si trovano ad affrontare la sfida di 
implementare il lean a livello internazionale. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Background: lean management and culture 
Lean management is a philosophy that follows five principles – value, value stream, flow, 
pull, and perfection – to eliminate every source of waste from the production processes 
(Womack and Jones, 1996). It levers on an integrated socio-technical system of practices 
which reduce internal as well external process variability, thus allowing operational 
performance improvement (Shah and Ward, 2003; Li et al., 2005). The success achieved by 
Toyota, the Japanese automotive firm who conceived and implemented lean first, and by 
several other lean organizations in different countries and industries has led many firms to 
start a lean project to eliminate waste and significantly improve their performance. In 
particular, driven by the steeply increasing globalization, in recent decades a growing 
number of multinational corporations (MNCs) have sought to implement lean not only locally, 
within a single factory, but across factories located worldwide (Netland and Aspelund, 2014).  
However, several lean projects at both single- and multi-factory level encountered problems, 
and some even failed to achieve benefits (Liker and Rother, 2011). Scholars advanced 
several causes for this lack of success, namely, the complexity of lean implementation 
(Lander and Liker, 2007; Mackelprang and Nair, 2010), the existence of contingency factors 
limiting its positive impact (Bortolotti et al., 2013), the focus on Just-In-Time practices without 
adequate consideration of other important operations management dimensions (Matsui, 
2007; Agarwal et al., 2013), and the lack of attention to human resource management 
(Bateman, 2005; Agarwal et al., 2013). In particular, culture is certainly among the most 
critical and widest acknowledged in the lean literature (e.g., Spear, 1999; Liker, 2004; 
Rother, 2009; Kull et al., 2014). 
Scholars have studied the role of culture in successful lean implementation focusing on two 
main levels of culture: organizational culture and societal culture. On the one hand, some 
authors provided evidence that factories which successfully implement lean are 
characterized by specific organizational culture values and behaviors, such as long-term 
thinking and strategic approach to management, use of lot face-to-face contact and open 
communication, cooperation between employees, even those working in different 
functions\divisions as well as in different hierarchical levels (Spear, 1999; Liker, 2004; 
Rother, 2009). On the other hand, some scholars found that societal cultural values may 
favor or hinder the adoption of lean practices, thus affecting its effectiveness (Hofer et al., 
2011; Kull et al., 2014). According to a practice-culture perspective (Lozeau et al., 2002; 
Ansari et al., 2010), in fact culture values characterizing a particular country may be different 
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from lean ones; the resulting incongruence between values and lean practices may lead to 
difficulties or even unsuccessful implementation of lean. In particular, studies on lean 
implementation at single-factory are quite unanimous in considering organizational culture as 
a fundamental factor influencing performance, while in case of multi-factory implementation 
also societal culture seems to be of primary importance in determining the success of lean 
projects. 
1.2  Motivation for the doctoral thesis, main objectives and research questions 
Although literature highlights the importance of analyzing the interplay between lean and 
culture, previous contributions on this issue are fragmented and show significant limitations. 
In particular, a first limitation of studies focusing on lean implementation within a single 
factory is linked to the narrow set of organizational culture dimensions, lean practices and 
performance considered. Instead, an in-depth understanding of how lean and organizational 
culture can interact thus influencing a firm’s performance requires a comprehensive view of 
the phenomenon, which should be based on a holistic model considering the various 
dimensions of organizational culture, lean and performance. In addition, the majority of 
researchers studied organizational culture as an antecedent of lean practices but, as 
observed by Prajogo and McDermott (2005), arguments for the impact of lean practices on 
organizational culture were also advanced by several scholars, thus making an investigation 
considering the potential mutual relationships between these factors more appropriate. The 
basic assumption is that, not only can some organizational culture dimensions favor the 
successful implementation of lean, but also lean practices that are defined as soft – such as 
those concerning work organization, human resource management, relations or strategy. 
These can influence the behavior and beliefs of employees, thus creating the right 
organizational culture for the successful implementation of lean. Finally, previous 
contributions providing a more comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon (e.g., Spear, 
1999; Liker, 2004; Rother, 2009) generally focused on the Toyota case history, without 
leveraging on well-established organizational culture models. Hence, in order to understand if 
and how organizational culture affects the successful implementation of lean, I distinguished 
between soft and hard lean practices, and examine the differences between lean implementers 
both in terms of organizational culture dimensions and soft lean practices. In line with other 
studies (e.g., Prajogo and McDermott, 2005; Rahman and Bullock, 2005; Fotopoulos and 
Psomas, 2009), lean practices in this research will be referred to as soft and hard. The first 
ones concern human resource management, relations, people and strategy and the latter refer 
to lean technical and analytical tools (e.g., kanban and statistical process control). 
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The aim is investigating whether the successful implementation of lean is related to a certain 
organizational culture profile and the adoption of soft lean practices. 
 
Unlike lean adoption within a single unit, the analysis of lean implementation in multiple factories 
within MNCs has received little attention from scholars (Netland and Aspelund, 2014). Lean 
transfer projects are shown to be strategic for MNCs when seeking to achieve a superior 
competitive advantage (Colotla et al., 2003; Jensen and Szulanski, 2004). However, they are 
particularly complex to be implemented; besides problems characterizing lean adoption within a 
factory, managers have to deal with issues concerning the heterogeneity between contexts 
(Maritan and Brush, 2003). Although some scholars recognized the relevance of contextual 
variance in affecting lean transfer project effectiveness, and few previous studies also provide 
some hints on such relation, the literature is still lacking in providing a framework which explain 
how cultural differences influence the transfer of a successful lean system. Even if some 
contributions provide empirical evidence on criticalities faced by firms when transferring lean 
abroad (e.g., Bollbach, 2012) and give some indications on how overcoming a number of 
criticalities (e.g., Aoki, 2008), further research is needed to better analyze specific problems in 
lean transfer projects thus providing effective countermeasures. In particular, a relevant and 
heated debate is still present concerning the convenience of adapting source’s practices and 
solutions when transferring lean to foreign subsidiaries. In fact, while some scholars support 
strong adaptation (e.g., Wallace, 2004; Lee and Jo, 2007), others consider faithful replication of 
the original lean knowledge a more effective transfer approach (e.g., Ferdows, 2006).  
This thesis intends to provide a twofold contribution to this research stream. Fist, it aim at 
providing a deep examination of the impact of cultural differences between an Italian MNC 
and its Chinese subsidiary on lean knowledge transfer process, and the effectiveness of 
different transfer approaches. Second, the intent is to better explain how effectively 
managing lean knowledge across a number of lean knowledge owners and recipients in 
MNCs. Along with these points, problems in transferring lean knowledge across factories in 
different countries, and effective countermeasures adopted by MNCs to cope with such 
criticalities will be analyzed. 
 
Overall, the thesis aims to provide a better understanding of the role of culture in lean 
implementation at both single- and multi-factory levels. Three set of research questions were 
formulated according to this purpose.  
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RQ1 Do successful lean manufacturing units show a peculiar organizational culture? 
 RQ1a What is the ideal organizational culture profile for lean? 
 RQ1b Do successful lean factories adopt soft lean practices more extensively 
compared to unsuccessful lean factories? 
This first set of research questions focuses on lean implementation on a single-unit level and 
aims to define the peculiarities of successful lean factories, in terms of organizational culture 
dimensions and extent of use of soft versus hard lean practices. 
 RQ2 How do cultural differences between an Italian unit (lean source in a MNC) and a 
Chinese subsidiary (non-lean recipient) influence the transfer of lean management?  
 RQ2a How do cultural differences influence the effectiveness of lean knowledge 
transfer approach? Why do different lean knowledge transfer approaches 
lead to different outcomes? 
 RQ2b How should an Italian factory adapt its lean system to fit peculiarities of a 
Chinese subsidiary? 
This second set of research questions concerns lean implementation within an overseas 
manufacturing unit of a MNC. It aims to better understand the impact of societal culture, in 
terms of peculiarities of the recipient unit as well as extent of the difference between source 
and recipient, on a lean transfer project. 
RQ3 How can MNCs handle factories’ cultural differences in cross-border lean knowledge 
transfer projects? 
 RQ3a How do cultural contexts of the source and recipient influence cross-border 
lean knowledge transfer projects within MNCs? 
 RQ3b What are the main variables differentiating cross-border lean knowledge 
transfer projects within MNCs? 
This third group of research questions complements the second set by providing additional 
insights on cross-border lean implementation within MNCs. In particular, the research aims to 
extend the analysis of the impact of cultural characteristics on a lean transfer project by 
focusing on recipient as well as source cultural peculiarities. Besides identifying and describing 
main variables differentiating cross-border lean knowledge transfer, it intends to shed light on 
the influence of culture on problems as well as suitable level of adaptation of a transfer project. 
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1.3 Research methodology 
Two main projects were used to address the research questions in Section 1.2. 
1.3.1 HPM project 
In order to address the first set of research questions, I developed two hypotheses 
considering the difference between successful and unsuccessful lean factories in terms of 
organizational culture dimensions and the extent of adoption of soft lean practices.  I tested 
them using survey methodology. In particular, I adopted the multi-group analysis method and 
used the High Performance Manufacturing (HPM) database. 
HPM is an international research project set out to analyze the relationships between firms’ 
practices and performance. The HPM sample includes 317 manufacturing factories operating 
in mechanical, electronics, and transportation equipment sectors (SIC codes: 35, 36 and 37, 
respectively) and located in ten countries, i.e., Austria, China, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and the US.  
The HPM project started in the nineties. Some rounds of data collection occurred over the 
years. In particular, data used in this thesis belongs to the third round. Although I had not the 
opportunity to participate in the third round of data collection, I have collaborated in the fourth 
round of data gathering (in progress).  
In order to investigate the research hypotheses I used the multi-group analysis method using 
LISREL 8.80 (Sorbom, 1974). The aim was to test for differences between high-performance 
and low-performance lean factories in terms of organizational culture dimensions and 
application of lean practices. Numerous researchers attested the advantages of Sorbom’s 
(1974) method compared to the traditional general linear models (e.g., Lubke et al., 2003, 
and Raykov, 2001). These advantages are linked to the possibility of estimating the 
parameters for all groups simultaneously. As a matter of fact, this approach facilitates a 
comparison of different theoretical models to determine the one that best fits the data. 
Furthermore, it allows to evaluate latent mean differences, taking into account measurement 
error variance, thus obtaining more precise and accurate results compared to methods, such 
as the t-test or ANOVA (Martınez-Costa et al., 2009). 
1.3.2 European MNCs 
In order to address the second set of research questions, an in-depth case study was carried 
out at an Italian MNC with a subsidiary in China.  
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In-depth case study methodology was adopted since it allows to deeply analyze the process 
under examination and to provide detailed insights on how transferring activities are affected 
by socio-cultural differences between source and recipient units (Voss et al., 2002). As 
highlighted by Netland and Aspelund’s (2014), literature on lean knowledge transfer is scarce 
and several issues are still open. Yin (1989) suggested in-depth case when little prior 
research has been conducted. 
The theoretical sampling approach guided the selection of the case study (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
My aim was to identify a case that would have guaranteed a transparent description of the 
transfer process in a setting characterized by high cultural difference. Since my research 
focuses on the early phases of a lean implementation project, I chose a MNC that have 
recently launched lean knowledge transfer initiatives towards a non-lean subsidiary. In 
particular, the dyad considered – i.e., a source unit and a recipient factory of a MNC (Gupta 
and Govindarajan, 2000) – involves a Chinese manufacturing factory and its Italian 
headquarters. 
 
This firm was also included in the sample of European MNCs selected so as to answer to the 
third group of research questions according to a multiple case study method. 
The research arising from the third set of research questions is explanatory as well as 
exploratory in its nature. Indeed, besides relating cultural differences to transfer problems 
and countermeasures, it also characterizes and operationalizes the main variables 
differentiating cross-border lean knowledge transfer projects within MNCs. Multiple case-
study methodology was adopted to address the third set of research questions, since it is 
extremely valuable to identify and describe crucial variables as well to discover links between 
them (Yin, 1994). I analyzed seven transfer projects at a dyadic level, i.e., projects between a 
source unit and a recipient factory of a MNC, which is regarded as an appropriate unit of 
analysis to explore transfer project within MNCs (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). 
The process of case selection involved two major phases. Fist, a list of lean MNCs was 
identified, considering MNCs which had collaborated in master courses/university workshops 
on lean management and/or member of lean clubs/associations (e.g., Lean Enterprise CLUB 
of CUOA Business School). Second, I gathered data on these MNCs and their lean projects 
so as to determine if a MNC could be interesting from my research’s objective point of view. I 
focused on lean MNCs with headquarters in Europe that have recently transferred their lean 
systems to non-lean subsidiaries in China and U.S.. Data gathered on the field allowed me to 
select a sample which satisfies both literal and theoretical replication issues (Yin, 1994). In 
particular, I selected four cases in which the recipient is a Chinese factory and three cases in 
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which the recipient is a U.S. factory. China and U.S. provide examples of polar types of 
societal cultures, thus are useful to explore how such variable can affect the transferability of 
a lean system (Eisenhardt, 1989). Moreover, I selected dyads involving sources with both 
similarities and differences it terms of organizational culture values. In particular, my sample 
includes three cases in which the source has an OC1 characterized by a low power distance 
and four cases in which the source has an OC2 characterized by a high power distance. 
 
For all cases, I verified that the source unit has attested experience in lean, and that the lean 
knowledge transfer project provided successful results, i.e., lean knowledge transferred was 
routinized and lean practices persisted within the recipient factory, and the source monitored 
the status of lean implementation over time through KPIs and audits (e.g., number of 
standard works/procedures developed over time, audits on 5S).  
Given the sensitivity of the data under investigation, confidentiality was a key factor in 
ensuring “open and honest” dialogue with the MNCs. Therefore, I don’t disclose the MNCs’ 
identity. 
Semi-structured interviews represent my main source of data. Managers in charge of lean 
knowledge transfer projects, their team members and other managers deeply involved in the 
transfer projects (e.g., supervisors of lean projects within the MNC, managers who supported 
lean transfer project planning or practice adaptation) were interviewed in the period between 
March 2013 and April 2014. In order to increase research reliability, I also analyzed 
information from other sources such as companies’ documents (e.g., A3 documents on lean 
strategy deployment or company’s X matrix, the handbook of lean standards, the 
standardized procedures for implementing each lean practice, etc.) and web source, and 
triangulated these information with data from interviews (Eisenhardt, 1989). In addition, 
guided-tours of factories within each dyad allowed direct observations of lean practices 
implemented, and thus to verify the correctness of the data/information gathered during the 
interviews and from documents. For what concerns the in-depth case study, I also closely 
supervised a master student who performed his master project (about 7 months of work) in 
the firm.  
1.4 Personal interest and publications 
During my first year as a PhD student, I have experienced different kinds of “multicultural 
contexts” on the field. During a visit of an Italian shipyard, for instance, I found out that day-by-
day production activities were carried out by groups of people belonging to several countries, and 
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different cultures (i.e., foreign professionals required for ship building, but not available among 
Italians, work with Italian employees). I also recognized the need of other Italian manufacturers to 
face multicultural contests, as a consequence of the decision to internationalize the production. In 
particular, some of these MNCs were facing the challenge of replicating the successful 
experience of lean implementation in their subsidiaries abroad. Driven by these practical cases, 
which manifested an interest of practitioners toward cultural topic, and an evident lack of 
research in the literature, I decided to focus my research on cultural topic and, in particular, on 
the role of culture in lean implementation at both single- and multi-factory levels. 
During my PhD I have conducted both individual and collaborative research with enthusiasm. 
As a result of the great effort and devotion I put in my work, I also realized some scientific 
publications, which were presented in renowned national as well as international conferences 
in operations management, and published in qualified academic journals. The following 
publications are related with the present thesis: 
1. Bortolotti, T., Boscari, S., & Danese, P. (2015). Successful lean implementation: 
Organizational culture and soft lean practices. International Journal of 
Production Economics, 160, 182-201. 
2. Bortolotti, T., Boscari, S., & Danese, P. (2013).  LEAN MANAGEMENT AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE: EVIDENCES FROM HPM PROJECT. At AIiG 
Conference 2013, Milano (Italy), 17-18 ottobre 2013. 
3. Boscari S., Danese P., & Romano P. (2014). Creating a lean culture across national 
boundaries. At Cross Cultural Business Conference 2014, Steyr (Austria), 14 maggio 2014. 
– Under revision in International Journal of Production Economics 
4. Boscari S., Danese P., & Romano P. (2014). Effective lean knowledge transfer 
across manufacturing units in multinational corporations. At EurOMA 2014, 
Palermo (Ireland), 20-25 giugno 2014. 
– Winner of Harry Boer Highly Commended Award 
– Invited for possible inclusion in the EurOMA 2014 special issue in 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management 
– Under revision in International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management 
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1.5 Structure of the thesis  
The following part of the thesis is structured into 6 chapters.  
Chapter 2 evaluates the state‐of‐the‐art of the research into culture and lean management. 
Literature review involved two main phases. First phase concerns a general literature 
overview concerning the three main areas involved in this thesis: Section 2.1 focuses on 
culture in operations management, Section 2.2 on practice or knowledge transfer and 
Section 2.3 on lean management. Second phase concerns the literature analysis of studies 
dealing with culture and lean implementation at both single- and multi-factory level, 
discussed in Sub-Section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 respectively. 
Chapter 3 focuses on successful lean implementation within a manufacturing unit. Section 
3.1 presents the research hypotheses considering the distinctive characteristics of successful 
lean factories in terms of organizational culture dimensions and extent of use of soft lean 
practices. Section 3.2 describes the methodology adopted and Section 3.3 presents the 
results. 
Chapter 4 and 5 focus on the transferability of successful lean systems across dispersed 
manufacturing factories within MNCs. In particular, Chapter 4 considers the lean transfer 
project launched by an Italian MNC towards its Chinese subsidiaries. Section 4.1 describes 
the methodology adopted, Section 4.2 presents the case study and Section 4.3 summarized 
the key lessons learned from the experience of the Italian MNC. 
Chapter 5 considers the 7 lean transfer projects between European MNCs and Chinese and 
U.S. subsidiaries. Section 5.1 describes the methodology adopted, Section 5.2 presents the 
within-case analysis and Section 5.3 reports the cross-case analysis. 
Chapter 6 discusses the contributions of the thesis, limitations and opportunities for future 
research. In particular, Section 6.1 focuses on lean implementation within a manufacturing 
unit, while Section 6.2 concerns lean knowledge transfer between units of MNCs.  
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the theses briefly reporting the research questions, the 
answers to such questions based on the research findings, contributions and limits. 
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2. Literature review, research gaps and research questions  
As schematized by Figure 1, literature review involved two main phases. First phase 
concerns a general literature overview. In particular, I analyzed studies concerning culture in 
operations management (OM) so as to identify the most significant variables used by 
operations management scholars to deal with culture. In addition, I reviewed contributions on 
lean management (LM) to provide a general overview of this stream of research. In 
particular, I focused on lean adoption within a single-factory (indicated as LM in Figure 1) as 
well as lean implementation at multi-factory level in case of MNCs – i.e., practice or 
knowledge transfer (KT). In fact, feedbacks from the field, which I have constantly gathered 
from consultants and managers since the beginning of my research, highlighted that 
nowadays the challenge faced by many firms is not only to implement lean within 
headquarters or historical local factories, but also in newer subsidiaries overseas. Therefore, 
I also analyzed studies concerning practice or knowledge transfer (KT). 
Figure 1: Literature review 
 
 
As a second phase, I conducted a deep analysis of studies exploring the role of culture in 
lean implementation. I examined contributions consideridering a wide set of lean practices as 
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well as those focusing on one or more relevant bundles of lean practices, such as Total 
Quality Management (TQM), Just-In-Time (JIT), Human Resource Management (HRM), and 
Total Preventive Maintenance (TPM). In particular, I focused on lean implementation within a 
single manufacturing factory, but I also considered lean knowledge transfer (LKT) projects 
between dyads – i.e., a source and recipient manufacturing units – in MNCs. This second 
phase allowed me to identify gaps in the literature, thus defining the research questions. 
In the following sections I will present the literature review. Section 2.1 focuses on culture in 
operations management, Section 2.2 on practice or knowledge transfer and Section 2.3 on 
lean management. Studies dealing with culture and lean implementation at single- and multi-
factory level will be discussed in Sub-Section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, respectively. 
2.1 Culture in Operations Management 
In order to identify the most significant variables used by operations management scholars to 
study culture, I initially reviewed studies in the Scopus database including “Culture” or 
“Cultural” keywords together with “Operations Management” within “Article Title, Abstract, 
Keywords”. Abstract reading allowed to exclude not pertinent document titles, such as works 
belonging to other streams of research or dealing with culture in a very marginal way. 
Afterwards, partial or full paper reading led to identify the most significant variables regarding 
culture. 
 
A main variable concerns the level of culture. In particular, the majority of the authors 
referred to organizational culture and societal culture values. For what concerns the number 
of levels studied, several scholars focused on organizational culture or societal culture, while 
few considered the interplay between the two levels. Moreover, they dealt with culture 
according to a different degree of detail, i.e., as an overall concept or considering 
complementary sub-dimensions (less and greater detail, respectively). Finally, a different 
number of units were analyzed. In particular, the majority of the authors focus on a singular 
cultural profile, while some compared the cultural profile of two or more units.  
The following paragraphs provide an overview on organizational culture and societal culture.  
The literature on organizational culture is deep-rooted in the field of social sciences. Since 
the early 80's a growing number of scholars has been interested in the topic of culture, and 
this has resulted in a proliferation of organizational studies on the role of culture within 
organizations. As noted by Ginevičius and Vaitkūnaite (2006), empirical and theoretical 
contributions concern three main topics: organizational culture description, organizational 
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culture operationalization (i.e., organizational culture dimensions and scales development), 
and assessment of organizational culture impact on firm performance. 
Several definitions and conceptions of organizational culture have been provided by scholars 
over the years (Detert et al., 2000). Although a widely accepted view is still lacking in the 
literature, several similarities can be found among the different definitions provided (Denison 
et al., 2012). Indeed, Detert et al. (2000, page 851) stated that: “These definitions have  in 
common the view that culture consists of some combination of artifacts (also called practices, 
expressive symbols, or forms), values and beliefs, and underlying assumptions that 
organizational members share about appropriate behavior”.  
A broad number of researchers has considered organizational culture as a measurable 
characteristic of organizations (O’Reilly and Chatman, 1996; Sørensen, 2002). Thus, several 
models have been developed in order to provide an appropriate measure; the ones by 
Schein (1992), Hofstede (1990), O’Reilly et al. (1991), Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983), House 
et al. (2002) are among the most renowned and used. 
Driven by the globalization and increasing relevance of international operations, a growing 
number of researchers have considered the societal culture. Similar to studies on 
organizational culture, it can be observed that empirical and theoretical contributions focused 
on the three main topics: societal culture description, societal culture operationalization (i.e., 
societal culture dimensions and scales development), and assessment of societal culture 
impact on firm performance. 
Considering societal culture description and operationalization, a major debate in the 
literature concerned the issue whether societal culture and organizational culture could be 
considered as similar phenomena, thus operationalizable through the same models and 
dimensions. Hofstede et al.’s (1990) perspective supporting different description and 
operationalization seemed to prevail for a while. In particular, these scholars distinguishes 
between a more superficial level of culture involving practices characterizing organizational 
culture – process vs. result oriented, employee vs. job oriented, parochial vs. professional, 
closed vs. open; loose vs. tight control, and normative vs. pragmatic – and more profound 
values representing societal culture – power distance, individualism vs. collectivism, 
masculinity vs. femininity, uncertainty avoidance, and long- vs. short-term orientation. 
However, more recently researchers of the GLOBE project t empirically demonstrate the 
opposite view, providing a set of nine dimensions that can be used to measure both societal 
culture and organizational culture (House et al., 2002).   
A group of about 150 social scientists and management scholars worldwide have been 
engaged in the GLOBE project (House et al., 2004). One of their main purposes was to 
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develop a measurement model for culture and analyze the impacts of organizational culture 
and societal culture on company performance. Based on an extensive review of the literature 
GLOBE researchers developed a new measurement model of organizational culture, 
comprising nine dimensions: uncertainty avoidance, power distance, societal collectivism, in-
group collectivism, gender egalitarianism, assertiveness, future orientation, performance 
orientation, and humane orientation (House et al., 2004). Beginning with the analysis of 
existing research, the GLOBE researchers proposed and empirically tested a comprehensive 
measurement model of culture including several dimensions, each measured through a 
multi-item scale.  
In recent years, a growing number of operations management scholars have chosen to use 
the GLOBE measurement model to operationalize organizational culture and societal culture, 
thus investigating the impact of societal and organizational culture on company performance 
(e.g., Naor et al., 2010; Kull and Wacker, 2010; Kull et al., 2014). In line with these studies, 
the present thesis referrers to GLOBE cultural dimensions except for gender egalitarianism 
dimension (Table 1). 
Table 1: The culture dimensions considered (organizational level in italics) 
Culture dimensions Definitions 
Power distance The degree to which members of an organization or society expect and agree that 
power should be stratified and concentrated at higher levels of an organization.  
Institutional 
collectivism 
The degree to which organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and 
reward collective distribution of resources and collective action. 
In-group collectivism The degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their 
organizations or families.  
Future orientation The degree to which individuals in organizations or societies engage in future oriented 
behaviors such as planning, investing in the future, and delaying individual or collective 
gratification. 
Performance 
orientation 
The degree to which an organization or society encourages and rewards group 
members for performance improvement and excellence. 
Gender egalitarianism The degree to which an organization or society minimizes gender role differences while 
promoting gender equality. 
Assertiveness The degree to which individuals in organizations or societies are assertive, 
confrontational, and aggressive in social relationships. 
Uncertainty avoidance The extent to which members of an organization or society strive to avoid uncertainty 
by relying on established social norms, rituals, and bureaucratic practices. 
Humane orientation The degree to which individuals in organizations or societies encourage and reward 
individuals for being fair, altruistic, friendly, generous, caring, and kind to others. 
Source: House et al. (2004) 
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Several studies were developed to provide empirical evidence of the relationship between 
culture and performance (e.g., Gordon and DiTomaso, 1992; Lee and Yu, 2004; Naor et al., 
2010; Kull and Wacker, 2010; Prajogo and McDermott, 2011).  
Different kinds of performance were considered (Lim, 1995), such as financial (Peters and 
Waterman, 1982; Kotter and Heskett, 1992) and operational performance (Prajogo and 
McDermott, 2011). However, in the first case, it is generally recognized that results can be 
affected by external factors, and thus it is difficult to distinguish the real contribution of culture 
dimensions to a firm’s success (Prajogo and McDermott, 2011). 
The interplay issue between societal culture and organizational culture has played a leading 
role in the stream of literature exploring cultural-performance relationships (Naor et al., 
2010). The flattening of the world tendency (Friedman, 2006), and the consequent shift of 
competition from local to global borders, has raised its importance. In particular, two 
conflicting theoretical perspectives were advanced by scholars, based on the so-called 
convergence versus divergence hypothesis (Child and Kieser, 1979; Shenkar and Ronen, 
1987), stating the relative dominance of organizational culture and societal culture 
respectively. On the one hand, the convergence hypothesis assumes that firms can alter the 
behavior of their employees, which naturally is a reflection of their societal culture. Proof of 
this assumption, for instance, is the gradual convergence of companies in developing nations 
towards practices and a corporate culture typical of firms in industrialized countries (Ralston 
et al., 1997). On the other hand, the divergence hypothesis considers a company’s efforts to 
vainly alter their employees’ behavior and values. Indeed, the value system intrinsic in 
societal culture, and strongly rooted in individuals, remains unchanged (Ralston et al., 1997). 
As remarked by several scholars (e.g., Boisnier and Chatman, 2002; Liu, 2003; Karahanna 
et al., 2005), the issue concerning the role of different cultural levels has been debated in the 
literature and has yet to be resolved.  
Considering contributions focusing on lean implementation at factory level, some recent 
studies have begun to shed light on this issue (Gerhart, 2008; Naor et al., 2010). In 
summary, Gerhart’s (2008) analysis didn’t support the hypothesized role of societal culture 
as a constraint of organizational culture; whereas Naor et al. (2010) found that organizational 
culture does not completely reflect societal culture differences and that organizational culture 
is more dominant than societal culture or their interaction in predicting operational 
performance. In addition to this, literature provides several examples of how over the years 
some best practices, such as lean, have been effectively applied in manufacturing units 
across the world. For example, after 1980s, Japanese practices such as Just-In-Time and 
Total Quality Management began to be successfully emulated in many other countries 
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(Schroeder and Flynn, 2001) and today, several factories in different nations adopt lean 
successfully (Evans and Lindsay, 2005; Shook, 2010).  
Consistently with these arguments, this thesis focuses on organizational culture when 
dealing with distinctive characteristics of a successful lean factory (Sub-section 2.4.1, 
Chapter 3, and thus Section 6.1). 
2.2 Knowledge transfer 
Review of operations management literature dealing with culture (Section 2.1) allowed to 
identify a group of studies concerning a particular type of practice implementation, in which 
culture can play a crucial role. It concerns the transfer of knowledge between units, such as 
factories of a MNC, firms in a supply chain or in a supply network, etc.. Feedbacks from 
consultants and managers on the field confirmed that nowadays this phenomenon is 
particularly relevant for lean firms with factories located in different countries; thus, I decided 
to deepen knowledge transfer topic. 
I used Scopus database focusing on contributions involving "Knowledge Transfer" and its 
variants (e.g., “Practice Transfer”, etc.) within “Article Title, Abstract, Keywords”. Besides 
supporting the exclusion of not pertinent document titles, abstract and partial paper reading 
allowed to clearly distinguish different types of knowledge transfer, such as knowledge 
transfer between different firms in a supply chain or firms related by an alliance, etc.. This 
thesis concerns lean implementation within firms, thus I focuses on internal knowledge 
transfer, i.e., transfer of knowledge within units of a MNC. In particular, I analyzed the 
transfer of best practices between dispersed manufacturing factories of the same firm which, 
as mentioned before, turned out to be a main challenge for practitioners in general, and for 
lean MNCs in particular. Partial or full paper reading led to identify the most significant 
variables regarding knowledge transfer topic. 
 
Literature in organization and management studies is rich of contributions on how learning 
takes place in organisations. A central stream of learning theories traditionally focused on 
knowledge and practice transfer among units within a single factory; more recently, driven by 
a growing attention of literature to inter-firm dynamics (see for example the great 
development of contributions in supply chain management field), many authors have devoted 
their studies to deeply analyze knowledge and practice transfer in interorganizational network 
(i.e., groups of distinct organizations, one from each other). Levering on both bodies of 
research, some scholars have then used previous results to provide a greater understanding 
of learning processes in the specific case of MNCs.  
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As defined by Argote and Ingram (2000; p. 161), “Knowledge transfer in organizations is the 
process through which one unit (e.g., group, department, or division) is affected by the 
experience of another.” As indicated by this definition and explained by Szulanski (1996), 
internal knowledge transfer is a process that occurs at dyadic level between a source and a 
recipient units of a firm. In case of MNCs, a major role is played by inter-unit transfers such 
as ones between subsidiaries or dyads involving a parent group and a subsidiary factory, 
which often take place internationally (Kostova, 1999; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; 
Maritan and Brush, 2003; Jensen and Szulanski, 2004). Internal knowledge transfer refers to 
the exact or partial replication of organizational best practices that are performed in a 
superior way in a part of the firm (Szulanski, 1996; Kostova, 1999; Gupta and Govindarajan, 
2000), and manifests itself through changes in the knowledge and performance of the 
recipient units (Argote and Ingram, 2000). 
The transfer of organizational best practices between manufacturing units is a fundamental 
way in which MNCs leverage knowledge to seek competitive advantage (Jensen and 
Szulanski, 2004). However, studies on knowledge transfer have also indicated that such 
projects are often very difficult (Szulanski, 1996), with frequent incidence of transfer failure 
(Galbraith, 1990; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). Therefore, a number of scholars have 
focused on analyzing factors that can influence the difficulty of transfer and transfer project 
effectiveness, thus precluding the achievement of competitive advantage through reusing 
organizational best practices in multiple locations.  
First of all, these works show that transfer difficulties are related with the characteristics of 
the content that is being replicated. Some authors have distinguished between tacit vs. 
explicit dimensions of knowledge (e.g., Ferdows, 2006), others for example between hard or 
technical vs. soft or social dimensions (e.g., Winter, 1990; Yu and Zaheer, 2010). They 
shown that while explicit or hard knowledge is easier to codify and can be diffuse by means 
of documents and manuals, tacit or soft knowledge concerns know-how and know-way that 
is more difficult to codify and hard to convey without high interaction between the parties 
(Kogut and Zander, 1993; Mohr and Sengupta, 2002).  
From the literature it is also clear that certain contextual factors can act as facilitators or 
barriers to knowledge transfer, thus influencing the effectiveness of transfer projects. A first 
classification of contextual factors consider societal versus organizational levels. 
Societal level factors are particularly important in case of knowledge transfer within MNCs, 
since units are often located in different nations, characterized by specific peculiarities. 
Several scholars referred to societal culture values of recipient factories, providing evidence 
of their effects on the effectiveness of knowledge transfer. Kostova (1999) observed that 
while some countries constitute more favorable environments for the transfer of certain 
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practices, others introduce a number of criticalities and challenges (Kostova, 1999). 
Researchers studied culture considering not only the peculiarities of a recipient unit (i.e., in 
absolute terms), but also the characteristics of a recipient unit respect to ones of the source 
unit (i.e., in relative terms). In particular, the presence of a high cultural difference between 
source and recipient units, which typically characterized knowledge transfer between 
oversees factories, can be particularly challenging (e.g., Kostova, 1999; Jensen and 
Szulanski, 2004).  
Moreover, authors shown that also some organizational level factors can contribute to create 
a barren or a fertile context for internal knowledge transfer. In particular, organizational 
culture values promoting communication between the parties as well as a cultural orientation 
toward learning, innovation, and change can generally be favorable for practice transfer 
(Kostova, 1999; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). Furthermore, organizational culture values 
promoting cooperative relations among units in combination with commitment to, identity 
with, and trust in the parent company are likely to facilitate knowledge transfer (Kostova, 
1999); while arduous (i.e. laborious and distant) relationships are likely to create additional 
hardship in the transfer (Szulanski, 1996). Hofstede (1994) stressed the relevance of 
creating common organizational culture values units within MNCs since they are what keeps 
multi-factory firms together. 
For what concerns recipient, lack of absorptive capacity, i.e. “ability to recognize the value of 
new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, 
p. 128), is commonly referred as a characteristic that might hinder the transfer of knowledge. 
For example, Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) provide evidence of its negative impact on 
knowledge inflows to foreign subsidiaries, considering data from 374 subsidiaries within 75 
MNCs headquartered in the U.S., Europe, and Japan. Absorptive capacity is largely a 
function of pre-existing stock of knowledge of an organization; it acts as a filter through which 
more relevant information are distinguished from less important one, thus determining the 
organization’s ability to internalize and assimilate more valued signals (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). 
As suggested by Szulanski (1996), the expertise of a source unit is a major factor influencing 
knowledge transfer difficulty. For example, when a source is not recognized as 
knowledgeable, its attempts to transfer practices are likely to be resisted (Walton, 1975). 
Conversely, a skilled source that has experienced a successful implementation of a specific 
set of practices can effectively support their application in other factories (Maritan and Brush, 
2003). 
In other to overcome transfer problems, some authors recommended to strongly adapt the 
source’s practices and solutions (e.g., Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1988; 
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Kostova, 1999). According to Ansari et al. (2010), in fact adaptation allows to create a better 
fit between transferred practices and the recipient’s particular needs, thus increasing their 
acceptance. In a similar way, Lozeau et al. (2002) suggested that the shape of the change 
should socially reconstructed with recipient’s employees, even though this process inevitably 
create hybrid solutions and modification of the source’s practices. However, this transfer 
approach is not supported all scholars; in fact, there are researchers who, on the contrary, 
suggested to adapt with care (Zaheer, 1995; Jensen and Szulanski, 2004). According to 
Jensen and Szulanski (2004), in fact adaptation significantly increases the difficulty of cross-
border knowledge transfer. In addition, Zaheer (1995) suggested to follow the source’s 
original template rather than embark on full adaptation, since the first approach is a more 
risk-free way to proceed. Literature is still characterized by a considerable debate on the 
most suitable level of adaptation. 
Consistently with previous arguments, this thesis considers both organizational culture and 
societal culture values when dealing with transferability of successful lean systems across 
dispersed manufacturing factories within MNCs (Sub-section 2.4.2, Chapter 4 and 5, and 
thus Section 6.2). Since the level of knowledge of the parties can also affect the 
effectiveness of transfer projects, we control for such characteristics when selecting source 
and recipients units (see Sub-section 4.1.1 and 5.1.1). 
2.3 Lean management 
Lean management descended from Toyota Production System (TPS). TPS was developed 
by the Japanese automotive firm Toyota as alternative to the capital-intensive mass 
production systems used in the U.S., on the basis of experiments and initiatives occurred 
over a period of three decades under the supervision of Taiichi Ohno (Shah and Ward, 2007; 
Herron and Hicks, 2008). As a result of lean implementation, Toyota achieved significant 
benefits such as important reductions in inventory and lead-times, improvements in delivery 
performance and in space and resource utilization, and enhanced productivity and quality 
(Pavnaskar et al., 2003). 
In 1984 General Motors established a joint venture with Toyota – also known as NUMMI – to 
learn about such new managerial approach, thus replicating improvements in operational 
performance (Shook, 2010).  
In 1990 Womack et al. wrote the book of “The Machine That Changed the World”. This work 
introduced the term “lean production” and provided a first detailed description of a lean 
system (Shah and Ward, 2007). Moreover, it played a key role in disseminating such 
methodology outside the Japan (Holweg, 2007). Indeed, starting from its publication a 
20 
 
growing number of firms worldwide have started lean projects. In addition, during mid 1990s 
numerous academic contributions also focused on this topic. 
During the past two decades, several firms in various industries and located in different 
countries have successfully implemented lean management. Given the benefits obtained by 
the headquarters and other local and historical factories, a growing number of MNCs have 
then transferred lean practices to foreign subsidiaries seeking similar advantages. Beside 
Toyota, Mercedes, Caterpillar, John Deere, Scania, Bosch, Du Pont, Jotun, Hydro, Siemens, 
Ecco, Whirlpool, Swedwood, Lego and Volvo are few recent examples (Netland and 
Aspelund, 2013).  
2.3.1 Lean management: description and operationalization 
Lean management was studied according to two main perspectives, which are strictly related 
each other. As stated by Womack and Jones (1996), lean is a philosophy that follows five 
principles – value, value stream, flow, pull, and perfection – to eliminate every source of 
waste from the production processes. Using a more concrete perspective, Shah and Ward 
(2007) translated such philosophy and defined lean as an integrated socio-technical system 
of practices which allows to reduce internal and external process variability. 
Flynn et al. (1995), Cua et al. (2001), Shah and Ward (2003), and Shah and Ward (2007) are 
among the most relevant and complete works in the lean literature which provide an 
operationalization of lean management. They identified the relevant bundles of practices that 
compose a lean system. Just-In-Time, Total Quality Management, Human Resource 
Management, and Total Preventive Maintenance are commonly considered important 
bundles, but also supplier relationships, management support, manufacturing and continuous 
improvement strategies are recognized as crucial factors in lean implementation. Another 
interesting classification is the distinction between hard and soft practices (Samson and 
Terziovski, 1999; Rahman and Bullock, 2005; Fotopoulos and Psomas, 2009).  
Table 2 summarizes the lean practices usually considered in lean contributions and how they 
can be classified into hard and soft according to the literature. Even though it is impossible to 
find a perfect correspondence across all the contributions on the hard and soft practices 
considered, scholars applied a similar criterion in defining the characteristics and differences 
of these two bundles. In line with previous contributions, we argue that the technical and 
analytical tools which aim to improve production systems represent the hard practices (e.g., 
process control or kanban) while the practices that are related to principles, managerial 
concepts, people, relations, and strategy are soft (e.g., continuous improvement, top 
management leadership, customer and supplier involvement). Some lean practices, such as 
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autonomous maintenance and cleanliness and organization, were not classified by previous 
studies as hard or soft practices. According to the definitions above, in this study, they will be 
considered hard practices. 
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Table 2: The culture dimensions considered (organizational level in italics) 
Practice Lean literature Literature on hard/soft practices 
Hard/Soft 
lean practice 
Setup time reduction 
Flynn et al. (1995); Cua et al. (2001); McKone et al. (2001); Shah and Ward (2003); 
Shah and Ward (2007); Mackelprang and Nair (2010); Matsui (2007) 
Rahman and Bullock (2005) Hard lean practice 
Just-In-Time delivery 
by suppliers 
Cua et al. (2001); McKone et al. (2001); Shah and Ward (2007); Mackelprang and 
Nair (2010); Matsui (2007) 
Rahman and Bullock (2005) Hard lean practice 
Daily schedule 
adherence 
Flynn et al. (1995); McKone et al. (2001); Cua et al. (2001); Matsui (2007) Rahman and Bullock (2005) Hard lean practice 
Equipment layout  
Cua et al. (2001); McKone et al. (2001); Shah and Ward (2003); Shah and Ward 
(2007); Mackelprang and Nair (2010); Matsui (2007) 
Rahman and Bullock (2005) Hard lean practice 
Kanban 
Flynn et al. (1995); Cua et al. (2001); McKone et al. (2001); Shah and Ward (2003); 
Shah and Ward (2007); Mackelprang and Nair (2010); Matsui (2007) 
Rahman and Bullock (2005) Hard lean practice 
Process control 
Flynn et al. (1995); Cua et al. (2001); McKone et al. (2001); Shah and Ward (2003); 
Shah and Ward (2007); Matsui (2007) 
Samson and Terziovski (1999); Rahman and Bullock (2005); 
Taylor and Wright (2006); Fotopoulos and Psomas (2009) 
Hard lean practice 
Autonomous 
maintenance 
Cua et al. (2001); McKone et al., 2001; Shah and Ward (2003); Shah and Ward 
(2007); Mackelprang and Nair (2010) ; Matsui (2007); Matsui (2007) 
- Hard lean practice 
Cleanliness and 
organization 
Snell and Dean (1992); Flynn et al. (1995); Challis et al. (2005); Mackelprang and 
Nair (2010); Matsui (2007) 
- Hard lean practice 
Small group problem 
solving 
Snell and Dean (1992); Flynn et al. (1995); Challis et al. (2005); Shah and Ward 
(2007); Matsui (2007) 
Samson and Terziovski (1999); Lagrosen and Lagrosen (2005); 
Prajogo and McDermott (2005); Rahman and Bullock (2005); 
Taylor and Wright (2006); Fotopoulos and Psomas (2009) 
Soft lean practice 
Training employees 
Snell and Dean (1992); Flynn et al. (1995); Cua et al. (2001); McKone et al. (2001); 
Shah and Ward (2003); Shah and Ward (2007); Matsui (2007) 
Samson and Terziovski (1999); Lagrosen and Lagrosen (2005); 
Prajogo and McDermott (2005); Rahman and Bullock (2005); 
Taylor and Wright (2006); Fotopoulos and Psomas (2009) 
Soft lean practice 
Top management 
leadership for quality 
Flynn et al. (1995); Cua et al. (2001); McKone et al. (2001); Matsui (2007) 
Samson and Terziovski (1999); Lagrosen and Lagrosen (2005); 
Prajogo and McDermott (2005); Taylor and Wright (2006); 
Fotopoulos and Psomas (2009) 
Soft lean practice 
Supplier partnership 
Flynn et al. (1995); Cua et al. (2001); McKone et al. (2001); Shah and Ward (2007); 
Matsui (2007) 
Rahman and Bullock (2005); Fotopoulos and Psomas (2009) Soft lean practice 
Customer involvement 
Flynn et al. (1995); Cua et al. (2001); McKone et al. (2001); Shah and Ward (2007); 
Matsui (2007) 
Samson and Terziovski (1999); Prajogo and McDermott (2005); 
Rahman and Bullock (2005); Taylor and Wright (2006); 
Fotopoulos and Psomas (2009) 
Soft lean practice 
Continuous 
Improvement 
Hayes and Wheelwright (1988); Ahire and Dreyfus (2000); Shah and Ward (2003); 
Shah and Ward (2007); Matsui (2007) 
Samson and Terziovski (1999); Lagrosen and Lagrosen (2005); 
Fotopoulos and Psomas (2009) 
Soft lean practice 
Manufacturing-
business strategy 
linkage 
Flynn et al. (1995); Ahire and Dreyfus (2000); Cua et al. (2001); McKone et al. 
(2001); Shah and Ward (2003); Swink et al. (2005); Shah and Ward (2007); Matsui 
(2007) 
Samson and Terziovski (1999); Lagrosen and Lagrosen (2005); 
Prajogo and McDermott (2005); Rahman and Bullock (2005); 
Fotopoulos and Psomas (2009) 
Soft lean practice 
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2.3.2 Lean management impact on factory performance 
The vast majority of the empirical works support the overall positive impact of lean on a firm’s 
operational performance. The main benefits consist in a reduction of process variability, 
scraps and rework time, which in turn, reduce production costs and lead times, and increase 
process flexibility and quality conformance. 
Cua et al. (2001) stressed the importance of the simultaneous use of Just-In-Time, Total 
Quality Management and Total Preventive Maintenance when implementing lean. Moreover, 
Total Preventive Maintenance tools, together with 5S practices (or cleanliness of the 
organization), play a strategic role not only in directly gaining a better performance, but also 
in preparing the right environment for an efficient adoption of Just-In-Time and Total Quality 
Management techniques (McKone et al., 2001; Mackelprang and Nair, 2010). The 
importance of these so-called hard practices is highlighted also in Taylor and Wright’s (2006) 
study. As a matter of fact, the authors empirically proved that the hard part of the Total 
Quality Management methodology is a strong predictor of manufacturing performance 
improvements. Nevertheless, the efficacy of the hard practices is magnified especially when 
they are coherently accompanied by intangible and soft practices, linked to Human Resource 
Management (Matsui, 2007), management leadership and support (Danny Samson and 
Terziovski, 1999; Matsui, 2007), customer and supplier involvement (Rahman and Bullock, 
2005; Matsui, 2007) and manufacturing strategy (Lagrosen and Lagrosen, 2005; Matsui, 
2007). The effectiveness of the joint implementation of hard and soft lean practices was also 
proved by the results of Shah and Ward’s (2003; 2007) contributions, where the authors 
depicted lean success as the result of a complex system of interrelated socio-technical 
practices. 
However, in the literature there are also some examples of lean failures. The lack of 
significant performance gains is typically imputed to the complexity of lean implementation 
due to possible negative synergies between Just-In-Time tools and techniques (Mackelprang 
and Nair, 2010), the implementation of Just-In-Time without adequate consideration for other 
OM practices and a coherent long-term manufacturing strategy (Matsui, 2007; Agarwal et al., 
2013) or difficulties in adapting Just-In-Time to particular contexts (e.g., non repetitive-
contexts, Lander and Liker, 2007). 
Anyhow, Just-In-Time cannot not be viewed as the one and only source of lean failure. In 
particular, there is evidence pointing to organizational culture as a key determinant of lean 
success or failure (Prajogo and McDermott, 2005). In fact, lean is a complex transformation 
which involves employees and managers operating at different levels and often radically 
changes their way of working. The organizational culture can favor or hinder this change 
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(Lee et al., 2013). Therefore, Sub-section 2.3.1 focuses on the role of organizational culture 
in lean implementation. 
2.4 Culture and lean management 
The second phase of the literature review concerned a deep analysis of studies exploring the 
role of culture in lean implementation. I examined contributions consideridering a wide set of 
lean practices as well as those focusing on one or more relevant bundles of lean practices, 
such as Total Quality Management, Just-In-Time, Human Resource Management, and Total 
Preventive Maintenance. Sub-section 2.4.1 focuses on contribution on lean implementation 
within a single manufacturing factory. Section 2.4.2 considers studies on lean knowledge 
transfer projects between dyads in MNCs.  
2.4.1 Lean implementation within a manufacturing unit: the role of organizational 
culture 
Starting from the nineties to the present day, scholars and managers has intensely studied 
Toyota’s approach to manufacturing in order to understand its success in obtaining superior 
operational performance. Seeking to achieve similar benefits, many firms worldwide have 
attempted to transform their production system and replicate TPS implementing tools and 
techniques such as Just-In-Time (Liker, 2004). However, as explained in Section 2.3.2, most 
of these lean projects resulted in poor performance improvements or even failed to realize 
any benefits. According to leading scholars of lean, a main cause of these failures is 
companies’ fairly superficial approach in adopting lean, i.e. focus on more evident elements 
of the TPS, such as hard practices, and little attention paid to deeper aspects related to this 
system, such as soft practices and especially to organizational culture (Liker, 2004;Liker and 
Rother, 2011). By contrast, the “Toyota Way” has succeeded in gaining operational 
excellence and superior performance thanks to continuous investments on people and the 
establishment of an organizational culture consistent to Toyota’s principles and practices 
(Liker, 2004).  
Due to the critical role of organizational culture in lean adoption, there have been a number 
of attempts by scholars to formalize behaviors and values characterizing the “ideal culture” 
for lean, i.e., an organizational culture consistent with lean practices and principles and 
conducive to superior performance. In particular, some scholars focused their study on TPS, 
since they recognized the superior performance achieved by Toyota compared to other 
companies that adopt lean trying to merely replicate tools and practices. For example, Spear 
25 
 
(1999) codified “the DNA of TPS” as five “Rules-in-Use”, i.e. principles that guide the design, 
operation, and improvement of all activity, connection, and pathway for every product and 
service in Toyota (Spear and Bowen, 1999). More recently, Liker (2004) described the 
“Toyota way” according to 14 principles on which Toyota based its organizational culture, 
while Rother (2009) carried out a detailed analysis of the two more relevant Toyota’s 
organizational routines, i.e. patterns of thinking and behavior also called “kata”. Although 
these contributions provided some relevant hints on behaviors and values consistent with 
lean, such as promotion of continuous improvement and long-term decision making, they 
focused on TPS and didn’t formalize the organizational culture according to well-establish 
models in the organizational culture literature.  
On the other hand, some contributions tested the relationships between organizational 
culture, lean practices, and performance examining a specific or a narrow sub-group of 
practices (e.g., time-base manufacturing practices, Human Resource Management, and 
Total Quality Management). Nahm et al. (2004) investigated time-base manufacturing 
practices – i.e., reengineering set-ups, cellular manufacturing, quality improvement efforts, 
preventive maintenance and pull production – and their relationships with organizational 
culture as defined by Schein (1992). Patel and Cardon (2010) proved that the interaction 
between organizational culture and Human Resource Management practices leads to an 
improvement in labor productivity.  
To date, the majority of the contributions and the most advanced results concern the Total 
Quality Management bundle (Bright and Cooper, 1993; Watson and Korukonda, 1995; Tata 
and Prasad, 1998; Detert et al., 2000; Naor et al., 2008). In particular, several authors tried to 
identify the “ideal culture” for Total Quality Management implementation (Tata and Prasad, 
1998; Detert et al., 2000).  
Few studies explicitly analyzed the role of organizational culture as an antecedent of Total 
Quality Management practices. For instance, using two alternative models of fit (i.e., 
mediation and moderation), Naor et al. (2008) investigated the relationships between the 
cultural dimensions developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983), quality management 
practices and manufacturing performance – i.e., cost, quality, delivery and flexibility. Lately 
Baird et al. (2011) confirmed the direct impact of some organizational culture dimensions – 
i.e., teamwork, respect for people, outcome orientation and innovation – as identified by 
O’Reilly et al. (1991) on the level of Total Quality Management implementation. This in turn 
affects quality and inventory performance. 
Other authors highlighted that the relationship between organizational culture and Total 
Quality Management is not straightforward because they can interact and influence each 
other in a recursive way. For instance, Prajogo and McDermott (2005) explored the 
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relationship between Total Quality Management practices – i.e., the Malcolm Baldrige 
National Quality Award operationalization developed by Samson and Terziovski, 1999 – and 
Denison and Spreitzer’s (1991) dimensions of organizational culture. The results, based on a 
survey including 194 Australian organizations, confirm that organizational culture is an 
antecedent of Total Quality Management practices. However, the authors also suggested an 
additional recursive impact of Total Quality Management on culture.  
Although contributions in this second stream of research provide additional, relevant hints on 
the relations between organizational culture, lean practices and performance, they are limited 
by non-consideration of a complete set of hard and soft lean bundles. 
Therefore, from the above discussion I concluded that: 
 Previous studies considering the relation between organizational culture, lean, and 
performance converge on the existence of a certain fit between organizational culture 
and lean practices that can determine a firm’s superior performance. This means that 
companies which successfully implement lean should reveal a certain organizational 
culture profile, because a certain fit between organizational culture and lean can 
determine the best conditions for significant performance improvements; 
 Some authors provide evidence supporting that the relationship between 
organizational culture and lean practices is not straightforward because they can 
interact and influence each other in a recursive way; 
 Previous research examining the relation between organizational culture, lean, and 
performance is fragmented and there lacks a holistic framework – i.e., a model based 
on well-establish dimensions of culture, a wide set of both soft and hard lean 
practices and most important operational performance. 
According to discussion above, the first main aim of this thesis is to investigate whether the 
successful implementation of lean is related to a certain organizational culture profile and to 
the adoption of soft lean practices. 
The following first set of research questions was defined: 
RQ1 Do successful lean manufacturing units show a peculiar organizational culture? 
 RQ1a What is the ideal organizational culture profile for lean? 
 RQ1b Do successful lean factories adopt soft lean practices more extensively 
compared to unsuccessful lean factories? 
A survey methodology is employed to explore this topic. Levering on a holistic model on 
relations between lean practices, organizational culture, and performance, in Section 3.1 I 
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will develop two hypotheses considering the distinctive characteristics of successful lean 
factories. Moreover, Section 3.2 provides methodological insights and Section 3.3 
summarizes the findings, which will be discussed in Section 6.1. 
2.4.2 Lean knowledge transfer in MNCs:  the role of culture 
During the past two decades a growing number of manufacturing firms have been engaged 
in developing lean factories in foreign countries. Toyota itself has faced the challenge of 
transferring lean knowledge to non-Japanese manufacturing units since the mid-eighties, 
when it established the joint venture with the American General Motors (see also Section 
2.3). As these cases demonstrated, implementing lean in environments different from the 
parent’s one is particularly difficult and requires that managers cope with the heterogeneity 
between contexts, in addition to traditional issues characterizing lean adoption within a single 
factory. This is one of the main reasons why lean knowledge transfer deserves a specific 
investigation.  
This thesis focuses on internal lean implementation; accordingly, it considers lean knowledge 
transfer projects between dispersed factories belonging to the same organization. Unlike 
lean implementation within a single unit, the analysis of lean knowledge transfer projects in 
MNCs has received little attention from scholars. In general, as revealed by Netland and 
Aspelund’s (2014) systematic literature review on lean knowledge transfer, a number of 
topics have been insufficiently addressed and need future research attention. As studies in 
the broader field of knowledge and practice transfer within MNCs underline, and specific 
works on lean knowledge transfer confirm (e.g., Lee and Jo, 2007; Maritan and Brush, 2003), 
it is important to fill this gap because knowledge transfer can be a source of competitive 
advantage but is a challenging process. 
A major contribution on lean knowledge transfer is Maritan and Brush’s (2003) empirical 
study on lean adoption in multiple manufacturing units of a large diversified US-based MNC. 
Drawing on the process view suggested by Szulanski (2000), the authors empirically 
investigated whether and how (i) peculiarities of lean knowledge and (ii) characteristics of the 
parties and their relations – overall referred to as heterogeneity – affect lean knowledge 
transfer projects.  
First of all, their findings confirm the relevance of devoting specific research to lean 
knowledge transfer. Indeed, the study underlines how lean transfer projects are particularly 
difficult due to the high level of complexity and the broad scope of the knowledge that must 
be transferred. Second, basing on Szulanski’s seminal works (1996; 2000) and evidences 
from four case studies, an ideal process model unveiling critical phases and activities in lean 
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transfer projects was empirically developed. Third, the use of a process view allowed to 
recognize that not only initial starting conditions (i.e., characteristics of the parties and their 
relations at the beginning of the transfer project) matter. Indeed, also heterogeneity created 
during the process, such as change of the source characteristics due to decision of 
transferring knowledge from a different unit, can affect results of transfer programmes and 
cause problems which manifest, for example, in delays in scheduled activities, regressions to 
an earlier stage of the transfer process, or difficulty in obtaining target performance.  
Although Maritan and Brush’s (2003) study provided insightful findings, it does not 
considered the impact of societal level factors, having the authors considered all factories 
located in the same country of the headquarters. However, societal factors such as societal 
culture are recognized to be among the major issues of knowledge transfer projects in MNCs 
(Kostova, 1999). Moreover, even though this contribution represents an important framework 
for guiding lean knowledge transfer across MNCs’ units, Maritan and Brush’s description 
stays on an abstract level and provides little indications on how to fulfill each activity.  
Consistent with Maritan and Brush (2003), other scholars observed that organizational level 
factors – e.g., firm’s strategy, organizational culture values – can contribute to create a 
barren or a fertile context for lean knowledge transfer projects (e.g., Kerrin, 1999; Colotla et 
al., 2003; Lee and Jo, 2007; Browning and Heath, 2009). Although considered only by few 
studies on lean knowledge transfer, among the various factors, organizational culture values 
it is likely to affect lean transfer project success. Indeed, considering the broader literature on 
internal lean implementation, it is possible to note that organizational culture values are 
indicated by several scholars as crucial for effective lean implementation (see Sub-section 
2.3.1 and, for example, Liker, 2004; Liker and Rother, 2011). In addition, more general 
studies on knowledge transfer in MNCs stressed the relevance of creating common 
organizational culture values units within MNCs – e.g., values promoting communication, 
cultural orientation toward learning, innovation, and change, trust in the parent – for keeping 
multi-factory firms together (e.g., Kostova, 1999; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Hofstede, 
1994; see Sub-section 2.1.1).  
For what concerns socio-cultural peculiarities, the broader field of international studies 
indicates factors such as attitudes toward managers, perceptions of authority, inter-
organizational cooperation, attitudes toward achievement and work, class structure and 
individual mobility, attitudes toward wealth and material gain, attitudes toward scientific 
management, attitudes toward risk, societal ideology, beliefs about foreigners, and the nature 
and extent of nationalism, as major sources of variability in practice implementation across 
countries (Oliff et al., 1989). Accordingly, several authors claimed the necessity of defining 
human resource development and management policies according to socio-cultural 
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characteristics of firm’s environment (Hofstede, 1980; Tata and Prasad, 1998). Previous 
studies on lean (e.g., Maheshwari and Zhao, 1994; Zhao et al., 1995; Kull et al., 2014) 
showed that country’s socio-cultural characteristics can also affect the way lean is 
implemented by a factory and the success of its lean journey. Similarly, some studies on lean 
knowledge transfer provide evidence of the influence of societal level factors in general, and 
societal culture in particular, on transfer projects (e.g., Wallace, 2004; Jun et al., 2006).  
Although the majority of the studies have focused on the impact of cultural characteristics of 
the recipient unit, peculiarities of a source unit can also influence a knowledge transfer 
project and its overall success. Szulanski (1996) explained that source’s characteristics can 
affect especially the early stages of a transfer project, since the knowledge owner entity has 
a major role in conducting the initiative. In particular, the source’s organizational culture is 
likely to affect choices in planning and implementation activities in knowledge transfers as 
well as external managers’ behaviors in foreign site. Indeed, as pointed out by Koufteros et 
al. (2007) considering the broader relevant literature on culture, organizational culture is a 
coping mechanism used by organizational members to deal with problems, has far reaching 
impact on decisions, and, more generally, shapes employees behaviors. 
Overall, previous studies provide empirical evidence on criticalities faced by firms when 
transferring lean abroad. In addition, scholars give some indications on how overcoming a 
number of criticalities (e.g., Aoki, 2008). With regard to countermeasures, as in case of more 
general literature on knowledge transfer (Section 2.2), level of adaptation is a main issue 
discussed by researchers. On the one hand, some scholars support strong adaptation (e.g., 
Wallace, 2004; Lee and Jo, 2007). On the contrary, others consider faithful replication of the 
original knowledge and solutions of the source a more effective approach (e.g., Ferdows, 
2006). As a consequence, literature is still lacking to conclude which level of adaptation is 
most suitable in case of lean transfer projects. 
Therefore, from the above discussion I concluded that: 
 Although in the last two decades many firms have launched initiatives to transfer lean 
to overseas subsidiaries, literature exploring lean knowledge transfer between 
factories of MNCs is scarce, and in particular needs further contribution to better 
analyze the role of culture in lean knowledge transfer projects; 
 Previous studies show that cultural characteristics of a recipient unit, in terms of both 
the extent of source-recipient difference and the presence of  recipient’s distinctive 
features, can affect lean knowledge transfer, for example determining problems in 
lean practice implementation;  
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 Previous studies show that characteristic of the source unit can also influence 
knowledge transfer within MNCs. Therefore, in order to develop a deeper 
understanding of the impact of culture on lean knowledge transfer projects, it is 
important to study such projects from a broad perspective which simultaneously 
considers cultural characteristics of the recipient as well as of the source unit; 
 Although the majority of previous studies explored the influence of contextual factors 
on lean knowledge transfer in a general way, a process view, which distinguishes 
between the different phases of a transfer project, is indicated as more appropriate to 
provide a deep understanding of such relation (Szulanski, 2000; Maritan and Brush, 
2003). A detailed analysis of the impact of culture on lean knowledge transfer is still 
lacking; thus, in order to develop a deeper understanding, it is important to distinguish 
the impact of culture on the different phases of the lean knowledge transfer process; 
 Previous studies discussing problems in lean knowledge transfer failed to relate 
problems to culture conditions of different contexts, although it is recognized that 
culture can hinder lean knowledge transfer; 
 In the literature there is a debate on the most effective approach to transfer lean 
knowledge; although cultural characteristics of source and recipient are recognized to 
affect lean knowledge transfer, previous studies failed to relate level of adaptation to 
cultural peculiarities of a dyad. 
This thesis intends to provide a twofold contribution to the research stream on lean 
knowledge transfer within MNCs: 
A) Providing a deep examination of the impact of cultural differences between an Italian 
MNC and its Chinese subsidiary on lean knowledge transfer process and 
effectiveness of different transfer approaches;  
B) Explaining how effectively managing lean knowledge across a number of lean 
knowledge owners and recipients in MNCs. 
Along with these points, problems in transferring lean knowledge across factories in different 
countries and countermeasures adopted by MNCs to cope with such problems will be 
considered. 
According to these aims, two sets of research questions were defined.  
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RQ2 How do cultural differences between an Italian unit (lean source in a MNC) and a 
Chinese subsidiary (non-lean recipient) influence the transfer of lean management?  
 RQ2a How do cultural differences influence the effectiveness of lean knowledge 
transfer approach? Why do different lean knowledge transfer approaches 
lead to different outcomes? 
 RQ2b How should an Italian factory adapt its lean system to fit peculiarities of a 
Chinese subsidiary? 
An in-depth case study is conducted to fulfill the first purpose. Chapter 4 describes the 
methodology used, provides a description of the case, and summarized key lessons learned, 
while Section 6.2 discusses the findings.  
 
RQ3 How can MNCs handle factories’ cultural differences in cross-border lean knowledge 
transfer projects? 
 RQ3a How do cultural contexts of the source and recipient influence cross-border 
lean knowledge transfer projects within MNCs? 
 RQ3b What are the main variables differentiating cross-border lean knowledge 
transfer projects within MNCs? 
A multiple case study methodology is employed to fulfill the second aim. Chapter 5 describes 
the methodology used and provides the analysis, while Section 6.2 discusses the findings.  
Framework 
Drawing on both lean literature and the field of knowledge transfer, I developed two 
frameworks to guide my empirical research on lean knowledge transfer projects within 
MNCs. Framework A (Figure 2) was defined to guide the longitudinal study of the lean 
knowledge transfer process between the Italian source and Chinese subsidiary. Consistent 
with Maritan and Brush’s (2003) study on the impact of heterogeneity on a lean knowledge 
transfer (LKT) process, Framework A relates cultural heterogeneity between the source’s 
and the recipient’s contexts to the way in which the various phases in the transfer process 
are managed (e.g., the roles of source’s and recipient’s management and adaptations 
needed to make effective the headquarters’ lean system), and success of the project (i.e., 
institutionalization of lean practices, Kostova ,1999). 
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Figure 2: Framework A 
 
 
Framework B (Figure 3) was defined to guide the study of different cross-border lean 
knowledge transfer projects of different MNCs. As schematized, this work considers not only 
the cultural characteristic of a recipient’s context (i.e., societal culture peculiarities and extent 
of difference from the source), but also the characteristic of a recipient’s context (i.e., 
organizational culture values), and their impact on a lean knowledge transfer project (i.e., 
problems encountered by the source in a transfer project, and level of adaptation between 
planned actions and effective solutions and countermeasures put into practice). 
Figure 3: Framework B 
 
 
Similar to some previous studies (Browning and Heath, 2009; Mollenkopf et al., 2011), these 
frameworks are not intended to be “proven” as in case of hypothesis testing, but rather to 
provide the necessary focus to research while I started field work (Stuart et al., 2002; Yin, 
2003). 
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3. Lean implementation in a manufacturing unit: the role of 
organizational culture and soft lean practices 
3.1 Research hypotheses 
The review of the literature on organizational culture and lean proves the important role of 
organizational culture in determining an effective lean implementation. In particular, 
managerial belief encouraging intra-firm and inter-firm collective actions as teamwork and 
integration, typical of organizational culture characterized by high-level institutional 
collectivism, was proved to be necessary to obtain an higher performance when applying 
such lean practices as time-based practices (e.g., Nahm et al., 2004), Human Resource 
Management (e.g., Patel and Cardon, 2010; Lee et al., 2013), and Total Quality 
Management (e.g., Baird et al., 2011). In addition, Karlsson and Åhlström (1996) observed 
that in several cases lean requires that suggestions for process improvements and changes 
come from the shop floor employees and middle managers who directly experience problems 
on the production lines. Accordingly, firms that strive to effectively implement lean are usually 
characterized by a lower power distance. Similarly, Lee et al. (2013) argued that the 
attributes that positively link team working and operational performance are organizational 
support, the extensive use of teams for problem solving, a performance orientation and a 
collaborative climate, whereas coercive influence and adaptation difficulty of the workers 
represent negative attributes. Thus, high-level institutional collectivism and human 
orientation, together with low assertiveness seem to be necessary ingredients in order to 
create an organizational climate that fosters collaboration and employee involvement in 
decision making.  
On the basis of an extensive literature review, Detert et al. (2000) proposed that the ideal 
organizational culture for firms involved in Total Quality Management programs should be 
characterized by a long-term orientation and strategic approach to management, and 
stressed the importance of these values to obtain successful results in the long run. As 
observed by Flynn et al. (1994), a culture high in future orientation supports continuous 
improvement, which in turn enhances the firm’s performance. Scholars also provided some 
preliminary evidence for the importance of performance orientation when adopting lean. 
Baird et al. (2011), for instance, found that the extent of Total Quality Management 
implementation is higher for companies which were competitive, focused on results with high 
performance expectations, which correlated with performance as well. Accordingly, 
organizations that show high levels of future and performance orientation are expected to 
achieve better performance through lean. 
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Finally, an organizational culture characterized by a high level of uncertainty avoidance also 
fosters lean effectiveness, since it fits practices allowing control of processes (e.g., process 
control), and composed by detailed work procedures (e.g., daily schedule adherence). 
Indeed, employees threatened by risks incidental to unpredictable events are attracted by 
and support norms and practices that allow work standardization and control. Conversely, 
people not interested in reducing/avoiding uncertainty consider these procedures costly, 
time-consuming and unnecessary. Hence, different workforce motivation in uncertainty 
avoidance is expected to influence the efforts on the part of employees in implementing lean 
practices. Hence, I can safely say that a firm’s organizational culture plays an important role 
in determining lean success for several reasons. Therefore, I can posit that:  
Hypothesis 1: High-performance lean manufacturing factories differ from low-
performance lean manufacturing factories in terms of organizational 
culture.  
 
On the one hand, the literature suggests that a certain level of organizational culture 
dimensions can favor the successful implementation of lean. On the other hand, and in 
accordance with the convergence hypothesis of organizational culture stated above, the lean 
literature clearly suggests that the adoption of soft practices can help to build the right 
environment for an effective lean implementation. As stated in Section 2.4.1, it can be argued 
that organizational culture and soft practices mutually interact, as certain organizational 
culture dimensions are undoubtedly correlated with soft lean practices - related to work 
organization, management leadership, people, relationships (collaboration with customers 
and suppliers) and the firm’s strategy (Detert et al., 2000; Naor et al., 2008; Patel and 
Cardon, 2010; Baird et al., 2011). 
The importance of soft lean practices in achieving high performance is commonly accepted 
(Shah and Ward, 2003; Lagrosen and Lagrosen, 2005; Matsui, 2007; Shah and Ward, 2007; 
Fotopoulos and Psomas, 2009). Moreover, some authors empirically proved that while soft 
practices are strongly related to performance, hard practices are not in all cases (e.g., 
Samson and Terziovski, 1999). The introduction of Human Resource Management practices 
to favor inter-functional teams and to train employees to perform multiple tasks, a common 
strategy shared and supported by managers, customers and suppliers in line with a 
continuous improvement philosophy, and collaborative relationships with customers and 
suppliers, are all fundamental for effective lean implementation (Flynn et al., 1995; 
Schmenner and Swink, 1998; Matsui, 2007). In fact, Matsui (2007) argued that hard 
practices, as Just-In-Time, have only a marginal effect on operational performance when soft 
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practices are not fully employed, since Human Resource Management and manufacturing 
strategy have a higher effect on competitive performance compared to Just-In-Time. The 
importance of collaboration with suppliers in a lean environment is strongly suggested by 
Hsu et al. (2009) and Romano and Formentini (2012) as without supplier assistance, 
continuous improvement is not supported and hard lean practices cannot be successful. 
Moreover, Flynn et al. (1995) highlighted that management support and strategy are vital if a 
company wants to improve its operational performance through lean because they help to 
direct lean efforts toward the expected results.  
To conclude, the use of soft practices makes it possible to avoid the resistance to change by 
the actors involved in lean implementation, which is frequent in lean projects and typically 
leads to lean failure. In fact, the utilization of these practices contributes to prepare the right 
environment in which implementing the hard lean tools, by educating managers, employees, 
customers and suppliers about the importance of changing the production system according 
to a lean perspective, and the benefits for both the firm and employees. Thus, I postulate 
that: 
Hypothesis 2: High-performance lean manufacturing factories differ from low-
performance lean manufacturing factories in terms of the extent of 
adopting soft practices. 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Data collection and sample 
To test the research hypotheses, I used the High Performance Manufacturing (HPM) 
database. HPM is an international research project set out to analyze the relationships 
between a firm’s practices and performance. HPM sample includes manufacturing factories 
operating in mechanical, electronics, and transportation equipment sectors (SIC codes: 35, 
36 and 37, respectively) and located in ten countries, i.e., Austria, China, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and the US. In each country, data Ire collected by 
local HPM research teams, responsible for selecting factories, contacting them, distributing 
the questionnaires, and providing assistance to the respondents, so as to ensure that the 
information gathered was both complete and correct. The factories Ire randomly selected 
from a master list of manufacturing factories (i.e., using Dun’s Industrial Guide, JETRO 
database, etc.). In each country, the local HPM research team had to include an 
approximately equal number of high performing and traditional manufacturing units, in order 
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to build a sample with factories that use advanced practices in their industry, i.e., world class 
manufacturing factories, as Ill as traditional (i.e. not world class manufacturing) ones. Finally, 
all factories had to represent different parent corporations and have at least 100 employees. 
Approximately, 65 percent of factories contacted agreed to administer the survey and filled 
the questionnaires. Data from 317 factories Ire returned. Table 3 reports additional 
information about the sample distribution for country and industry. 
Each factory participating in the HPM project received a batch of 23 separate questionnaires, 
distributed by individual visits or by post to different respondents, considered the best 
informed about the topic of each of the 23 questionnaires. Table 4 provides the list of 
selected recipients for each factory. 
Table 3: Sample distribution  
Country 
  
Industry 
Electronics Machinery Transportation 
Austria 10 7 4 
China 21 16 14 
Finland 14 6 10 
Germany 9 13 19 
Italy 10 10 7 
Japan 10 12 13 
South Korea 10 10 11 
Spain 9 9 10 
Sweden 7 10 7 
United States 9 11 9 
Table 4: Respondents for each factory 
Recipient of the questionnaire Number of respondents per factory 
Plant accounting manager  
Direct labor  
Human resources manager  
Information systems manager  
Production control manager  
Inventory manager  
Member of product development team  
Process engineer  
Plant manager  
Quality manager  
Supervisor  
Plant superintendent  
1 
10 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
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In order to reduce the problem of common method bias, whenever possible, the same item 
was administered to different respondents within the same factory. Then, to conduct factory 
level analysis, for each item I aggregated individual informant responses to the factory level 
by taking the average of within-factory responses.  
Each questionnaire consists of both perceptual scales and objective items. In particular, it 
included a mix of item types and some reversed scales to further reduce the possibility of 
common method variance. The questionnaires were originally developed in English and then 
were translated into the language of participating countries by a local member of the HPM 
team. They were then back-translated into English by a different local HPM researcher to 
assure accuracy in translation. 
3.2.2 Variables and scales 
The present work uses only a portion of the questionnaires of the whole HPM survey. HPM 
scales are based on existing literature and previously used measurement scales. In addition, 
at the beginning of the HPM project, the content validity of each scale was checked through 
interviews with experts and managers. As a result, in this study I adapted scales validated in 
past works and extensively used in the OM literature.  
A measurement of the multidimensional concept of organizational culture is based on and 
adapted to the eight multi-item scales conceived by Naor et al. (2010) – i.e., power distance, 
institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism, future orientation, performance orientation, 
assertiveness, uncertainty avoidance, humane orientation. The items used to measure these 
scales targeted shop floor employees, supervisors and human resource managers. 
Respondents were asked to provide their opinions on different aspects of the organizational 
culture by using Likert-scaled perceptual items, with values ranging from 1 (i.e., strongly 
disagree) to 7 (i.e., strongly agree) (see Appendix). For each item addressed to multiple 
respondents within the same factory, I checked the inter-rater agreement by measuring the 
interclass correlation (ICC) index. I found that all the ICC indexes are greater than 0.70, 
indicating an acceptable concordance among the different informants (James et al., 1984). 
As regards the lean concept, given its configurational nature, first of all I identified the lean 
practices which are usually included in the literature to characterize lean. Secondly, in line 
with previous Operations Management studies, I classified the practices into soft and hard. 
Table 2 reports some well-known and largely cited works on lean and highlights, for each 
practice (on the lines), the studies that consider it to measure lean, as well as those that 
classify it as a soft or hard practice (see Sub-section 2.3.1). As a result, eight multi-item 
perceptual scales were considered for hard practices – i.e., set up time reduction, Just-In-
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Time deliveries by suppliers, daily schedule adherence, equipment layout, kanban, process 
control, autonomous maintenance, and cleanliness and organization – and seven for the soft 
ones – i.e., small group problem solving, training employees, top management leadership for 
quality, supplier partnership, customer involvement, continuous improvement, manufacturing-
business strategy linkage. Appendix reports the complete list of items used to measure each 
scale. All the items were evaluated with a seven-point Likert-scale (1 is for “strongly 
disagree” and 7 is for “strongly agree”). 
Since several different respondents were involved, such as quality and human resource 
managers, and direct labors, I tested the inter-rater agreement validity, as was done for the 
organizational culture part of the questionnaire. 
As well as measuring the adoption of the different lean practices through a set of multi-item 
perceptual scales, the HPM questionnaire also includes a question concerning the overall 
level of lean manufacturing application in the factory compared to competitors on a five-point 
Likert scale (1 is for “poor, low” and 5 is for “superior”). This item targeted the quality 
manager. In this study this variable was used to distinguish in the sample between lean 
implementers and non lean implementers (see section Sub-section 3.2.4). It can obviously 
be expected that lean implementers are those that extensively adopt the lean practices 
reported in Table 2. However, since managers’ perceptions of what implementing lean 
exactly means sometimes differ, I checked whether there are differences between lean 
implementers and non lean implementers in terms of hard and soft lean practices. On the 
one hand, this can help to avoid potential biases in classifying a factory as a lean 
implementer. On the other hand, it can help to examine whether lean implementers give 
equal importance to the implementation of hard and soft practices. In fact, as assumed by 
hypothesis 2, this can influence the successful implementation of lean. 
Finally, to measure factory performance, I considered four dimensions, i.e. cost, quality, 
delivery, and flexibility, in terms of perceptual and relative measures of performance (e.g., 
Cua et al., 2001; Bozarth et al., 2009). In particular, the respondents were asked to compare 
their performance with that of competitors on a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 indicating “poor, 
low” to 5 “superior”), in terms of unit cost of manufacturing, quality conformance, on-time 
delivery performance, fast delivery, flexibility to change product mix and flexibility to change 
product volume. I computed an overall measure of factory performance by calculating the 
mean of these six items and used this value to distinguish between high and low performers 
in the sample (see section 3.2.4). This choice is coherent with the widespread view that lean 
allows to improve at the same time different performance dimensions, as it allows to 
overcome the trade-offs that usually characterize a factory’s competitive capabilities 
(Schmenner and Swink, 1998). 
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3.2.3 Measurement scale assessment 
An iterative modification process based on Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was run 
using LISREL 8.80 in order to refine the organizational culture and lean scales and assess 
the unidimensionality of the constructs under study. In particular, for each construct, I 
developed a single-factor CFA model and checked that the model parameters fell within the 
recommended limits. Whenever such a condition was not fulfilled, I refined the model by 
deleting one item at a time, and repeated this procedure until the model parameters were 
acceptable (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1989). In the case of constructs made up of less than 
four items, a two-construct model was considered in order to have sufficient degrees of 
freedom to compute fit statistics (Li et al., 2005). 
Then, I tested three CFA models. The first model concerns the organizational culture and 
includes eight latent variables. The second and the third models regard hard and soft lean 
practices and include six and nine latent variables respectively. Tables 5, 6, and 7 report the 
CFA results generated from these measurement models.  
The overall fit of each CFA model was judged to be satisfactory. In fact, the relative χ2 is 
between 1 and 3, CFI value is greater than 0.90, RMSEA is lower than 0.08, and in particular 
the lower and upper limits of confidence interval for RMSEA are lower than 0.05 and 0.08 
respectively (Hair et al., 2006). Thus I can conclude that the overall fit of the measurement 
models investigated is acceptable. 
In each CFA model, all the standardized estimates of the observed variables exceeded 0.500 
and all the corresponding t-values were statistically significant (t-values statistically 
significant at p < 0.001). The significant and substantial item loadings provide statistical 
evidence of convergent validity. Taken together, the convergence of items to the factors they 
are intended to measure with significant positive loadings and a good overall model fit 
demonstrates the unidimensionality of our scales (Hair et al., 2006). 
In addition, for each latent variable, I checked that the composite reliability was greater than 
0.7, indicating high reliability. Finally, to assess discriminant validity I performed a series of 
delta χ2 tests. Specifically, for each possible pair of latent variables, I compared two nested 
models: (1) the model with free correlation between the two constructs and (2) the nested-
model with the correlation set to 1. In accordance with the method used by Huang et al. 
(2008), if the delta χ2 is statistically significant, the two latent variables are distinct. 
Discriminant validity is confirmed for our constructs since all the χ2 differences resulted 
statistically significant (p < 0.001). 
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Table 5: Results of CFA for organizational culture model 
Construct Item
a Factor 
loading 
t-value 
Power distance OC01 0.647 - 
 
OC02 0.553 8.027 
 
OC03 0.655 9.155 
 
OC04 0.570 7.648 
Institutional collectivism OC05 0.661 - 
 
OC06 0.615 9.152 
 
OC07 0.500 7.211 
 
OC08 0.522 7.473 
 
OC09 0.549 8.307 
In-group collectivism OC10 0.861 - 
 
OC11 0.889 20.873 
 
OC12 0.864 19.927 
 
OC13 0.817 18.117 
Future orientation OC14 0.646 - 
 
OC15 0.825 11.681 
 
OC16 0.620 9.414 
 
OC17 0.838 11.779 
Performance orientation OC18 0.843 - 
 
OC19 0.943 19.340 
 
OC20 0.754 15.568 
Assertiveness OC21 0.599 - 
 
OC22 0.758 10.128 
 
OC23 0.773 10.247 
 
OC24 0.768 10.204 
Uncertainty avoidance OC25 0.522 - 
 
OC26 0.549 4.392 
 
OC27 0.889 4.496 
Humane orientation OC28 0.500 - 
 
OC29 0.800 6.353 
 
OC30 0.501 5.490 
 OC31 0.712 6.258 
χ2=862.238 (406); RMSEA=0.0619 [0.0565; 0.0674] CFI=0.90 
a
 In order to control for industry effects, I standardized the individual items by 
industry 
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Table 6: Results of CFA for hard lean practices model 
Construct Item
a Factor 
loading 
t-value 
Daily schedule adherence HLM01 0.896 - 
 
HLM02 0.588 11.200 
 
HLM03 0.855 18.561 
 
HLM04 0.557 10.462 
Equipment layout HLM05 0.722 - 
 
HLM06 0.811 12.973 
 
HLM07 0.770 12.443 
 
HLM08 0.642 10.489 
Just in time delivery by suppliers HLM09 0.711 - 
 
HLM10 0.570 8.978 
 
HLM11 0.658 10.233 
 
HLM12 0.536 8.478 
 
HLM13 0.566 8.925 
Kanban HLM14 0.682 - 
 
HLM15 0.851 12.669 
 
HLM16 0.858 12.669 
Setup time reduction HLM17 0.673 - 
 
HLM18 0.655 9.857 
 
HLM19 0.676 10.108 
 
HLM20 0.568 8.712 
Process control HLM21 0.848 - 
 
HLM22 0.881 20.003 
 
HLM23 0.655 12.875 
  HLM24 0.915 21.009 
Cleanliness and organization HLM25 0.626 - 
 HLM26 0.866 12.283 
 HLM27 0.919 12.684 
 HLM28 0.793 11.569 
Autonomous maintenance  HLM29 0.699 - 
 HLM30 0.544 8.311 
 HLM31 0.686 10.122 
 HLM32 0.732 10.595 
χ2=973.782 (436); RMSEA=0.0655 [0.0604; 0.0707] CFI=0.91 
a
 In order to control for industry effects, I standardized the individual items by industry 
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Table 7: Results of CFA for soft-lean practices model 
Construct Item
a
 Factor 
loading 
t-value 
Top management leadership for quality SLM01 0.664 - 
 
SLM02 0.825 12.336 
 
SLM03 0.642 10.052 
 
SLM04 0.811 12.184 
 
SLM05 0.745 11.397 
Supplier partnership SLM06 0.720 - 
 
SLM07 0.470 7.280 
 
SLM08 0.760 10.77 
 
SLM09 0.596 9.049 
Small group problem solving SLM10 0.613 - 
 
SLM11 0.813 11.366 
 
SLM12 0.813 11.367 
 
SLM13 0.835 11.565 
 
SLM14 0.613 9.243 
 
SLM15 0.699 10.219 
Continuous Improvement SLM16 0.737 - 
 
SLM17 0.462 7.733 
 
SLM18 0.713 12.006 
 
SLM19 0.591 9.932 
 
SLM20 0.726 12.240 
Training employees SLM21 0.758 - 
 
SLM22 0.863 14.895 
 
SLM23 0.456 7.737 
 
SLM24 0.786 13.746 
 
SLM25 0.622 10.724 
Manufacturing-Business Strategy Linkage SLM26 0.604 - 
 
SLM27 0.779 10.120 
 
SLM28 0.786 10.165 
 
SLM29 0.554 8.009 
 
SLM30 0.510 7.496 
Customer involvement SLM31 0.692 - 
 
SLM32 0.678 10.496 
 
SLM33 0.757 11.492 
  SLM34 0.669 10.373 
χ2=1135.974 (506); RMSEA=0.0664 [0.0617; 0.0713] CFI=0.90 
a
 In order to control for industry effects, I standardized the individual items by industry 
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3.2.4 Multi-group analysis 
In order to investigate the research hypotheses I used the multi-group analysis method using 
LISREL 8.80 (Sorbom, 1974). The aim was to test for differences between high-performance 
and low-performance lean factories in terms of organizational culture dimensions and 
application of lean practices. Numerous researchers attested the advantages of Sorbom’s 
(1974) method compared to the traditional general linear models (e.g., Lubke et al., 2003; 
Raykov, 2001). These advantages are linked to the possibility of estimating the parameters 
for all groups simultaneously. As a matter of fact, this approach facilitates a comparison of 
different theoretical models to determine the one that best fits the data. Furthermore, it allows 
to evaluate latent mean differences, taking into account measurement error variance, thus 
obtaining more precise and accurate results compared to methods, such as the t-test or 
ANOVA (Martınez-Costa et al., 2009). 
In order to perform the analysis, four a-priori groups were preliminary formed. First of all, I 
split our sample into lean vs. non-lean adopters, by using the question on the level of lean 
application in the factory (see section 3.2.2). After having computed the statistical median 
score of this single-item scale, I assigned a high lean (HL) or low lean (LL) implementation 
value to the factories having a score above or below the median respectively. Secondly, I 
followed the same procedure to assign a high performer (HP) and low performer (LP) score 
to factories in our sample, where a HP value refers to the factories with a performance score 
above the median, while a LP value to the factories with a performance score below the 
median (see Appendix for further details). Finally, by crossing these two dummy variables, I 
formed four groups of factories, as shown in Table 8. This study focuses on factories 
characterized by a high level of lean implementation and high performance (HLHP) and 
those with a high level of lean implementation and low performance (HLLP). 
Table 8: Number of factories for the a-priori groups 
GROUP 
Lean implementation 
score 
Performance score 
Number of 
factories 
HLHP (High lean implementers and 
high performers)  
HL (high) HP (high) 95 
HLLP (High lean implementers and 
low performers) 
HL (high) LP (low) 63 
LLHP (Low lean implementers and 
high performers) 
LL (low) HP (high) 63 
LLLP (Low lean implementers and 
low performers) 
LL (low) LP (low) 96 
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The measurement invariance assessment between groups represents the first step for 
testing group-mean differences. To determine evidence of invariance, an iterative process 
was run assessing the absence of significant differences in χ2 values (delta χ2) between 
each pair of nested-models, developed from a baseline model by forcing increasingly-
stringent constraints on the parameters (Byrne, 1998). Since no significant differences were 
detected in our measurement models, I assured that HLHP and HLLP groups are configural, 
metric and scalar invariant, and thus I can conclude that it is possible to compare relevant 
latent variable means of the two groups by performing delta χ2 tests. 
3.3 Multi-group analysis results 
As for organizational culture, the multi-group analysis results indicate that, among the eight 
dimensions of organizational culture, institutional collectivism, future orientation, 
assertiveness, and humane orientation are significantly different between high-performance 
and low-performance lean factories, providing support to hypothesis H1. Instead, no 
significant differences between the two groups were found for power distance, in-group 
collectivism, performance orientation, and uncertainty avoidance dimensions. 
In order to better comprehend the role of organizational culture in lean implementation, I also 
analyzed the differences between lean vs. non-lean adopters in terms of organizational 
culture dimensions. Thus, I performed a second multi-group analysis considering factories 
with a high and low level of lean implementation (HL and LL). Outcomes reveal significant 
differences between these groups in the three dimensions of in-group collectivism, future 
orientation and uncertainty avoidance. 
For each organizational culture dimension, Table 9 reports the latent variable means of the 
groups considered and differences in χ2 values (delta χ2) between HLHP and HLLP, and HL 
and LL (in the fourth and seventh columns respectively). 
Particularly interesting is the comparison between the delta χ2 values which prove that both 
HLHP and HLLP, and HL and LL are significantly different for the future orientation 
dimension and not so for power distance and performance orientation. Instead they show 
contrasting results if I consider the other organizational culture dimensions. This comparison 
is very useful in order to better interpret and comprehend the role of the different 
organizational culture dimensions in lean implementation (see Sub-section 6.1.1). In fact, in-
group collectivism and uncertainty avoidance are significantly different in HL and LL 
factories, but not in HLHP and HLLP factories. This suggests that they may favor the 
implementation of lean, and thus assume different values in lean and non-lean adopters, but 
alone do not guarantee the achievement of superior performance through lean. Conversely, 
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institutional collectivism and humane orientation are significantly different in HLHP and HLLP 
factories, and not significantly different in HL and LL factories. Thus they do not differentiate 
a lean and non-lean adopter, but make the difference in the successful implementation of 
lean. 
Table 9: Multi-group analysis results for organizational culture dimensions 
OC dimension HLHP HLLP Delta χ
2
 HL LL Delta χ
2
 
Power distance -0.167 0.011 1.724 -0.166 0.167 3.291 
Institutional collectivism 0.275 -0.057 4.156* 0.174 -0.196 3.393 
In-group collectivism 0.309 0.018 3.107 0.172 -0.170 5.216* 
Future orientation 0.245 -0.231 8.623* 0.126 -0.102 6.447* 
Performance orientation 0.154 0.011 2.859 0.087 -0.086 3.083 
Assertiveness -0.228 0.040 4.011* -0.115 0.115 2.280 
Uncertainty avoidance 0.026 -0.070 1.698 0.117 -0.094 4.363* 
Humane orientation 0.118 -0.028 3.931* 0.090 -0.085 1.952 
 
In order to test hypothesis H2, a further multi-group analysis was run including hard and soft 
lean practices (Table 10). Results indicate that HLHP and HLLP factories fail to show 
significant differences for none of the hard dimensions considered – i.e., set up time 
reduction, Just-In-Time deliveries by suppliers, daily schedule adherence, equipment layout, 
kanban, process control, autonomous maintenance, and cleanliness and organization. 
Instead, the two groups significantly differ in the adoption of almost all soft lean practices – 
except for top management leadership for quality – namely small group problem solving, 
training employees, supplier partnership, customer involvement, continuous improvement, 
manufacturing-business strategy linkage, providing support to hypothesis H2. Thus, I can 
conclude that what really makes the difference in the successful implementation of lean is 
the adoption of soft, rather than hard, practices. 
Again, further details were obtained by running an additional multi-group analysis comparing 
lean and non-lean adopters (HL and LL). Significant differences were found for all the hard 
dimensions considered. This means that in several cases, managers who were asked to 
evaluate their overall level of lean application in the factory compared to competitors, 
considered it “high” because of the implementation of hard practices. However, our analysis 
demonstrates that these practices are not enough for the successful implementation of lean, 
and factories which failed to achieve a superior performance (HLLP factories) underestimate 
the importance of soft practices. 
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Table 10: Multi-group analysis results for lean dimensions 
Lean dimension HLHP HLLP Delta χ
2
 HL LL Delta χ
2
 
     Soft lean practices 
Continuous Improvement 0.365 -0.036 4.239* 0.153 -0.148 3.465 
Training employees 0.389 -0.001 7.317* 0.138 -0.176 2.533 
Manufacturing-Business 
Strategy Linkage 
0.416 -0.037 5.789* 0.113 -0.132 2.957 
Top management leadership 
for quality 
0.278 -0.028 2.031 0.110 -0.101 2.952 
Small group problem solving 0.290 -0.096 4.208* 0.113 -0.077 2.900 
Supplier partnership 0.297 -0.051 3.919* 0.035 -0.001 2.134 
Customer involvement 0.291 -0.137 3.929* 0.124 -0.089 3.165 
     Hard lean practices 
Autonomous maintenance 0.266 -0.002 1.528 0.130 -0.132 3.859* 
Cleanliness and organization 0.243 -0.026 2.031 0.092 -0.099 4.656* 
Kanban 0.315 0.097 2.960 0.165 -0.181 4.922* 
Equipment layout 0.244 0.064 2.028 0.184 -0.183 5.426* 
Process control 0.246 -0.022 1.975 0.165 -0.161 4.359* 
Just in time delivery by 
suppliers 
0.282 -0.061 2.467 0.166 -0.167 3.818* 
Daily schedule adherence 0.298 -0.049 2.458 0.186 -0.197 5.995* 
Setup time reduction 0.286 -0.065 2.708 0.126 -0.114 7.604* 
       
3.3.1 Additional analyses 
HPM database involves manufacturing units located in different countries. In order to control 
for potential influence of societal culture, I run an additional analysis. Similarly to procedure 
adopted by Naor et al. (2010), I divided the database between Western and Eastern units 
and verified the presence of different organizational culture values. The results show that the 
two groups are different in terms of in-group collectivism, future orientation, and performance 
orientation, confirming findings of Naor et al. (2010). These evidences suggest that there can 
be an interplay between societal culture and organizational culture.  
Secondly, I looked for differences in organizational culture values as well as in use of soft 
practices between the successful lean firms located in Western vs. Eastern countries. This 
allows to control if there are differences between successful lean units across the two 
regions in terms of organizational culture values or adoption of soft lean practices. I didn’t 
find significant differences among these two groups.  
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These findings suggest that societal culture does not influence the organizational culture and 
soft practices of successful lean firms. Moreover, they suggest opportunities for future 
research. In particular, an interesting investigation should be conducted in order to determine 
whether and to what extent the differences in organizational culture found between Western 
and Eastern units play a role in facilitating or inhibiting the early phases of lean adoption. 
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4.  Cross-border transfer of a lean system in a MNC: from an 
Italian unit to a Chinese subsidiary 
4.1 Methodology 
An in-depth case study methodology was adopted to address the research objectives since it 
allows to deeply analyze the process under examination and to provide detailed insights on 
how transferring activities are affected by socio-cultural differences between a source and 
recipient unit (Voss et al., 2002). As highlighted by Netland and Aspelund’s (2014), literature 
on lean knowledge transfer is scarce and several issues are still open. Yin (1989) suggested 
in-depth case when little prior research has been conducted. 
4.1.1 Case selection 
The theoretical sampling approach guided the selection of the case study (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
My aim was to identify a case that would have guaranteed a transparent description of the 
transfer process in a setting characterized by a high cultural difference. Since my research 
focuses on early phases of a lean implementation project, I chose a MNC that have recently 
launched lean knowledge transfer initiatives towards a non-lean subsidiary. In particular, the 
dyad considered involves a Chinese manufacturing factory and its Italian headquarters. 
I verified that the source unit has attested experience in lean, and that the lean knowledge 
transfer project provides successful results, i.e., lean knowledge transferred was routinized 
and lean practices persisted within the recipient factory, and the source monitored the status 
of lean implementation over time through KPIs and audits (e.g., number of standard 
works/procedures developed over time, audits on 5S).  
Given the sensitivity of the data under investigation, confidentiality was a key factor in 
ensuring “open and honest” dialogue between the researcher and the MNC. Therefore, I 
don’t disclose the MNC’s identity.  
The MNC selected is a leading Italian manufacturing firm realizing heating, ventilation, and 
air conditioning products. About a thousand employees work in production and sales facilities 
located in all the five continents. Table 11 provides further general information on the 
headquarters and the site under study.   
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Table 11: General information on the headquarters and the Chinese subsidiary 
 Headquarters Chinese subsidiary 
Factory establishment (Year) 1973 2005 
Target market (Countries) West-Central Europe APAC 
Employees (Number)   450 200 
Lean implementation (Year) 2007 2009 
 
4.1.2 Data collection and analyses 
A research protocol was created to enhance the reliability and validity of the case study (Yin, 
1994). The literature review on organizational practice transfer in MNCs and lean 
management guided the selection of sections and issues to involve in such protocol. In 
particular, main sections and issues concern phases and activities in the transfer process, 
ways in which they were implemented and transfer approach, main problems found and 
countermeasures used, role of the source and recipient in performing activities, cultural 
peculiarities of the Chinese recipient. 
Such research protocol was a based to collecting data through semi-structured interviews. I 
collected about 10 hours of data by interviewing headquarters’ managers personally involved 
in the design and implementation of the lean transfer project. When necessary, additional 
data was gathered involving other employees. Face to face interviews were conducted by at 
least two researchers, were recorded, and painstakingly transcribed. Telephone 
conversations were also held to gather additional data and to validate previous interviews. 
Moreover, guided-tours of the Italian factory allowed direct observations. As recommended 
by McCutcheon and Meredith (1993), I triangulated data from semi-structured interviews with 
information gathered with other methods (e.g., analysis of MNC’ documents and intranet) to 
increase the research reliability. Moreover, I closely supervised a master student who 
performed his master project (7 months of work) in the company. Data were collected 
primarily between March 2013 and April 2014.     
Data analysis relied on an iterative approach, which involved frequent steps back and forth 
among the data during the process of concept development. This is also a result of frequent 
preliminary analysis’ discussion among the researcher and MNC’s managers involved in the 
transfer.  
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4.2 The case study 
This section provides a detailed description of activities undertaken during the early phases 
of the lean transfer project towards the Chinese factory. Two consecutive initiatives were 
launched by the Italian MNC which basically resulted in (1) abandon of lean management – 
i.e. unsuccessful initiative – and (2) routinization of the lean knowledge transferred – i.e. 
successful initiatives –, respectively. The two initiatives are presented simultaneously so as 
to bring out differences that led to opposite results. For each initiative, activities are disclosed 
in chronological order and grouped into phases according to Maritan and Brush’s (2003, p. 
949) model of lean transfer: (1) project initiation, (2) train factory management, (3) redesign 
processes, (4) disseminate training and buy-in, (5) initiate implementation, and (6) stabilize 
and consolidate. I relabeled the first phase as “project initiation” instead of “assess factory 
endowment” since in my case it was widely beyond the assessment of factory endowment, 
comprehending planning activities. Moreover, I don’t consider subsequent phases, which 
characterize more mature initiatives and thus are out of this study scope. Table 12 
schematizes findings from the case description.   
Project initiation  
The analysis of recipient’s initial conditions and the design and deployment of lean transfer 
project’s activities characterize the initiation phase. A cross-functional team was created in 
the headquarters and performed most of this phase, while the Chinese management 
supported it in specifying the starting situation. 
From the technical point of view, the Chinese factory had been shaped following the 
headquarters’ layout, and the same equipments had been used. Since its foundation, the 
factory has been managed in a quite autonomous way by local personnel according to a 
traditional non-lean managerial approach. In order to strengthen inter-unit relations and 
support the launch of the lean transfer project, the source team organized a factory guided 
tour of the Italian unit and some meetings with main representatives of Chinese factory 
explaining the importance of a greater coordination between units and benefits of lean 
practice sharing; these occasions were also used by the headquarters to acquire additional 
information about the recipient.  
In all these preliminary activities the Chinese management appears to favorably accept lean 
implementation as well as to agree with the following implementation proposal advanced by 
the headquarters.  
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The Italian unit’s experience was used as a basis for lean transfer project design. The source 
team’s effort was primarily directed to codify the headquarters’ lean knowledge and unveiling 
steps leading it to a successful lean implementation so as to replicate them in the Chinese 
subsidiary. Some minor modifications to the Italian lean system were allowed so as to make 
it more effective for the Chinese environment (e.g., replacement of text with photos to 
overcome high illiteracy rate of Chinese operators in work instructions as well as in 
documents to be posted in the cell boards). Exemplary successful cases of lean 
implementation in China documented in books were also analyzed to comprehend main 
peculiarities of such country. 
A greater attention to social culture peculiarities of the Chinese context distinguished the 
second initiative. Indeed, the cause-and-effect analysis carried out at the beginning of such 
initiative pointed out socio-cultural differences between source and recipient as the major 
cause of unsuccessful transfer. Coherently, the factory assessment was integrated with 
additional and deepened information on local personnel’s values and behaviors; previous on-
field experience was the main data source. Such information also supported the definition of 
countermeasures to problems faced in transferring lean, which were defined by the source 
external managers in collaboration with the recipient workers.  
Training  
The recipient management was trained by some Italian lean experts who moved for a limited 
period of time to the Chinese factory.  
Some theoretical lessons were planned so as to transfer basic concepts of lean philosophy 
and introduce the first set of best practices, i.e. value stream mapping, 5S, and preventive 
maintenance. All the class sections also involved ample space for exercises, thought to 
improve understanding of theoretical concepts and as a mean to verify effective knowledge 
acquisition. Learning-by-doing sessions followed. Through this approach the source team 
believed it could effectively overcome criticalities of the training phase, such as possible 
misunderstandings due to different meanings associated with a term (e.g., waste or 
standard) and risk of illusory consensus (i.e., “yes” answers that don’t really mean “yes”; 
Davies, 2006, p. 129). However, the analysis preceding the second initiative revealed that 
these problems were more critical than expected. As a countermeasure, external managers 
agreed in anticipating actions in the gemba. Indeed, learning-by-doing would have 
considerably limited misunderstandings, since external managers could have concretely 
showed what lean practices meant, and allowed to gather truthful feedbacks, by verifying 
recipient’s actual behaviors. 
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Redesign processes 
A team involving both headquarters’ and subsidiary’s managers is created so as to redesign 
Chinese factory’s processes according to lean principles. In this way, concepts learned by 
the Chinese management during training phase could be deepened and fixed according to a 
learning-by-doing approach.  
A major criticality was faced by external managers in redesigning processes. Although local 
managers had cleverly solved classroom exercises, they manifested a scarce attitude to 
propose solutions to face real problems (e.g., few proposals, wait for supervisors’ 
instructions). As a consequence, headquarters’ members performed most of this phase 
compensating Chinese management’s inertia (e.g., provide specific solutions to redesign 
activities or to resolve problems), and finishing activities on time. Conversely, during the 
second initiative local employees were given more time to define personal proposals, while 
external representative supported local employees by providing guidelines and stimulating 
analysis. Indeed, the cause-and-effect analysis revealed that the lack of proactivity was 
linked to cultural reasons, rather than scarce abilities. In other words, the Chinese personnel 
were accustomed to wait and observe instructions from higher levels rather than providing 
solutions; in addition, they feared to present proposals with doubtful results. Since these 
attitudes were incompatible with lean practices and philosophy, but rooted in Chinese 
workers, it was essential to strongly contrast them right away, and to instill autonomy and 
proactiveness behaviors and values. 
Disseminate training and buy-it  
Once redesigned the processes, the source personnel charged Chinese managers with 
training operators on the new working method. In particular, levering on a learning-by-doing 
approach, the management had to show them how to perform workstation operations 
following headquarters’ instructions as well as transfer lean principles and knowledge about 
5S and preventive maintenance practices.  
As pointed out by the Italian representatives, the choice of assigning training activities to 
local personnel was primarily due to language differences (i.e., Italian managers didn’t speak 
Chinese, while local operators didn’t understand English), which made communication very 
difficult. However, they supervised the activity development by occasionally going on and 
observing gemba.  
The time external managers spent on the shopfloor significantly increased during the second 
initiative. Indeed, be in contact with local employees on a daily basis helped them to build 
trust and to gain knowledge about local peculiarities. As revealed by the cause-and-effect 
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analysis, these actions were fundamental to instill lean behaviors as well as to define 
appropriate adaptations, thus sustaining the lean implementation in the long run.   
Initiate implementation 
The implementation phase starts when transferred knowledge is used to perform everyday 
work, following the normal production level. External managers help local managers to solve 
problems, while gradually handing over factory management.  
As in the case of process design, the major difficulties faced by the headquarters in 
implementation phase was the scarce autonomy of Chinese employees, especially 
concerning problem-solving activities, mistakes in applying standard works and 
misunderstandings of lean practices’ content and aim (e.g., inadequate care of equipments, 
not well-organized workstations after 5s sections, mistakes in the table boards, incapacity of 
interpreting KPIs in the table boards, activities implemented and decisions taken without 
appropriate quantitative analyses on the as is situation, etc.). Such problems resulted in 
frequent interruptions of production activities. A great effort was made by the Italian 
managers to resolve production criticalities, thus sustaining lean transformation. 
These problems appeared significantly reduced in the second initiative. As suggested by the 
source team, the different approach in conducting previous phases and the headquarters’ 
increased awareness of recipient’s peculiarities, which resulted in a greater capacity to 
define effective countermeasures, helped to increase Chinese workers’ participation and 
autonomy, and to make them better understand lean practices. 
Another major obstacle that undermined the implementation phase was the low loyalty to the 
organization of Chinese employees. The development of collaborative relations and the 
establishment of ad-hoc incentive mechanisms (e.g., retention plans for managers and team 
leaders, and better working conditions and creation of a learning program for operators) 
helped to contrast employees’ layoffs.  
Stabilize and consolidate 
In this phase the use of the transferred knowledge should be gradually routinized. The 
recipient performs most of this phase, though both on-site and remote support and 
supervision by the headquarters can play a decisive role in preventing that the lean project 
regress. 
As long as external managers were on-site they encountered difficulties similar to the 
previous phase (see implementation phase). When repatriated, the new obstacle they faced 
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concerned the factory assessment. Although the headquarters maintained constant 
communications with the overseas management, it was hard put to determine whether the 
subsidiary was progressing in lean implementation or if there were, for instance, a number of 
unresolved problems. Inter-firm communication was also hampered by the lack of objective 
parameters on certain aspects (e.g., overall factory’s knowledge on lean management). 
Concerning the second initiative, Italian managers observed that the development of strong 
and trustful relations besides the definition of ad-hoc KPIs increased communications’ 
transparency and effectiveness, helping remote supervision and support.  
56 
 
Table 12: Case study findings 
Phase of the 
transfer process 
First initiative Second initiative 
How activities are carried out 
Roles of source and 
recipient 
Main problems faced by 
the source 
Main adaptations and ad-hoc 
solutions 
Changes in roles  
(1) Project 
initiation 
Meetings between source and 
recipient representatives as a 
major mean to gather 
information about the recipient 
and to communicate change in 
manufacturing strategy 
Source’s effort is primarily 
directed to codify the 
headquarters’ lean practices and 
solutions; minor modifications to 
source’s practices 
A cross-functional team 
is created in the source 
and put in charge of the 
design of the transfer 
project  
Chinese management 
supports source’s data 
gathering 
No major problems Recipient factory assessment is 
integrated with additional and deepened 
information on local personnel’s values 
and behaviors  
Greater attention to social culture 
peculiarities of the Chinese context 
Previous on-field experience as the main 
source of data  
Strong adaptation of headquarters’ lean 
practices and solutions 
Recipient workers 
collaborate with 
source in defining 
countermeasures to 
problems 
(2) Train factory 
management 
Recipient management is 
trained by Italian lean experts 
assigned to the Chinese factory 
Theoretical lessons with ample 
space for exercises, followed by 
learning-by-doing sessions 
Italian and Chinese 
managers as source 
and recipient of lean 
knowledge, 
respectively 
Misunderstandings 
(different meanings 
associated with terms, 
e.g., waste or standard) 
Illusory consensus (“yes” 
that is not “yes”) 
Learning-by-doing sessions: 
 concretely showing what lean practices 
mean source avoids  
misunderstandings  
 verifying recipient’s actual behaviors 
source gathers truthful feedbacks on 
training 
Training as team 
work in gemba 
(3) Redesign 
processes 
Team work 
Activities finish according to 
scheduled time, but increased 
source’s effort  
Headquarters’ 
managers have a major 
role in solving problems  
Scarce participation to 
problem-solving and 
improving activities (e.g., 
few proposals, wait for 
instructions) 
Local employees are given more time 
and are supported in defining personal 
proposals, instead of providing specific 
solutions  
Recipient as a key 
solver of problems; 
source provides 
support 
(4) Disseminate 
training and 
buy-in 
Learning-by-doing approach 
Source supervises training 
activities by occasionally going 
on gemba 
Chinese managers are 
in charge of training 
operators in lean 
practices 
Different language 
(Italian managers didn’t 
speak Chinese, while 
local operators didn’t 
understand English) 
External managers spend more time on 
the shopfloor:  
 day-by-day contact helps to build trust 
between the parties 
 source increases its knowledge about 
local peculiarities 
Source and recipient 
spend more time 
together; external 
and local managers 
collaborate in 
training operators 
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Table 12: (Continued) 
Phase of the 
transfer process 
First initiative Second initiative 
How activities are carried out 
Roles of source and 
recipient 
Problems faced by the 
source 
Adaptations and ad-hoc solutions Changes in roles  
(5) Initiate 
implementation  
A great effort was made by the 
Italian managers to resolve 
production criticalities 
Gradually hands over 
of factory’s activities 
(from source to 
recipient) 
Scarce autonomy in 
performing problem-
solving and improvement 
activities 
Mistakes in applying 
standard works and 
misunderstandings of 
lean practices’ content 
and aim 
Low loyalty to the 
organization 
Scarce autonomy is contrasted by: 
 defining adaptations and ad-hoc 
solutions in previous phases 
 creating collaborative relations 
(previous phases) 
Low loyalty to the organization is 
contrasted by: 
 creating collaborative relations 
(previous phases) 
 defining ad-hoc incentive mechanisms 
(retention plans, better working 
conditions and learning program) 
Recipient managers 
are more 
autonomous in 
implementing lean 
and control 
subsidiary’s status 
(6) Stabilize and 
consolidate 
Constant communication 
between the parties 
Recipient has a leading 
role 
Source is in charge of 
on-site and remote 
support and 
supervision 
Scarce autonomy in 
performing problem-
solving and improvement 
activities 
Low loyalty to the 
organization  
Difficulties in 
communicating, that in 
turn hinder remote 
subsidiary assessment 
Difficulties in communicating and in 
assessing subsidiary status is contrasted 
by: 
 creating collaborative relations 
(previous phases) 
 defining ad-hoc control mechanisms 
(e.g., measure of the factory’s 
knowledge on lean management) 
 
- 
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4.3 Key lessons learned 
Basing on Maritan and Brush’s (2003) process model and the initiatives conducted by an 
Italian MNC towards a Chinese subsidiary, I described activities needed to effectively design 
and carry-out a lean implementation project in an overseas non-lean unit. I observed that the 
main activities in the analyzed transfer project followed Maritan and Brush’s (2003) process 
model. However, my case study also suggests that, besides implementation activities, 
planning activities play a crucial role in determining the effectiveness of the transfer project. 
Moreover, by contrasting the two initiatives, it emerges a significant difference in the way 
transferring activities were conducted by the headquarters (i.e., different replication approach 
and level of cooperation between source’s managers and recipient employees), which is 
likely to explain different initiatives’ outcomes. Consistent with the approach of some 
previous scholars (e.g., Narasimhan and Jayaram, 1998), I summarize key lessons learned 
from the experiences of the case study in the form of propositions.  
With regard to planning activities, I observed that, at the beginning of both initiatives, a cross-
functional team was put in charge of defining how the transfer project should have been 
implemented. The headquarters’ experience served as a model for defining the transfer 
project. However, while in the first initiative the team opted for a high fidelity approach in 
replicating the source’s lean practices and solutions, a strong adaptation mode was 
eventually selected as appropriate to fit the subsidiary’s peculiarities. Indeed, the cause-and-
effect analysis carried out before launching the second initiative clearly indicated that socio-
cultural differences between the factories had hindered the correct implementation of 
source’s lean practices and solutions, and that implementation problems could have been 
solved by introducing modifications and ad-hoc solutions. For example, misunderstandings 
during training sessions could have been reduced by anticipating activities on gemba and 
reducing/eliminating theoretical lessons. In addition, Chinese employees’ participation could 
have been encouraged by giving more time to define personal proposals and creating trustful 
relations between workers. In line with some previous studies (e.g., Maritan and Brush, 2003; 
Wallace, 2004), these findings suggest that lean management leads to superior results when 
adapted to a firm’s context, thus source managers have to consider and define specific 
solutions to fit recipient’s peculiarities when designing a lean transfer project.  
In addition, my case study demonstrates that socio-cultural differences can be particularly 
crucial when transferring lean overseas. On the one hand, when a source focuses on 
technical elements, underestimating socio-cultural characteristics, it is likely that external 
representatives will manage foreign employees in an unsuitable way. As in the first initiative, 
there can be resource shortage for some phases of the transfer process (e.g., insufficient 
time for process reengineering in order to stimulate recipient participation), incorrect priority 
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determination (e.g.; respect of scheduling rather than leaving time to subsidiary’s 
management to provide its own proposals), and failures in selecting most effective solutions 
to handle transferring activities (e.g., training approach). On the other hand, a thorough 
contextual analysis of socio-cultural elements, in addition to technical ones, it is likely to 
enable a source team to define suitable solutions for managing people, such appropriate 
training methods and incentive mechanisms, which influence effectiveness of both hard and 
soft lean practices.  
The following statements illustrate the relevance of properly understanding socio-culture 
differences to effectively transfer lean overseas. 
 “[During the first initiative] we hadn’t fully understood what we should have done 
to make lean philosophy explicit for local workers. […] When we launched 5S in 
the headquarters, employees discussed a lot to decide the most appropriate 
equipment arrangement. Conversely, there was a little discussion among Chinese 
workers. We noticed that sometime people in China placed their equipments in a 
“not-rational way”, leaving far more used tools and vice versa [placing nearest 
those less frequently used]. […] It seemed that they were acting in a “mechanical 
way”; acting as taught, but without understanding that the 5S practice was 
intended as a mean to improve their work. […]  
The thoughtful analysis we made before launching the second initiative revealed 
us many important aspects of the Chinese context … before, we had only partially 
understood them because of the great difference in the way of thinking, acting, 
etc.. Recognizing and adequately managing their peculiarities was essential to 
successfully implement lean.”  
 
Therefore, previous findings suggest that the transfer project design should be based on a 
comprehensive analysis of the subsidiary’s initial conditions, which encompasses both 
technical and socio-cultural peculiarities. In addition, the case study suggests that field 
experience played an important role in properly managing adaptation. On the one hand, 
during the project initiation phase of the first initiative, source managers gathered data on 
foreign context by organizing meetings with recipient representatives, analyzing exemplary 
cases documented in books, etc.. However, even though some socio-cultural peculiarities 
were identified, headquarters managers weren’t able to correctly estimate their 
consequences on lean implementation, as well as to define effective countermeasures to 
possible problems. Conversely, experience on the field and cause-and-effect analysis of first 
initiative supported problem identification and solution. For example, while during theoretical 
lessons occurred in the first initiative source managers had considered no request for 
clarification and ability to solve exercises as Chinese managers’ proper understanding of 
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source’s lean practices, during the second initiative they opted for learning-by-doing sessions 
to avoid misunderstandings and obtain truthful feedback by verifying actual behaviors. 
Therefore, in line with studies stressing the relevance of social mechanisms for knowledge 
transfer, such as assignments of source managers or expatriates (e.g., Riusala and Suutari, 
2004; Inkpen, 2008), my findings suggest that source has to invest direct resources in the 
recipient factory to effectively transfer lean. 
Based on these empirical evidences, I propose that the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: When a lean system is transferred between a source and 
recipient factories characterized by a high socio-cultural 
difference, the source has to carefully investigate socio-cultural 
peculiarities of the recipient, in addition to technical ones, and 
define adaptations accordingly. For this purpose, direct 
resources should be invested.  
 
With regard to countermeasures, my observations suggest that it is important to establish a 
collaborative relation between source representatives and recipient employees; to this aim, 
headquarters’ management has to guarantee a strong presence on the recipient’s gemba. As 
mentioned before, source managers’ experience on the field was crucial for identifying 
recipient peculiarities and, in turn, defining adaptations. Moreover, gemba team-work was 
more effective then theoretical sessions in transferring lean knowledge (e.g., reducing 
misunderstandings and misleading feedbacks). In other words, it can be argued that the 
presence of headquarters’ representatives on the shop-floor while collaborating with local 
employees allowed to create a sort of “double learning process”.  
Second, from the case emerged that the source’s strong presence on the gemba helped to 
reduce or eliminate incompatible  behaviors, i.e. behaviors in contrast with lean philosophy, 
such as low participation to problem-solving and process improvement, no open 
communication and illusory consensus, low loyalty to organization, etc.. For example, as long 
as the Italian management didn’t vigorously promote workers’ autonomy and participation by 
leaving more time to analyze problems and supporting workers asking for their views rather 
than providing solutions, local employees continued to wait for superiors’ orders, fearing 
effects of not effective solutions or wrong choices. As stressed by Shook (2010), change 
what people do – i.e., reduce or eliminate incompatible behaviors – is the first step to instill a 
lean culture into an organization.  
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Finally, the creation of trust between the parties was also fostered by source and recipient 
work side by side, day after day. This was fundamental to stimulate openness and to 
maintain transparency in communications, also once Italian managers repatriated.  
Another important countermeasures used to sustain lean implementation within the recipient 
are incentive and control mechanisms. Incentive mechanisms, such as retention plans for 
managers and team leaders, and better working conditions and creation of a learning 
program for operators, were defined to increase Chinese employees loyalty to the 
organization. With regard to control mechanisms, it was defined tools for assessing the 
overall level of lean knowledge within the factory and recipient employees’ individual 
understanding of lean philosophy. During the first initiative the remote control of recipient 
factory’s lean status was hindered by lack of objective measures, which can be notified 
unambiguously. Conversely, the definition of control mechanisms supported local managers 
in controlling the status of the lean implementation project by measuring a set of dimensions 
which were really critical in Chinese context. Moreover, it supported remote control by the 
source providing truthful and precise indications. 
Previous empirical evidences are summarized through the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: When a lean system is transferred from an Italian source 
towards a Chinese recipient, the success of the project is 
subordinated to on-gemba collaboration between source’s 
representatives and recipient’s employees. It supports 
adaptation, allowing to define more effective solutions, helps to 
overcome non-lean behaviors and to create trust between the 
parties. Ad-hoc incentive and control mechanisms are also 
important to sustain lean implementation. 
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5. Cross-border transfer of a lean system in MNCs: from European 
units to Chinese and US subsidiaries 
5.1 Methodology 
The objective of my research is to explore how cultural differences can affect the cross-
border transfer of a lean system, in terms of problems faced by a source during the transfer 
project and solutions implemented to handle such criticalities. The study is explanatory as 
well as exploratory in its nature. Indeed, besides relating cultural differences to transfer 
problems and countermeasures, it also characterizes and operationalizes the main variables 
differentiating cross-border lean knowledge transfer projects within MNCs. Therefore, the 
multiple case-study methodology is adopted to address this research objective, since it is 
extremely valuable to identify and describe crucial variables and to discover links between 
them (Yin, 1994). I analyzed seven transfer projects at a dyadic level, i.e., projects between a 
source unit and a recipient factory of a MNC, which is regarded as an appropriate unit of 
analysis to explore transfer project within MNCs (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000).  
5.1.1 Case selection 
Theoretical sampling guided the selection of the case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989).The 
process of selection involved two major phases. Fist, a list of lean MNCs was identified, 
considering MNCs which had collaborated in master courses/university workshops on lean 
management and/or member of lean clubs/associations (e.g., Lean Enterprise CLUB of 
CUOA Business School). Second, I gathered data on these MNCs and their lean projects so 
as to determine if a MNC could be interesting from my research’s objective point of view. I 
focused on lean MNCs with headquarters in Europe that have recently transferred their lean 
systems to non-lean subsidiaries in China and U.S.. 
Data gathered on the field allowed me to select a sample which satisfies both literal and 
theoretical replication issues (Yin, 1984). In particular, I selected four cases in which the 
recipient is a Chinese factory and three cases in which the recipient is a U.S. factory. China 
and U.S. provide examples of polar types of societal cultures, thus are useful to explore how 
such variable can affect the transferability of a lean system (Eisenhardt, 1989). Moreover, I 
selected dyads involving sources with both similarities and differences it terms of 
organizational culture values. Indeed, although literature on lean knowledge transfer focuses 
on recipient cultural characteristics (either absolutely evaluated or relatively to the source), 
some clear differences between the cases emerged during data collection. In particular, such 
differences concern the level of power distance – i.e., “the degree to which members of an 
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organization (or society) expect and agree that power should be stratified and concentrated 
at higher levels of an organization” (House et al., 2004) – within a source, which reflected in 
the way external managers conducted a lean transfer project. Within some sources all 
employees, regardless of their role within the company, were strongly encouraged to 
collaborate in order to achieve company’s goal; the source’s senior management also 
vigorously promote face-to-face contact and communication between workers at different 
hierarchical levels. Accordingly, all lean knowledge transfer project’ actions designed by the 
source, even early actions such as training and creation of operation instructions, sought 
contact and involvement of all employees (e.g., source planned that learning-by-doing 
sections of training teams would have involved both local managers and employees as well 
as source representatives). In addition, external managers considered the constant presence 
of on the recipient’s gemba as a key means to create trustful relations. In the following, I will 
use the term “OC1” in order to refer to this type of cultural profile characterized by a low 
power distance.  
Conversely, in other cases, even if the sources encouraged bottom-up participation of 
employees, lean implementation followed a directed top-down approach (e.g., everyone’ 
suggestions is valued and allows company’s continuous improvement, but specific targets 
are settled by senior management and derived level-by-level to guide all the initiatives). In a 
similar way, the source decided to focus external managers’ effort on local managers, while 
delegating them actions toward operators (e.g., external managers would have trained local 
managers and then they would have trained operators); audits similar to ones employed in 
the source would have been used to control effectiveness of local managers’ work. In the 
following, I will use the term “OC2” in order to refer to this type of cultural profile 
characterized by a high power distance.  
My sample includes three cases in which the source is characterized by OC1 and four cases 
in which the source has an OC2. Table 13 shows case study position according to the two 
sampling variables employed. 
Table 13: Sampling matrix 
  Country of lean knowledge recipients 
  U.S. China 
OC of the European 
lean knowledge owner 
units 
OC 1 Delta U.S. Beta China, Delta China 
OC 2 Alpha U.S., Gamma U.S. Alpha China, Gamma China 
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Finally, my cases show some common characteristics which are useful to limit confounding 
effects when studying the link between variables as well as to set precise boundaries for the 
research. On the one hand, I focused on European MNCs with an attested experience in 
lean. It is worth noting that I considered different dyads with the same source, i.e., I analyzed 
dyads composed by the same source which had transferred lean both in China and in U.S. 
(see Table 14). On the other hand, the recipient factories are non-lean subsidiaries. 
Moreover, I verified that mainly local employees worked within the recipients at different level 
work, thus assuring that values and behaviors can go back up to the societal context of the 
recipient. Finally, I verified that lean knowledge transfer projects provided successful results, 
i.e., lean knowledge transferred was routinized. Table 14 provides information for the seven 
cases selected. 
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Table 14: Overview of the cases 
Case MNC 
Dyad 
Interviewees 
Source Recipient 
Alfa 
China 
MNC 1 including five manufacturing 
factories in four continents (Asia, 
North America, South America and 
Europe); headquarters in Italy; 
products: humidification and control 
systems for heating, ventilation, air 
conditioning/refrigeration 
Source Alpha: Italian 
manufacturing unit, which 
produces the whole range of 
products of the MNC 
Recipient Alpha China: Subsidiary located in 
Suzhou (China) with about 200 employees, 
which makes products for APAC markets 
The lean expert in charge of lean transfer 
project in the Chinese factory and its team 
members; Italian managers who supported lean 
transfer team; the chief group organization 
officer (i.e., supervisor of all lean projects in the 
organization) 
Alfa U.S. MNC 1 Source Alpha Recipient Alpha U.S.: Subsidiary located in 
Pennsylvania (U.S.) with about 30 
employees, which makes products for the 
North American market  
The lean expert in charge of lean transfer 
project in the U.S. factory and its team 
members; the chief group organization officer 
Beta 
China 
MNC 2 including nine manufacturing 
units in three continents (Asia, North 
America, and Europe); headquarters 
in France; products: critical power, 
power control and safety, energy 
efficiency, and solar power solutions 
Source Beta: Italian 
subsidiary, which produces 
products and services relate 
to high-availability power 
supplies to critical 
applications  
Recipient Beta China: Subsidiary located in 
Shanghai (China) with about 40 employees, 
which provides products and services relate 
to high-availability power supplies to critical 
applications for the Chinese market 
Lean expert responsible for transferring lean to 
Chinese factory and its team members (e.g., 
Managing Director of critical power division); 
the lean expert responsible for lean projects 
within the Italian subsidiary; the the Managing 
Director of the Chinese subsidiary 
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Table 14: (Continued) 
Case MNC 
Dyad 
Interviewees 
Source Recipient 
Gamma 
China 
MNC 3 including thirty-five 
manufacturing factories in four 
continents (Asia, North America, 
South America, and Europe); 
headquarters in U.K.; production: 
industrial, architectural, heat transfer 
fabrications, and renewable energy 
solutions and superconductors  
Source Gamma: Italian 
subsidiary, which produces 
heat-transfer coils and 
coolers and related services 
for the European market; 
managers from the 
headquarters also 
collaborate  
Recipient Gamma China: Subsidiary located 
in Wuxi (China) with about 250 employees, 
which realizes heat-transfer coils and coolers 
for the Chinese market 
The lean expert in charge of the lean transfer 
project to the Chinese factory; the Italian 
factory’s lean expert (i.e., manager in charge of 
lean projects within the excellent lean factory for  
the company’s division realizing heat-transfer 
coils and coolers) 
Gamma 
U.S. 
MNC 3 Source Gamma Recipient Gamma U.S.: Subsidiary located in 
Kentucky (U.S.) with about 250 employees, 
which realizes heat-transfer coils and coolers 
for the North America market  
The lean expert in charge of the lean transfer 
project to the U.S. factory; the Italian factory’s 
lean expert  
 
Delta 
China 
MNC 4 including twenty-eight 
manufacturing units in four 
continents (Asia, North America, 
South America, and Europe); 
headquarters in Sweden; products: 
heat transfer, separation and fluid 
handling  
Source Delta: Italian 
subsidiary, which produces 
air heat exchangers and 
related services for the 
European market; managers 
from the headquarters also 
collaborate 
Recipient Delta China: Subsidiary located in 
Suzhou (China) with about 30 employees, 
which realizes air heat exchangers for 
Chinese market 
The lean expert in charge of lean transfer to 
Chinese factory and its team members (e.g. the 
lean expert for air heat exchangers); the lean 
expert for air heat exchangers in European 
factories 
Delta 
U.S. 
MNC 4 Source Delta Recipient Delta U.S.: Subsidiary located in 
Virginia (U.S.) with about 100 employees which 
realizes air heat exchangers for U.S. market 
The lean expert in charge of lean transfer project 
to U.S. factory and its team members; the expert 
for air heat exchangers in European factories 
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5.1.2 Data collection, reduction and analyses 
A research protocol was created to enhance the reliability and validity of case study (Yin, 
1994). It included four main sections derived from the literature review on knowledge 
transfer: (1) cultural characteristics of the recipient context (either absolutely evaluated or 
relatively to the source), (2) cultural peculiarities of the source, (3) problems faced by a 
source during the transfer project, and (4) solutions implemented to handle such criticalities. 
For each section of the research protocol, I defined some issues to be investigated so as to 
gather complete and useful information on the lean transfer project in each dyad. 
As defined in this research protocol, semi-structured interviews represent my main source of 
data. Managers in charge of lean knowledge transfer projects, their team members and other 
managers deeply involved in the transfer projects (e.g., supervisors of lean projects within 
the MNC, managers who supported lean transfer project planning or practice adaptation) 
were interviewed in the period between March 2013 and April 2014 (see Table 14 for further 
details on interviewees). The interviews were conducted by at least two researchers, ranged 
from 90 to 160 minutes, and were recorded and painstakingly transcribed. In order to 
increase research reliability, I also analyzed information from other sources such as 
companies’ documents (e.g., A3 documents on lean strategy deployment or company’s X 
matrix, the handbook of lean standards, the standardized procedures for implementing each 
lean practice, etc) and web source, and triangulated these information with data from 
interviews (Eisenhardt, 1989). Finally, guided-tours of factories within each dyad allowed 
direct observations of lean practices implemented, and thus to verify the correctness of the 
data/information gathered during the interviews and from documents. Where data 
discrepancies were found, the aspects generating contradictions were thoroughly 
investigated. 
Data reduction process was used to summarize the large amount of information resulted 
from data collection. It basically consisted in the characterization of each dyad based on the 
research variables of interest in this study – i.e., cultural context and lean knowledge transfer 
project. As reported in Table 15, every research variable was characterized by a set of items, 
and every item was classified by using a well-defined rule determined by comparing data 
across the cases and starting from the literature. I depicted the cultural context based on the 
cultural characteristics of the source organization and the country of the recipient unit. I 
selected these variables starting from the literature on lean and knowledge transfer (see 
Chapter 2) and after iterative cycles of axial coding based on cross-case comparison. In 
particular, from the cross-case analysis it emerged that, ceteris paribus, these were the 
variables that mainly affected a lean knowledge transfer project, in terms of problems in 
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performing transfer projects and/or level of adaptation between planned actions and effective 
solutions and countermeasures put into practice.  
As mentioned before, literature on lean knowledge transfer focuses on recipient’s cultural 
context (see Sub-section 5.1.1), and does not provide a common way to operationalize 
source organization’s cultural characteristics. By comparing cases, I distinguished between 
OC1 – i.e., low power distance – and OC2 – i.e., high power distance – (see previous section 
and Table 15).  
For what concerns the country of the recipient unit, I considered two polar types of recipients: 
U.S. and Chinese subsidiaries, as they differ for socio culture peculiarities, which are 
recognized as an influential variable in knowledge transfer projects (Kostova, 1999; Gupta 
and Govindarajan, 2000; Jensen and Szulanski, 2004) and in lean implementation (e.g., 
Hines et al. 2011; Wiengarten et al. 2011; Kull et al., 2014). 
As regards lean knowledge transfer project, I focused on problems in transferring lean 
knowledge and level of adaptation between planned actions and effective solutions and 
countermeasures put into practice. In particular, my research focuses on the early phases of 
lean knowledge transfer projects, thus transfer projects were analyzed in the period between 
when the source contacted the recipient to inform it about the lean transfer opportunity, until 
the recipient proved to master lean practices. Main activities involved concerns so-called 
kickoff meetings and excellent factory visits, training of local employees, local managers’ 
support and supervision in lean implementation in loco and, after the handover, in the 
distance. Consistent with some previous contributions (e.g., Szulanski, 1996; 2000; Jensen 
and Szulanski, 2004), I studied problems by distinguishing the phase of a knowledge transfer 
project in which problems occurred. Two main phases – i.e., introduction and implementation 
– can be distinguished in such period considering the nature of the problems encountered by 
dyads.  
For what concerns the extent of adaptation between planned actions and effective solutions 
and countermeasures put into practice, I considered three intermediate levels between 
adoption and adaptation (Ansari et al., 2010; Netland and Aspelund, 2014): low, medium, 
and high level of adaptation, which concern decreasing fidelity in replicating the source’s 
solutions. 
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Table 15: Data reduction 
Variable 
Characterisati
on 
Rating 
Cultural 
context  
Source 
organization  
OC1 (low power distance): Within the source factory, all workers, regardless of 
their role within the company, are strongly encouraged to collaborate in order to 
achieve company’s goal; the source’s senior management also vigorously 
promote face-to-face contact and communication between workers at different 
hierarchical levels. Accordingly, all lean knowledge transfer project’ actions 
designed by the source, even early actions such as training and creation of 
operation instructions, sought contact and involvement of all employees (e.g., 
source managers participated to all training activities – i.e., not only taught 
foreign managers, but also closely supervised training sessions towards foreign 
operators –, standard works were jointly redefined, etc.); constant presence of 
external managers on the gemba as a key means to create trustful relations; in 
case of problems, source managers tended to provide guidelines instead of 
precise solutions, so as to stimulate the participation of the counterpart. 
OC2 (high power distance): Although the company encourages bottom-up 
participation of employees, lean implementation within the source followed a 
directed top-down approach (e.g., everyone’ suggestions is valued and allows 
company’s continuous improvement, but specific targets are settled by senior 
management and derived level-by-level to guide all the initiatives). In a similar 
way, the source decided to focus external managers’ effort on local managers, 
while delegating them actions toward operators (e.g., external managers would 
have trained local managers and then they would have trained operators); audits 
similar to ones employed in the source would have been used to control 
effectiveness of local managers’ work; in case of problems, source managers 
tended to provide specific solutions.   
 
Country of the 
recipient unit 
China: High difference with European countries in terms of socio-cultural traits 
that results in the lack of a common language and differences in the meanings 
assigned to the artifacts of communication, which are accentuated by the high 
illiteracy rate; high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance, which reflect 
in high respect for hierarchies and fear in providing ideas as well as solutions 
with not clear results; group loyalty is a fundamental value underlying family 
relationships, not working ones. 
US: Low difference with European countries resulting from similarities in the 
language systems and in the meanings assigned to the artifacts of 
communication and favored by low illiteracy rate; workers value tangible and 
short-term results (low pragmatism combined with high masculinity); freedom of 
expression and self initiative (low power distance combined with high 
individualism); group loyalty characterized some working relationships. 
  
71 
 
Table 15: (Continued) 
Variable 
Characterisati
on 
Rating 
Lean 
knowledge 
transfer 
project 
Problems in 
performing lean 
knowledge 
transfer project 
Introduction phase: Source encountered problems in launching the project; 
recipient managers opposed to lean knowledge transfer project during initial 
meetings. 
Implementation phase: Source encountered problems in performing training and 
in supporting and supervising recipient workers both in loco and in the distance; 
communications difficulties and several local employees’ behaviors in contrast 
with the lean philosophy (e.g. no openness, no feedback on training, low 
participation at problem-solving activities, low autonomy, and low loyalty to the 
organization).  
Lean 
knowledge 
transfer 
project 
Level of 
adaptation 
between 
planned actions 
and effective 
solutions and 
countermeasur
es put into 
practice 
 
High: Some planned actions, such as training and gemba audits, proved 
ineffective, thus required a redesign; new tools, such as incentive or controlling 
mechanisms, needed to be created; the source invested considerable additional 
resources and made a huge effort to redesign and re-do activities, create new 
tools, and change behaviors while implementing planned actions, which resulted 
in significant delays in project’ scheduling (several months). 
Medium: Although no planned actions weren’t redesigned, the source had to 
invest additional resources to encourage lean behaviors during implementation 
(e.g., training period was extend to fix some fundamental concept of lean 
philosophy, such as waste or standard, or stimulate openness among workers); 
creation of some new tools required few additional resources; project’ scheduling 
was subject to some delays (few months). 
Low: Project was essentially performed as planned; few additional resources 
were needed to overcome recipient’s opposition to lean knowledge transfer 
project and introduce minor modifications to existing tools; project’ scheduling 
was subject to minor delays (about a month). 
 
The data analysis was done according to the two-step method suggested by Eisenhardt 
(1989). Firstly, the within-case analysis was performed by considering each case as a stand-
alone entity and looking for unique patterns of each case (see Section 5.2). This allowed to 
become intimately familiar with every case, but also facilitated the comparison of the seven 
cases (Voss et al., 2002). The second step concerns cross-case analysis, where axial and 
selective coding techniques were adopted to make connections among categories so as to 
explain the phenomenon under study (see Section 5.3). 
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5.2 Within-case analysis 
This section synthesizes the within-case analysis. In particular, main activities involved in 
each transfer project are briefly presented together with problems occurred in transferring 
lean and adaptations introduced to successfully implementing lean abroad. 
Alfa China  
The source initially organized a factory guided tour in the Italian unit (i.e., the exemplar lean 
factory within the MNC), followed by a presentation of the main steps of lean implementation 
in this factory and benefits achieved. The source eventually presented the lean transfer 
project and in that occasion the recipient approved to implement lean. The recipient’s 
managers seemed to acknowledge lean as a powerful mean for improving the Chinese 
factory. 
According to the approach used in the Italian factory, training on lean practices involved two 
main steps. First, local managers were trained by external lean experts in classroom lessons, 
then learning-by-doing activities on the shop floor; afterwards, local managers trained local 
operators through learning-by-doing sessions on the shop floor. In particular, Chinese 
managers trained operators quite independently, while source representatives occasionally 
controlled activities. The participation of Chinese employees to learning activities was low: no 
interaction with mentors, no questions for more details, few ideas during learning by doing 
sections, etc.. In addition, several problems occurred when lean activities began to be put 
into practice. As source’s reports on periodical factory’s audits highlight, there were 
numerous mistakes in applying standard works and misunderstandings of lean practice 
content and aim (e.g., not well-organized workstations after 5s sections, inadequate care of 
equipments, mistakes in the table boards, incapacity of interpreting KPIs in the table boards, 
activities implemented and decisions taken without appropriate quantitative analyses on the 
as is situation), which resulted in frequent interruptions of production activities and required 
intervention of the source managers for solving problems. Such problems severely 
prejudicated lean implementation. The low loyalty to organization also contributed in 
determined a rapid loss of the transferred knowledge. 
After several months the source was in the Chinese factory, the headquarters’ 
representatives decided to redo training; before launching a second initiative, activities were 
redesign. In order to limit misunderstandings and non lean behaviors, the source decided to 
lever on a team based learning-by-doing approach and to participate to training sessions with 
operators. Instead of providing detailed solutions to handle problems, this time recipient 
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managers were given only some guidelines and were asked to analyze and define how to 
perform activities (e.g., propose a sequence of steps and related timing for carrying out 
activities, analyze coherence between proposals and lean principles, define impacts on 
performance, etc.). In this way, the source partially adapted its best practices (e.g., cell 
meeting duration was extended to allow gathering suggestions for PDCA cycles, PDCA 
labels with pictures, more pictures and symbols instead of text in standard work instruction). 
As a result, the introduction of new knowledge was facilitated, and some problems, such 
illiteracy issue, effectively overcame.  
The source established highly-frequent contacts to control and support the recipient, also 
after the handover. In particular, the source committed local managers to using the source’ 
audit system to monitor operational performance as well as operators’ lean knowledge by 
asking precise and regular feedbacks; among measures constantly checked, the new KPI on 
training (i.e., the ration between the overall numbers of employees on ones properly taught). 
In order to address low loyalty issue, the headquarters also predisposed a list of employees 
in charge of training new workers (more experience and cooperative operators were 
selected) and defined a specific reward system (e.g., monetary rewards for workers who 
cooperated in lean implementation and were loyal to the company; better work conditions, 
such as more safety workstations, etc.). 
Alfa U.S. 
As in the case Alfa China, the source initially organized a tour of the Italian factory followed 
by a presentation. In that occasion, the recipients’ managers asked several details about the 
lean tools implemented, the time dedicated to the lean project and results achieved, and 
postponed the decision about lean transfer project, in order to have more time to collect 
further information. Afterwards, the source organized some other meetings, in Europe and in 
the U.S., to painstakingly expose the characteristics of lean practices, standards, and tools 
and make all potential advantages more evident. Only some weeks later, the recipient 
agreed to participate to the lean transfer project. 
Similar to the Chinese case, training included two main phases: local managers were trained 
in classroom lessons and learning-by-doing sessions, then local managers trained local 
operators quite independently through learning-by-doing sessions; source experts 
occasionally control activities. Training proceeded almost smoothly and accordingly to time 
scheduled. After training, recipient managers and operators actively began to implement lean 
practices, accordingly to source’s lean standards (only minor modifications were introduced, 
such as in the case of “water spider” standard – i.e., the standard that regulates how 
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production lines have to be supplied with components and subsystems according to a milk-
run logic and the presence of a dedicated operator –, which required a different solution due 
to low factory’s production volumes that not justified the cost of a dedicated operator). They 
demonstrated a propensity towards using KPIs and quantitative analyses, which were 
prerequisite to lean implementation. The participation of managers and workers during 
practical sections and lean implementation on field was high, with several suggestions 
provided and PDCA opened. U.S. managers levered on acquired knowledge to generate 
new improvement initiatives also after the handover (e.g., actions to reduce WIP and buffer 
stocks, to improve the quality and/or reduce set-up time of some workstations). They 
replicated the headquarters’ approach of fixing weekly appointments for allowing incremental 
advancements (i.e., production stopped for 20 minutes in a week to doing training activities, 
small group problem-solving, 5s sections etc). Also operators displayed a proactive behavior 
and displayed initiative in providing ideas for solving problems (e.g., high numbers of PDCAs 
opened and closed after handover). As a result of increasing lean implementation, 
operational performance improved.  
Beta China  
The source arranged a meeting and a tour of its factory with key recipient managers (i.e., 
future factory manager, operations manager, quality manager, and R&D manager of the 
Chinese unit) to show how every-day work used to be done according to lean best practices. 
The lean transfer project was eventually presented. The recipient agreed to implement the 
proposal, and the next day training activities began in the source’s factory. 
The source organized some learning-by-doing sections to illustrate the principles and basic 
techniques underpinning lean management. After about a month, recipient key managers 
were charged with training other recipient employees, while source lean experts strictly 
control training activities by participating to all the training sessions. Especially at the 
beginning of lean transfer project, communication between the parties was hindered by the 
high cultural differences and high power distance of recipient employees. Chinese workers 
hard put to provide suggestions and make decisions since they feared negative impacts of 
wrong choices. The source encouraged recipient participation in leading up to lean 
transformation in different ways: redefining standard works (e.g., creating instructions more 
detailed than source’s ones), questioning recipient’s opinion on how to perform an activity 
according to lean principle and on possible solutions to solving a problem instead of giving 
predefined solutions, etc. Although this approach would have taken more time with respect to 
giving source’s solutions, the source preferred to extend the training period of some weeks, 
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leaving time to Chinese workers to express their ideas instead of imposing headquarters’ 
solutions. 
However, Chinese managers faced difficulties in extending lean implementation to other 
factory’s areas as well as in maintaining optimal performance in the redesigned cell due to 
low loyalty of employees (e.g., due to dismissals, there were few skilled workers who could 
teach new colleagues what to do, focus cannot be put only on new value streams, but also 
on replacing operators in redesigned one). Besides levering on multi-tasking training, the 
source cooperated with recipient workers so as to define specific solutions to overcome the 
problem. In particular, the source adopted its incentive system by creating a retention plan 
for managers (i.e., bonus payments was introduced for older employees) and allowed them 
overtimes to fulfill their need of higher salaries. Moreover, they created better work conditions 
by providing new/additional foods and introducing a shuttle to transport workers between 
flats and the factory; attraction as well as retention of employees were also favored by lean 
education programs activated by the company. In addition, the source’s audit checklists were 
widened by introducing aspects on openness, participation, and proactivity so as to control 
that these behaviors were followed by operators, but also to remark their importance to 
managers, thus supporting cultural change.  
Gamma China  
At the beginning, the source organized a meeting with recipient’s managers to display them 
the lean transfer project and illustrate the advantages of lean implementation; a tour of the 
more advanced lean factory in the MNC operating in the same division (i.e., heat-transfer 
solutions) also took place. The recipient’s managers immediately agreed to launch the lean 
transfer project.  
Source lean experts trained local managers, which in turn trained operators. Accordingly to 
MNC guidelines, both theoretical and practical sessions occurred in the first case, while only 
the learning-by-doing method was used in the case of operators. However, some 
misinterpretations of source’s best practices occurred during training sessions. In fact, during 
subsequent control of transferring activities, the source reported numerous errors in the 
procedure implementations (e.g., assembly sequence defined in the standard work not 
respected by some operators, equipments arranged in an inconvenient or harmful way), 
employees’ difficulty in recognizing muda (e.g., importance of reducing inventories, waste 
related to overproduction), and local employees  tendency to not freely express their ideas 
with supervisors (e.g., few suggestions to resolve problems, no revelation of unsatisfactory 
aspects of their job before leaving it, always affirmative answers even in case of 
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disagreement). The source had to repeatedly interrupt production activities, while spending 
much time to correct errors. In addition, the source recalled some of the lean concepts 
previously introduced in new learning sessions. Instead of theoretical lessons, they opted for 
learning-by-doing method (e.g., concretely showing managers “what is waste” through its 
manifestation in recipient’s every-day-activities). Moreover they personally worked side-by-
side with local employee following new training sessions, eliminating errors in practice 
implementation, and stimulating in all the activities the participation and team-work of both 
mangers and operators. In order to increase the effectiveness of headquarters’ practices and 
overcome problems such as high illiteracy of recipient operators, the source also concede 
some adaptation to its lean standards and related tools (e.g., production scheduling with 
magnets on a board instead of electronic support, reduced number of operations for each 
workstation and more detailed and visual instructions). 
Dismissal of some operators and of the operations manager caused severe knowledge 
drops, which reflected in temporary interruption or slowdown of some activities and 
deviations from lean standards (e.g., several improvement initiatives had been temporary 
stopped during training of the new operations manager, training focused on new operators 
instead of new lessons for more experienced employees). Especially newer workers 
manifested the tendency of not communicating problems and being risk-adverse (e.g., no or 
few notifications of quality or process issues through Andon system or PDCAs, no or few 
ideas for problem resolution); similarly managers shown low autonomy in managing the 
subsidiary (e.g., large amount of e-mail sent to European managers for asking support in 
decision-making). These problems in turn reflected on performance. As a countermeasure, 
the source introduced a self-assessment mechanism to stimulate teamwork, contributions to 
problem-solving activities, and communication across hierarchical levels; it also helped 
recipient managers to analyze employee knowledge about lean principles and practices. In 
addition, Gamma source fixed highly frequent calls to control KPIs as well as performance on 
this self-assessment mechanism and provide support to problem resolution. Moreover, a 
reward structure was developed for stimulating collaboration and acknowledging the efforts 
of more cooperative workers (e.g., financial incentive, more comfortable rest rooms). 
Gamma U.S. 
The source organized a meeting and a tour similar to those in the case Gamma China. 
Recipient’s managers disapproved the initiatives considering them time-consuming and in 
contrast with daily and weekly performance targets of the unit. The source had to handle a 
debate about the usefulness of introducing lean, and had to provide all the factory reports 
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available to support tangible evidences of a return in the long-term, even in the expense of 
an initial investment and a decrease of factory’s productivity. However, few weeks later, after 
visits and meetings, the recipient’s managers agreed to participate to the lean project. 
As in the Chinese case, training involved two steps. First, source representative levered on 
theoretical and practical sessions to train managers, and then local mangers trained 
operators quite independently and by using learning-by-doing method. The participation of 
U.S. workers in both theoretical and practical sections was high (e.g., questions for 
clarifications or more information during classroom lessons, many ideas for solving problems 
and suggestions for redesigning activities and processes); in addition, lean implementation 
was facilitated by openness in communication and collaboration between task force 
members as well as accuracy in implementing standards.  
Recipient managers proved to master lean practices, which were gradually diffused to other 
value streams in the factory. Even managers who had more vigorously opposed to the lean 
transfer project’s launch, eventually thrived lean change (considerable improvements 
achieved by the unit during implementation stage helped to convince more skeptic 
managers); they recognized the critical role of lean as shown by their active participation to 
improvement initiatives (e.g., operator training, problem-solving support, incentive definition 
to stimulate operators’ contribution, cooperation in providing reports and new ideas to the 
source).  
Delta China  
Chinese managers were invited to take part to firm’s lean implementation strategy during a 
meeting; in that occasion, they manifested the intention to implement lean. After a short 
while, the source presented a proposal for lean transfer to the Chinese managers, who 
immediately agreed to start the project. 
According to the company’s guidelines, greenfield factories should be able to product at a 
predefine production level and use the fundamental elements of the company’s production 
system (i.e., respect standard works, use the kanban pull system, do basic cleaning and 
lubrication of equipment, keep clean and organized workstations, use PDCA and work in 
team to continually improve aspects of products and processes) within a year and a half 
since the lean transfer project’s started. At the beginning of the project key recipient 
managers were trained within the source’s factory by participating to every-day activities for 
about a month and a half (i.e., a period deemed sufficient to make various production stages 
and related potential issues clear to recipient managers). Afterwards, these managers came 
back to China and, under the direct supervision of the source, trained other workers on 
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practical aspects, such as the use of equipments, as well as more complex elements, such 
as reading KPIs shown in cell boards. In order to increase clarity and recipient’s participation, 
standard works were also jointly redefined. Moreover, all training activities followed a team 
based learning-by-doing approach, which was deemed particularly appropriate for the 
Chinese context (it would help to avoid consensus even when operators disagreeing to fulfill 
a task, improve the clarity of communication, etc.). 
Training activities were thwarted by some problems related to Chinese employees’ 
behaviors; for example, at the beginning operators were very reluctant to make any 
intervention, even the simplest, on equipments, didn’t propose solutions to resolve problems 
to avoid the risk of failure, while sought consensus and support by managers in every work 
and decision. Thus, the source decided to extend the training period to allow to fix lean best 
practices and to stimulate the recipient’s participation. 
Best practice implementation was hindered by low loyalty to organization and low 
cooperation of some Chinese employees (especially less experience and/or older operators, 
for example, provided very few suggestions in problem-solving), which in turn decreased the 
performance. A number of countermeasures were defined by the source while collaborating 
with local employees to cope with low loyalty issue. In particular, financial rewards were 
defined for more cooperative workers (e.g., employees supporting training of newer 
operators, providing more suggestions for problem resolution) and work conditions were 
improved consistently with needs manifested by locals during production meetings. 
Delta U.S. 
A tour of the Italian factory and a presentation of its lean implementation project were 
organized by Delta source to invite the U.S. factory to join the firm’s lean implementation 
strategy. However, the recipients’ managers initially opposed to lean transfer proposal. The 
source had to organize some other meetings to answer recipient’s several questions about 
lean tools implemented, the time dedicated to the lean project and results achieved. Data 
collection as well as analysis required more time than planned, thus the project started about 
a month later, after recipient agreement. 
Following the company’s indications, recipient key managers were trained by participating in 
the every-day activities in the source factory, while other recipient employees were trained 
within their factory according to a team based practical approach. Although local managers 
were put in charge of training local operators, source representative closely monitored 
activities’ advancement. Similarly, standard works were created by the recipient under the 
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supervision of the source and best practices were gradually introduced. 
Source managers didn’t report major criticalities in these activities; operators were 
adequately trained by scheduled time, both managers and operators took an active part in 
process redefinition and problem resolution, as well as they were able to successfully 
implement fundamental lean practices and achieve performance targets six months after the 
lean transfer project started. Moreover, U.S. managers levered on acquired knowledge to 
redesign other production lines in the factory; they also asked for external support for 
introducing lean in other areas of the recipient unit (e.g., R&D).  
KPIs improvement achieved through lean implementation were attested by the source unit 
and more than one production cells were certified (the MNC used to certify units and 
celebrate the achievement of important objectives). 
5.3 Analysis and results 
This section compares the seven cases so as to identify some possible links between the 
cultural context and problems occurred during the lean transfer projects as well as level of 
adaptation between planned actions and effective countermeasures put into practice. Data 
and information from individual cases were approached through two-variable matrices. First, 
the variable problems in performing lean knowledge transfer project is related to the country 
of the recipient unit. A second matrix relates the cultural context of the source organization 
with the country of the recipient unit, and classify the cases in terms of level of adaptation 
introduced. In fact, evidence from the cases and interviews suggested that interesting 
relations could be found between these variables. The cross-case analysis helped to make 
possible links among variables more evident and was useful to explain the meaning of the 
relations found. Results are summarized in the form of propositions. 
5.3.1 Problems in transferring lean knowledge  
From the within case analysis it emerges that in all the cases investigated the source had to 
face some major difficulties during the early phases of a lean knowledge transfer project. 
Table 16 points out a classification of main problems in transferring lean knowledge 
overseas according to the phase of transfer project in which such problems occurred and the 
country of the recipient unit. As emerges from the visual pattern, it seems that when lean is 
transferred to U.S., main problems are present in the introduction phase. In contrast, when a 
lean transfer project involves a Chinese recipient, some major difficulties affect the 
implementation phase. 
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Table 16: Problems in performing lean knowledge transfer project 
  Country of the recipient unit 
  U.S. China 
Problems in 
performing lean 
knowledge transfer 
project  
Introduction 
phase 
Alpha US, Gamma US,      
Delta US 
 
Implementation 
phase 
 
Alpha China, Beta China, 
Gamma China, Delta China 
 
Evidence from the cases and interviews suggested that socio-cultural peculiarities of a 
recipient unit play a major role in determining problems in transferring lean knowledge. In 
particular, the U.S. context acted as a barrier for the introduction phase of a lean transfer 
project. Low level of pragmatism combined with high level of masculinity, which reflect in 
employees’ focus on short-term and tangible performance as well as tendency of questioning 
new information and proposal to assess their validity, seems to explain managers’ attitude 
against lean implementation at the beginning of the transfer project in cases Alpha U.S., 
Gamma U.S., and Delta U.S.. In case Gamma U.S., for example, managers basically 
opposed the source’s proposal because of considerable time it would have taken to redesign 
production processes and to train employees in lean management, at the expense of worse 
daily- and weekly-sales KPIs.  
Although lean transfer projects require an initial investment, they are expected to fulfill a 
sustainable competitive advantage for the entire organization; during initial meetings and 
factory tours, the sources Alpha, Gamma, and Delta provided several evidences on long-
term advantages obtainable through lean implementation and standardization of production 
processes among subsidiaries. However, this wasn’t enough to persuade U.S. managers to 
approve the proposal for lean transfer. Besides highlighting short-term disadvantages, in all 
the cases Alpha U.S., Gamma U.S., and Delta U.S., the U.S. top management asked for 
additional data that clearly proved tangible benefits of a lean project.  
Conversely, the Chinese socio-cultural context acted as a facilitator for the introduction 
phase of a lean transfer project. In fact, in every project toward an eastern subsidiary – i.e., 
cases Alfa China, Beta China, Gamma China and Delta China –, high respect for hierarchies 
(i.e., high power distance) led managers to approved the source’s proposal, which was 
perceived as a directive of the European headquarters that could not be questioned. 
With regard to the implementation phase, differences between socio-cultural contexts are 
helpful in better understanding the presence or absence of relevant problems in Chinese and 
U.S. factories, respectively. On the one hand, the high power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance characterizing the Chinese society, which reflects in the high respect for 
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hierarchies and tendency of preferring orders issued by supervisors rather than to make 
decisions autonomously, seem to play a major role in determining employees’ non-lean 
behaviors, such as passive participation to problem solving and continuous improvement 
activities and no open communication, in cases Alfa China, Beta China, Gamma China and 
Delta China. In addition, such cultural peculiarities combined with low loyalty towards 
organization seem to explain difficulties in extending or even maintaining the lean 
implementation status achieved by the subsidiaries in all Chinese cases. In cases Beta 
China and Delta China, for example, teamwork sessions were initially hindered by Chinese 
members’ low participation. As emerged from interviews, local employees had difficulty 
providing ideas to solve problems because they feared to contradict supervisors. High 
respect for authorities also thwarted both Chinese operators and managers in giving simpler 
information, such as interacting with clarification requests in theoretical lessons (case Alfa 
China and Gamma China) or providing feedbacks on working conditions (cases Alfa China, 
Beta China, Gamma China and Delta China). As the source representative in charge of the 
lean transfer project in case Delta China remarked, source managers made a huge effort to 
reduce power distance and uncertainty avoidance levels and get the cooperation of Chinese 
workers: 
 
“We have worked side-by-side, day-after-day for several weeks to overcome the 
strong hierarchical barriers, which prevented open communication among us [i.e., 
source’s managers and local workers] and local workers’ participation, and create 
trust”. 
 
In addition, compliance problem, misunderstandings, and several mistakes in practice 
implementation also occurred in all the Chinese cases. In case Alpha China, for example, 
differences in the meanings assigned to the artifacts of communication prevented Chinese 
managers from deeply understanding what is “muda”, even if the source had hired people 
with good English skills (i.e., language selected for communications among managers) and 
provided numerous practical examples to increase the clarity of theoretical concepts. 
Chinese employees’ tendency of hiding doubts and avoiding interaction hindered training in 
all the Chinese cases; especially in classroom lessons – case Alpha China and Gamma 
China –, the source was hard put to identify misunderstandings and fix problems. Chinese 
employees’ doubts and misunderstandings also caused mistakes in lean practice 
implementation. For instance, in case Gamma China the variation in the way operators did 
production activities in respect to what specified in standard works (e.g., different assembly 
sequence of components) revealed a misunderstanding of the fundamental concept, and 
related objectives, of “standard”. Moreover, local workers often took thinks literally and 
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skipped the procedures’ steps which were not made explicit in standards, since considered 
obvious by the European counterpart.  
For what concern extension/maintenance of the lean implementation status, in case Gamma 
China, for instance, only some weeks after the handover, the Chinese unit’s productivity 
significantly declined because of the operation manager’s dismissal in conjunction with two 
operators; cause-effect analysis clearly showed time for new employees’ training and 
problems related with their acquisition of lean work method as major origins of the variance 
in factory’s performance. Moreover, during the period in which new manager was taught, 
several improvement initiatives had to be temporarily stopped, thus precluding continuous 
improvement. Similarly, in the cases Alfa China, Beta China and Delta China the need of 
replacing dismissed operators forced managers to focus training on new workers, thus 
limiting initiatives in other areas of the manufacturing units or aiming at further developing 
lean skills of more-experienced employees. Moreover, in all the Chinese cases especially 
newer employees tended to not communicate problems to supervisors, provided low support 
to problem-solving, and manifested other aforementioned non-lean behaviors strictly 
dependent on high respect for hierarchies and risk aversions. In addition, Chinese managers’ 
concern of making inappropriate decisions limited their autonomy in subsidiary management. 
In case Gamma China, for example, a large amount of e-mails for approval and support 
requests arrived to European managers after their repatriation.  
Conversely, in cases Alfa U.S., Gamma U.S. and Delta U.S. the workers’ values such as 
freedom of expression and self initiative, that reflect low power distance combined with high 
individualism, favored training activities and implementation of lean practices. During 
classroom lessons, for example, U.S. workers asked for clarifications or more information to 
resolve any unclear issues about lean practices (case Alpha U.S. and Gamma U.S.). For 
what concerns implementation, they played an active part in problem resolution and process 
redesign, providing many ideas and suggestions. U.S. workers’ freedom of expression 
favored also the control of the subsidiary’s lean implementation status (i.e., both on field and 
remote control). In addition, US workers’ attitudes such as well as autonomy helped to 
smoothly move on towards following lean initiatives. Loyalty to the organization also 
contributed in making retention of acquired knowledge easier.  
The following proposition summarizes what emerged from cross-case analysis and 
information collected during the interviews. 
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Proposition 1: Major problems characterizing lean knowledge transfer are 
context-specific. 
 
Proposition  1a: 
Problems in U.S. are related to the introduction phase of the lean 
knowledge transfer project. 
 
Proposition  1b: 
Problems in China are related to the implementation phase of the 
lean knowledge transfer project. 
5.3.2 Adaptation of lean knowledge transfer projects  
Table 17 schematizes relations between the cultural context of the source organization, the 
country of the recipient unit and level of adaptation between planned actions and effective 
solutions and countermeasures put into practice. It seems that when lean is transferred to 
U.S., a low level of adaptation is needed. In contrast, when a lean transfer project involves a 
Chinese recipient, the level of adaptation can be affected by the cultural characteristics of the 
source organization. Therefore, in general both variables have to be considered to explain 
the level of adaptation. 
Table 16: Level of adaptation between planned actions and effective solutions and 
countermeasures put into practice 
  Country of the recipient unit 
  U.S. China 
Source 
organization 
OC1:  
low power 
distance 
Delta U.S. (Low adaptation) 
Beta China (Medium adaptation) 
Delta China (Medium adaptation) 
OC2: 
high power 
distance 
Alpha U.S. (Low adaptation) 
Gamma U.S. (Low adaptation) 
Alpha China (High adaptation) 
Gamma China (High adaptation) 
 
Different socio-cultural characteristics of recipient factories are helpful in better 
understanding opposite level of adaptation between planned actions and effective solutions 
put into practice in U.S. and China (i.e., low adaptation versus high or medium adaptation, 
respectively). As clarified in sub-section 5.3.1, low level of pragmatism combined with high 
level of masculinity, which reflect in employees’ focus on short-term and tangible 
performance as well as tendency of questioning new information and proposal to assess 
their validity, are likely to explain U.S. managers’ attitude against lean implementation at the 
beginning of the transfer project in cases Alpha U.S., Gamma U.S. and Delta U.S.. Detailed 
reports on results and improvements obtained by more advanced lean factories in the MNC 
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had to be provided to demonstrate concrete benefits gained through lean, as well as insights 
about lean practices (e.g., lean standards) had to be given to reveal the utility of the lean 
transfer project for the recipient factory. For this purpose, Alpha, Gamma and Delta sources 
organized other meetings and visits, and allowed recipients some time to analyze the new 
information and documents collected (e.g., detailed reports on lean projects in other factories 
of the firm). As emerged from interviews, these countermeasures required few additional 
resources and caused minor delays in lean transfer project (i.e., a postponement of teaching 
sessions of about a month), but were necessary to convince U.S. managers to participate to 
the lean transfer project.  
Conversely, values such as freedom of expression, self initiative  and autonomy, which are 
related with low power distance combined with high individualism of U.S. society, favored 
training activities and the subsequent implementation of lean practices, as well as the control 
of the subsidiary’s lean implementation status also after the handover. Since planned 
activities proceeded almost smoothly, time scheduled was respected and performance 
targets achieved without the need of additional performance. In case Delta U.S., for example, 
the effort and results of U.S. workers was acknowledged by the firm and certifying exemplar 
lean cells within the subsidiary. Only minor modifications to existing tools were introduced. 
For example, in Alfa U.S. the “water spider” standard, i.e., the standard that regulates how 
production lines have to be supplied with components and subsystems according to a milk-
run logic and the presence of a dedicated operator, was adapted. In particular, Alfa source 
ordained that the U.S. factory’s production volumes weren’t enough to justify the cost of a 
dedicated operator, thus a different solution was used.  
Therefore, the overall level of adaptation of each lean knowledge transfer project towards 
U.S. recipients was low. 
On the other hand, cultural peculiarities of the Chinese society, such as high power distance 
and uncertainty avoidance, played a major role in determining employees’ non-lean 
behaviors and compliance problem, while high cultural difference with European countries 
contributed in causing misunderstandings and mistakes in practice implementation in the 
cases Alfa China, Beta China, Gamma China and Delta China; in addition, low loyalty to the 
organization affected the difficulty in maintaining the recipient’s lean implementation status or 
in extending lean (see Sub-section 5.3.1). In order to cope with such problems and 
successfully implementing lean, all the the sources – i.e., Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Delta 
sources – had to invest additional resources compared to what planned, and to introduce 
some new tools; as a consequence, projects’ scheduling was subject to delays. For example, 
in all the cases towards Chinese recipients the incentive system was redesigned to promote 
loyalty, or training activities were extended so as to limit misunderstandings concerning lean 
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practice implementation and to reinforce lean behaviors. However, while in Alfa China and 
Gamma China dyads some planned actions proved ineffective, thus requiring considerable 
additional resources to be redesigned and re-done and determining significant delays (i.e., 
several months), in Beta China and Delta China cases some additional resources were 
required to encourage lean behaviors while implementing lean as planned, and resulted in 
few months of delay. Different cultural characteristics of the source units are helpful in better 
understanding the different level of adaptation between planned actions and effective 
solutions put into practice in dyads involving a Chinese recipient (i.e., high versus medium 
adaptation). 
High power distance – OC2 – is an important distinctive characteristic of the cases Alfa 
China and Gamma China. Firstly, it reflected in external managers’ focus on local 
management during the first transfer initiative. For example, in both Alfa China and Gamma 
China cases training sessions involved two subsequent steps: the external source 
representative trained local managers, which in turn then taught operators. Secondly, in line 
with solutions used in Alfa and Gamma source units, periodical audits were the main 
mechanism for controlling effectiveness of local managers’ work; in case of errors, the 
sources often indicated how to solve problems (i.e., provided precise solutions). For 
example, in the case Gamma China an audit conducted by the source revealed a variation in 
the way Chinese operators did production activities in respect to what specified in the 
standard works (e.g., different assembly sequence of components). Such errors reveal a 
misunderstanding of the fundamental concept, and related objectives, of “standard”, thus the 
source decided that a new training session was necessary to fix this concept.  
Overall, the (initial) approach employed by Alfa and Gamma sources proved ineffective in 
handling misunderstandings and mistakes in lean practice implementation as well as non-
lean behaviors and compliance problem. For example, delegation of training favored the 
transmission of doubts from local managers to operators, thus the spread of errors in lean 
practice implementation; consequently, during shop floor assessment tours, both Alfa and 
Gamma sources had to frequently interrupt production activities and spend much time to 
correct errors. Therefore, considerable additional resources were necessary to redesign as 
well as re-do some actions such as training.  
Conversely, low power distance – OC1 – characterizes Beta and Delta sources. Firstly, it 
reflected in external managers’ constant contact with both local managers and operators, 
even in the early actions of a lean transfer project such as training and creation of operation 
instructions. For example, in both Beta China and Delta China cases external managers 
participate in all training sessions.  Secondly, Beta and Delta sources encouraged high 
involvement of all recipient employees. For instance, rather than providing solutions to 
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problems, external managers’ closely worked with Chinese employees and stimulated their 
participation in providing ideas for overcoming obstacles. Accordingly, in Beta China case 
standard works were jointly redefined, creating more detailed instructions then in the 
source’s factory. In addition, the constant presence of external managers on gemba favored 
the creation of trustful relations between the parties (see the quotation in Sub-section 5.3.1). 
Overall the approach employed by Beta and Delta sources turned out to reduce 
misunderstandings and mistakes in practice implementation as well as non-lean behaviors 
and compliance problem. For example, the external managers’ presence in all the training 
sessions allowed the early identification of local employees’ misunderstandings, and their 
resolution before launching production activities (Beta China and Delta China). As suggested 
by Beta source’s managers during interviews, by constantly verifying employees’ behaviors, 
compliance problem could also be limited. In addition, the creation of trustful relations 
between the parties due to constant presence of external managers on gemba helped to 
reduce non-lean behaviors such as no openness in communication and low participation. 
Team work and collaboration between the parties also helped to define effective solutions to 
increase Chinese employees’ loyalty to the organization (e.g., retention plan and overtimes 
for managers, better work conditions for all workers, etc.). In both Beta China and Delta 
China cases the sources slightly postponed the handover to more vigorously fix lean 
behaviors in recipient employees. As in case Beta China, the source representatives 
preferred to leave more time to Chinese workers to express their ideas instead of imposing 
headquarters’ solutions. Although additional resources were necessary to create trust and 
encourage lean behaviors, and additional activities resulted in few months of delay, the lean 
transfer project was no subject to redesign and was essentially implemented as planned.  
The following proposition summarized these evidences: 
Proposition  2a: 
The level of adaptation in cross-border lean knowledge transfer 
projects is low when lean is transferred to US, independently from the 
OC of the source. 
Proposition  2b: 
The level of adaptation in cross-border lean knowledge transfer 
projects is high when lean is transferred to China in the cases of OC2. 
It is medium in the case of OC1. 
 
Finally, considering the activities and solutions in all lean transfer projects towards China in 
greater detail, it could be observed that, even if the cases are characterized by significant 
differences in the way transfer activities developed (e.g., presence/absence of transfer 
activity redesign, activities redone versus activities postponement), resources invested and 
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delays occurred in the lean transfer projects, thus in the overall level of adaptation of planned 
actions, there are some similarities between effective solutions eventually implemented by 
the four sources.  Firstly, Beta and Delta sources levered on constant contact with both local 
managers and operators since the beginning of the transfer project; when redesigning 
transfer initiatives, also Alfa and Gamma sources decided that a greater collaboration with 
local employees should have been created to overcome transfer problems in China. During 
the second initiative, for example, also Alfa and Gamma sources participated in training 
sessions with operators. A team-based practical method was eventually preferred, and 
effectively implemented by the various sources. As emerged by the interviews, such method 
allowed to overcome communication difficulties as mentors could concretely show what they 
meant when explaining lean principles and standards. Moreover, the sources could verify 
recipient workers’ understanding at once by observing their actions on gemba, thus avoiding 
compliance problem, as well as fixing possible mistakes in advance. In all the Chinese 
cases, extended cooperation in different activities, rather than “spot contacts” (as initially 
done by Alfa and Gamma), also favored the development of trust between source 
representatives and local employees; in turn trust was crucial for instilling lean behaviors 
such as openness, participation to continuous improvement activities and decision-making. 
Sources’ effort into understanding and meeting local needs (e.g., adaptation of tools, 
definition of ad hoc incentive system, etc.) was appreciated by Chinese workers and also 
contributed in stimulating their participation in lean implementation (e.g., providing ideas and 
suggestions to solving problems, support training of new employees, actively participate in 
new lean initiatives). 
Secondly, similar to Beta China and Delta China cases, during the second initiatives both 
Alfa and Gamma sources provided support to local employees in problem resolution by 
stimulating their participation and autonomy, instead of providing solutions used by the 
source. In other words, external managers helped local employees in defining and 
formalizing adapted solutions that better fit their needs.  
Thirdly, all the sources introduced a number of countermeasures aiming at increasing the 
Chinese employees’ loyalty to the organization. In particular, cooperation between source 
and recipient units was fundamental to adapt the incentive system to the specific needs of 
the recipient subsidiary. In case Beta China, for example, overtimes fulfilled local managers’ 
need of higher salaries and retention plan rewarded their loyalty to the organization, while 
additional services were provided to operators (e.g. shuttle for moving between apartment 
and factory, greater quantity and quality of food). As emerged from interviews, in all the 
cases lean itself also contributed to contrasting low loyalty thanks to more safety work 
conditions and employee empowerment. It could be observed that the implementation on 
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some lean practices also helped to limit low loyalty’s negative impacts. As in case Delta 
China, multitasking training ensured that operators could fill in for others in the event of 
dismissals. Tools like skill matrix supported identification of experienced workers, who can 
teach new operators by demonstrating what to do and help them in case of difficulties. 
Finally, some solutions were defined to improve the control of lean implementation status of 
the subsidiaries after the handover. In all the cases the sources committed Chinese 
managers to lever on existing audit systems to check on the progress of the lean 
implementation; they themselves had to strictly monitor recipients’ lean activities and status 
by asking locals precise and regular feedbacks before Chinese units become autonomous in 
lean implementation. However, new tools were also introduced. In case Alfa, for example, 
the source defined a KPI on operators’ global knowledge, which consisted in the ratio 
between the numbers of employees properly taught upon the whole. 
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6 Discussion 
This chapter discusses how the findings of my research relate to existing studies and 
contribute to the literature. In addition, I also shed light on contributions for managers. 
Finally, main limitations are recognized and discussed together with opportunities for future 
research. In particular, Section 6.1 focuses on lean implementation within a manufacturing 
unit, while Section 6.2 concerns lean knowledge transfer between units of MNCs. 
6.1 Lean implementation in a manufacturing unit: contributions, limitations 
and future research 
Starting from the GLOBE model of culture, a wide set of both soft and hard lean practices, 
and most important operational performance, I defined a comprehensive model to study the 
relations between organizational culture, lean practice, and performance of a manufacturing 
unit. I developed and tested two hypotheses considering the difference between successful 
and unsuccessful lean factories in terms of organizational culture and the extent of adoption 
of soft practices. The results of my research provide several academic and managerial 
contributions.  
6.1.1 Theoretical contributions 
The first contribution concerns the link between organizational culture and lean practices. My 
multi-group analysis confirms that they are related, thus supporting previous studies which 
debate the existence of a relationship (Nahm et al., 2004; Prajogo and McDermott, 2005; 
Naor et al., 2008; Baird et al., 2011). However, my results go further, investigating whether 
and how the different organizational culture values can determine the success or failure of 
lean implementation. 
This study highlights some differences between lean adopters and firms that do not lever on 
lean. The first ones have a higher level of in-group collectivism (i.e., an individual’s pride, 
loyalty, and cohesiveness in the organization), a greater future orientation (i.e., the 
propensity to invest and plan long term objectives), and a greater uncertainty avoidance (i.e., 
the willingness to reduce uncertainty through the use of regulations, bureaucracy, and 
techniques based on quantitative data). These characteristics can favor the implementation 
of lean practices, by influencing commitment on behalf of employees and managers to get 
involved in lean transformation. In fact, a high level of uncertainty avoidance usually leads 
managers to introduce practices able to limit unexpected process variability, such as process 
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quality control, work standardization, total preventive maintenance, and daily schedule 
adherence, while in general a high future orientation and in-group collectivism favor the 
propensity to introduce lean practices in order to improve processes. 
However, the main aim of this study was to understand whether companies that successfully 
implement lean show a peculiar organizational culture profile. My data analysis shows that a 
higher level of in-group collectivism, future orientation, and uncertainty avoidance are not 
enough to guarantee the successful implementation of lean. In fact, when comparing the 
organizational culture profile of lean adopters with a high and low level of operational 
performance, I found that high-performance factories are characterized by greater 
institutional collectivism compared to low-performance lean factories. Besides, firms that 
achieved positive results through lean, not only have greater future orientation compared to 
non-lean adopters, but also to low lean performers. Finally, high-performance factories are 
characterized by a lower assertiveness and greater attention to the humane orientation.  
An explanation for these results is that low assertiveness in combination with high humane 
orientation and institutional collectivism are fundamental to fuel an organizational culture that 
promotes collaboration within the company. In these contexts, employees feel free to search 
new solutions for possible process improvement, and share them in problem solving sections 
for lean with the top managers (Lee et al., 2013). Moreover, greater future orientation 
encourages employees to utilize new tools and methods, and promotes a philosophy for 
continuous improvement, which is typical of lean (Flynn et al., 1994; Agarwal, 2013). This 
can make the difference between high- and low-performance lean factories, since one of the 
major causes of lean failure is that at times people, after an initial adoption of lean practices, 
abandon the initiatives undertaken and return to their old ways of working (Bhasin, 2012). 
This organizational culture profile, characterized by low assertiveness, high humane 
orientation, institutional collectivism, and future orientation, is also recognized as a critical 
prerequisite for the development of external collaborative relationships with customers and 
suppliers, which are considered fundamental soft practices for the successful implementation 
of lean. 
Thus, compared to previous studies on the link between lean practices and organizational 
culture (e.g., Tata and Prasad, 1998; Detert et al., 2000; Liker, 2004; Patel and Cardon, 
2010), this research does not only confirm that there is a fit between a certain organizational 
culture profile and lean implementers but also that high performers show some additional 
fundamental organizational culture characteristics which make them different from low 
performers. This suggests that some organizational culture values are linked with the 
decision of whether to implement lean or not, while others influence the successful 
implementation of lean. Thus, the more a company is far from the ideal organizational culture 
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profile for lean – characterized by low assertiveness and high humane orientation, 
institutional collectivism, and future orientation – the less lean is effective in determining good 
performance. But how can a company build this organizational culture in order to succeed 
through lean? The results on differences between high and low performers concerning hard 
and soft lean practices adopted provide the basis for addressing this practical issue. 
The analysis of Table 10 points out that those factories that claim to have a high level of lean 
application extensively implement all the hard lean practices compared to non-lean adopters. 
Instead, focusing on lean factories, while high and low performers do not differ for hard 
practices, they are significantly different if I consider the adoption of soft practices, as high 
performers devote more attention to Human Resource Management, such as training 
employees and small group problem solving, develop long-term relationships with suppliers 
and customers, comprehend the importance of following a business strategy aligned with the 
manufacturing processes, and embrace a philosophy for continuous improvement. Thus, 
these findings demonstrate that the hard practices do not make a difference in achieving high 
operational performance results through lean. Even though lean hard practices remain 
insufficient per se, I am not arguing against their importance since they are necessary in 
order to be lean. What really differentiates high and low performers and leads to a 
competitive advantage is a greater utilization of soft practices.  
The implication for theory is twofold. Firstly, this study confirms those findings stressing the 
importance of adopting soft practices to reach a competitive advantage over competitors 
(e.g., Shah and Ward, 2003; Lagrosen and Lagrosen, 2005; Matsui, 2007; Shah and Ward, 
2007; Fotopoulos and Psomas, 2009; Liker and Rother, 2011). What emerges is that hard 
practices are not distinctive since they are easily acquired and replicated. As a consequence, 
their extensive adoption does not guarantee the successful implementation of lean. 
Secondly, the results on lean implementation appear in line with the convergence view of 
organizational culture supported by some scholars (Child and Kieser, 1979; Shenkar and 
Ronen, 1987). In fact, taken together the differences in soft practices adoption and 
organizational culture dimensions between high and low performers suggest that companies 
that successfully implement lean show a certain organizational culture profile and implement 
soft practices more extensively. As previously explained, a certain organizational culture 
profile can favor the implementation of such lean practices as the soft ones, but in a 
recursive way, it can also be argued that the adoption of soft practices may change the 
organizational culture profile of a company (Prajogo and McDermott, 2005; Narasimhan et 
al., 2012; Wincel and Kull, 2013). For instance, HRM practices – e.g., participating in small 
group problem solving, or employee training – and the exercise of continuous improvement, 
– are usually considered significant experiences by employees and managers alike, which 
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can change their behavior and beliefs. In addition, a manufacturing strategy consistent with 
corporate vision clearly favors a high future orientation, since it avoids spot and non-
coordinated initiatives (Naor et al., 2010). 
This perspective can contribute to tackling the practical question posed above on how to 
build the right organizational culture profile for lean.  
In addition, from a theoretical point of view, it contributes to the debate on the importance of 
societal vs. organizational culture and their effects on performance. My findings support Naor 
et al.’s (2010) assumption on the predominance of organizational versus societal culture in 
predicting operational performance improvements, and provides empirical evidence to 
explain why societal culture should be considered less influential. In fact, my analysis 
highlights that, even though Western and Eastern units present difference in some 
organizational culture values – i.e., in-group collectivism, future orientation, and performance 
orientation – in general, successful lean firms located in the two areas don’t show significant 
difference in organizational culture values as well in the use of soft lean practices (see Sub-
section 3.2.6). Therefore, these findings suggest that societal culture does not influence the 
organizational culture and the extent of soft lean practices of successful lean firms, even 
though it may be relevant, for example, in facilitating or inhibiting the early phases of lean 
adoption. Finally, my research suggests that the use of specific soft practices can really alter 
an employee’s value and behavior. 
6.1.2 Managerial contributions 
Results of my research on lean implementation within manufacturing units are important also 
for managers, because they can explain the reason why hard lean practices are not always 
the panacea for solving all manufacturing problems. Indeed, managers have to bear in mind 
that the success of lean is not related to the use of hard practices (e.g., kanban or SMED), 
since these practices are “order qualifier activities”, i.e., essential but not differentiating. 
Instead, soft practices must be viewed as “strategic order winner factors” which enable to 
achieve a better operational performance compared to competitors. From a managerial 
perspective, maximum attention should be placed on soft practices and organizational 
culture, which are linked. Indeed, my results show that firms which lever on soft practices 
and obtain a competitive advantage have a greater propensity towards an organizational 
system that values people, which encourages altruism and generosity to prevent despotic 
attitudes and aggressiveness and promotes future-oriented behavior in order to improve the 
resilience of the company. As a matter of fact, this culture is compatible with the use of lean 
soft practices. A certain organizational culture profile and lean soft practices not only favor 
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the collaboration with customers and suppliers, but also make employees collaborative with 
each other and loyal to the firm’s vision without opportunistic pressures. Moreover, they 
permit to develop and maintain shared long-term objectives starting from the manufacturing 
level up to organizational strategy in following the lean philosophy of continuous 
improvement. 
Thus managers, who experience difficulties in obtaining performance improvements through 
lean, do not have to invest resources to increase the level of hard practices implementation, 
instead they have to create the right environment that can make lean more effective. As my 
results demonstrate, most managers perceive lean as a set of hard practices to be 
implemented. When introducing lean, several managers usually firstly implement such lean 
hard practices as set up time reduction, layout redesigning, kanban etc. In a short time, they 
realize that these hard practices alone do not have the effect they expected on performance, 
but they are usually unable to recognize the cause of this failure, i.e., the lack of a rooted 
organizational culture consistent with lean. As a consequence, they tend to force non-
culturally prepared actors (i.e., employees, customers, and suppliers) to use hard lean 
practices. Instead the right road to lean requires that managers first and foremost recognize 
when the organizational culture is far from the optimal organizational culture profile that 
makes lean effective. Then they should lever on soft lean practices, as well as hard ones. 
These soft practices, when assimilated into the organization, become routines and can 
decrease the gap between current and ideal cultural profile because they allow for a better 
interrelation and communication between actors, thus promoting collectivism, humane 
orientation, future-oriented vision, and reducing assertive behaviors. Finally, when the right 
organizational culture configuration is achieved, lean methodology becomes effective in 
improving operational performance. 
6.1.3 Limitations and future research 
Limitations should be considered along with my results. Firstly, the research setting could 
limit the generalizability of my findings since HPM sample includes only three manufacturing 
industries.  A replication of the research in different sectors can represent an interesting 
opportunity for future research. For example, it might be interesting to understand if 
organizational culture dimensions have the same importance in other contexts. In fact it can 
be noted that in this study two organizational culture dimensions – power distance and 
performance orientation – are not significantly different in lean and non-lean adopters, and in 
high and low performers. Does this mean that these two dimensions do not represent a 
necessary condition for lean implementation and/or lean effectiveness, or in other industries 
they are related to lean? 
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A second limit is linked to the cross-sectional nature of the data. Starting from the analysis of 
the differences between lean adopters and high and low performers, I have formulated a 
theory on the interplay between soft lean practices and organizational culture, and on the 
role of various organizational culture dimensions in lean implementation. Future studies 
could extend and corroborate these results on the basis of longitudinal data providing 
evidence for possible causal relationships between organizational culture dimensions and 
lean practices. In particular, future empirical studies could address the following questions: 
can a certain organizational culture profile act as an antecedent of lean implementation? 
How can soft lean practices change organizational culture? I call for longitudinal case studies 
to fit this gap, substantiating possible causalities or mutuality between lean and 
organizational culture with rich data.  
A further limit is linked to the focus of this study. I analyzed lean adoption within firms’ 
boundaries and in the immediate supply network, since I considered internal lean adoption 
and the relationships with direct customers and suppliers. An interesting opportunity for 
future research lies in the exploration of the role of organizational and societal culture in 
relation to operations management and supply chain management practices involving the 
entire supply network, addressing unanswered questions about their impact on supply chain 
performance. 
6.2 Lean system transfer between units of MNCs: contributions, limitations 
and future research 
In order to enhance the understanding on how MNCs can efficaciously transfer a lean 
system in foreign countries characterized by different cultures, I conducted case study 
research. First, I examined the project launched by an Italian MNC to transfer lean to its non-
lean Chinese subsidiary (Chapter 4). Basing on Maritan and Brush’s (2003) process model of 
lean knowledge transfer, I deeply analyzed and contrasted two consecutive initiatives 
involved in such a project, which distinguish for the transfer approach used as well as for the 
outcome of the transfer initiative (i.e., unsuccessful versus successful implementation of lean 
practices). Results from this in-depth case study allow to clarify the impact of cultural 
differences between source and recipient factories on the lean transfer process and, in 
particular, on effectiveness of different lean knowledge transfer approaches.  
Second, I conducted a multiple case study considering lean knowledge transfer projects 
successfully managed by a number of European MNCs towards overseas non-lean 
recipients (Chapter 5). In particular, the cases selected involve Chinese and U.S. recipients, 
which provide examples of polar types of societal cultures. Moreover, some clear differences 
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emerged between the cases regarding the organization culture characteristics of the source 
units; two different profiles were considered. Results from the cross-case analysis provide 
further evidence on the role of culture in influencing lean implementation within MNCs and, in 
particular, in determining problems and level of adaptation necessary to successfully transfer 
lean overseas.  
Overall, these results on the transferability of lean systems provide several academic and 
managerial contributions.  
6.2.1 Theoretical contributions 
First of all, findings of both my in-depth and multiple case studies confirm the relevance of 
devoting specific research on cross-border transferability of lean systems in MNCs, 
especially with respect to impacts of culture on transfer projects’ effectiveness. Although the 
more general literature on best practice transfer in MNCs underlines the influence of cultural 
differences in cross-border transfer projects (e.g., Kostova, 1999; Jensen and Szulanski, 
2004) and studies on lean implementation show that culture can greatly affect lean 
effectiveness (e.g., Wincel and Kull, 2013; Liker and Rother, 2011), a little research has been 
focused on analyzing the role of culture in lean knowledge transfer projects. However, as 
pointed out by studies available, the transfer of a lean system between dispersed units of a 
MNC and its effectiveness are likely to be influenced by organizational and societal context 
conditions in general (e.g., Lee and Jo, 2007; Browning and Heath, 2009), and cultural 
characteristics in particular (Wallace, 2004; Jun et al., 2006; Aoki 2008). My in-depth case 
study shows that the first attempt to transfer lean undertaken by Italian managers failed 
despite the success of such lean system within the headquarters. Only after a second 
initiative, in which particular solutions to fit local culture peculiarities were put into practice, 
the foreign unit achieved the objective of maintaining the improvements obtained through 
lean. Similarly, the evidence from my multiple case study shows that all European MNCs had 
to overcome some problems in transferring lean, which were peculiar of the subsidiaries’ 
cultural contexts, before the projects had succeed. In other words, findings from both my in-
depth and multiple case studies support the necessity of dealing with heterogeneity between 
contexts besides traditional issues characterizing lean adoption – i.e., problems 
characterizing implementation within a manufacturing unit – when transferring a lean system 
overseas. 
The impact of culture on lean implementation within MNCs 
My research contributes to the literature by increasing the understanding of the impact of 
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culture on lean implementation within MNCs.  
In line with more general literature on organizational practice transfer in MNCs (e.g., 
Kostova, 1999; Jensen and Szulanski, 2004), findings from my in-depth and multiple case 
studies demonstrate that cultural differences, in terms of both the extent of source-recipient 
difference and some distinctive features of a recipient unit, can be a major hurdle in the 
transfer of a lean system towards an overseas factory. In general, cultural differences can 
lead to various problems during the transfer projects, which sometimes can even preclude 
the success of implementation (Kostova, 1999; Jensen and Szulanski, 2004). Coherently, in 
the case of the project between the Italian and Chinese factories I observed that, for 
example, high socio-cultural differences resulting in lack of a common language and 
differences in the meanings assigned to the artifacts of communications led to 
misunderstandings during theoretical learning sessions and, in turn, to errors in lean practice 
implementation during subsequent phases of the transfer project. In addition, the high 
respect for hierarchies of the Chinese employees resulted in problems such as illusory 
consensus (i.e., “yes” that is not “yes”) and low participation to problem-solving activities. 
Therefore, the presence of various problems, which were not properly acknowledged and 
managed by the source, determined the initial unsuccessful transfer of the Italian lean 
system. These research findings are also in line with contributions on lean which suggest 
that, even though lean can be successfully adopted worldwide, societal culture peculiarities 
can play a relevant role in its implementation (Herron and Hicks, 2008; Kull et al., 2014). In 
particular, they confirm some previous studies on lean implementation in China, which 
suggest some societal culture characteristics such as high power distance and low loyalty to 
the organization as major obstacles for lean, especially for implementation of soft lean 
practices concerning employees involvement in problem solving and product/process 
improvement activities, suggestion programs, and cross-functional training (Rao et al., 1999; 
Zhao et al., 2006; Hofer et al., 2011).  
In addition, my in-depth case study contributes to the literature by providing a detailed 
analysis of the impacts of cultural differences on a lean transfer project. The majority of 
previous studies explored the influence of contextual factors on lean knowledge transfer in a 
general way (e.g., Wallace, 2004; Jun et al., 2006; Ferdows, 2006); conversely, some 
scholars (Szulanski, 2000; Maritan and Brush, 2003) suggested that a process view, which 
distinguishes between the different phases of a transfer project, is more appropriate. In fact, 
for example Maritan and Brush (2003) found that not only initial starting conditions matters 
but also heterogeneity created during the process (e.g., change of the source characteristics 
due to decision of transferring knowledge from a different unit, etc.) can affect problems and 
results of a transfer project. Therefore, my in-depth case study levered on Maritan and 
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Brush’s (2003) process model of lean knowledge transfer to analyze the impact of cultural 
differences on problems characterizing each phase of the transfer project. In that, my study 
represents a first contribution providing a detailed analysis of the impacts of cultural 
differences on a lean transfer project. 
With regard to my multiple case study on lean transfer projects between European sources 
and Chinese and U.S. recipients in MNCs, findings provide further evidence on the relevance 
of cultural differences in affecting lean implementation, and in particular in determining major 
problems during cross-border transfer of lean. However, this research also found that main 
transfer problems are context-specific – i.e., similar within a context and different between 
China and U.S. – and can be effectively classified by considering the phase of lean 
knowledge transfer process in which they occur. On the one hand, I observed that main 
criticalities in U.S. are related with the introduction phase. Low level of pragmatism combined 
with high level of masculinity, which reflect in employees’ focus on short-term and tangible 
performance as well as tendency of questioning new information and proposal to assess 
their validity, are recognized as cultural peculiarities of the U.S. context (Hofstede et al., 
2010). In particular, I found that these characteristics are likely to explain managers’ attitude 
against the transfer projects in the introduction phase of a lean transfer project. On the other 
hand, main problems in China are related with the implementation phase. High power 
distance and high uncertainty avoidance, which reflect in employees’ high respect for 
hierarchies and tendency of preferring orders issued by supervisors rather than to make 
decisions autonomously, combined with low loyalty to the organization, which results in a 
high rate of dismissals, are some cultural characteristics of the Chinese context (Hofstede et 
al., 2010; Hofer et al., 2011). Such peculiarities are likely to explain employees’ non lean 
behaviors such as low participation in problem solving activities and no open communication, 
and compliance problem (or illusory consensus, i.e., “yes” that is not “yes”); high cultural 
differences respect Europe counties seem to be a prominent reason for misunderstandings 
and errors in lean practice implementation during the implementation phase; low loyalty 
seems to explain difficulties in extending or even maintaining the lean implementation status 
achieved by the subsidiaries. 
Besides considering the extent of source-recipient difference and distinctive features of 
recipient factories (i.e., cultural differences), in the multiple case study I also analyzed 
impacts of different source units’ organizational culture profiles on lean knowledge transfer, 
thus providing a wider perspective of the influence of culture on cross-border lean transfer 
projects within MNCs. Although studies on lean implementation within MNCs don’t pay 
adequate attention to this aspect, the more general literature on organizational practice 
transfer in MNCs clearly shows that organizational level factors such as organization culture 
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values promoting communication, cooperative relations and learning can affect transfer 
projects (e.g., Szulanski, 1996; Kostova, 1999; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). As explained 
in Sub-section 5.1.1, some clear differences regarding sources’ organization culture 
characteristics, and in particular the level of power distance, emerged between the cases 
during data collection; thus, I considered source units showing two different organizational 
culture profiles OC1 and OC2, characterized by low versus high power distance, 
respectively. Although there was no evidence of impacts of this variable on major problems 
characterizing a lean transfer project, I found that source’s organization culture 
characteristics can affect the level of adaptation needed to effectively transfer a lean system 
overseas. On the one hand, these findings provide further support for the context specificity 
of main problems characterizing transfer projects. On the other hand, they contribute to the 
debate on practice adaptation by identifying an important determinant of project adaptation in 
lean practice transfer, thus supporting definition of countermeasures needed to successfully 
transfer a lean system overseas. Next paragraph will discuss the impact of cultural 
differences and source units’ organizational culture profiles on level of adaptation.  
Transfer project adaptation: how to adapt 
Findings from my in-depth and multiple case studies contribute to lean literature by providing 
a better understanding on how MNCs should adapt their projects to successfully transfer lean 
systems overseas.  
First, from the analysis of the project launched by the Italian MNC towards its Chinese 
subsidiary, it emerges that strong adaptation is fundamental to effectively transfer a lean 
system when source and recipient are characterized by a high socio-cultural difference. The 
case examines two consecutive initiatives which differ for the transfer approach used as well 
as for the final outcome. In particular, the first initiative can be seen as an attempt to faithfully 
replicate the original lean system developed by the Italian headquarters, which resulted in an 
unsuccessful transfer. On the contrary, significant modifications and ad-hoc solutions were 
defined in the second initiative to fit peculiarities of the Chinese context; this approach turned 
out to be effective in order to maintain the improvements introduced into recipient factory 
through lean. 
Results from my multiple case study provide further evidence on this point. The cross-case 
analysis confirms that the level of adaptation is influenced by socio-cultural differences, in 
terms of both the extent of source-recipient difference and some distinctive features of a 
recipient unit. However, it also demonstrates that organizational culture characteristics of the 
source can affect the level of adaptation. In fact, while all transfer projects toward U.S. 
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factories were essentially performed as planned, with few additional resources needed and 
minor delays in the scheduling (i.e., low adaptation), in case of China the level of adaptation 
required was high or medium depending on level of power distance characterizing the 
source’s organizational culture (i.e., high and low power distance, respectively).  
Therefore, overall these findings provide a relevant contribution to the debate on adaptation 
in transferring lean practices. From the literature review on lean transfer within MNCs it 
emerges that while some scholars support strong adaptation (e.g., Wallace, 2004; Lee and 
Jo, 2007), others consider faithful replication of the original knowledge and solutions of the 
source a more effective approach (e.g., Ferdows, 2006). My results suggest that, in general, 
transfer approach effectiveness depends on cultural characteristics of the dyad involved in a 
transfer project.  
Transfer project adaptation: why adapt 
Besides investigating how culture influences approach effectiveness, my research explores 
reasons underlying successful versus unsuccessful outcomes, clarifying why strong 
adaptation is important to effectively transfer a lean system in case of a high cultural 
difference between the source and recipient. To this aim, findings from the in-depth case 
study are interpreted in light of the “compatibility perspective” theorized by Lozeau et al. 
(2002).  
As claimed by Lozeau et al. (2002), a misfit – i.e., so-called “compatibility gap” – between 
practices and recipient’s characteristics occurs when practices are transferred across 
different contexts. In general, such gap can be filled according to four main approaches (i.e., 
“transformation”, “customization”, “loose-coupling”, and “co-optation/corruption”). However, 
the probability that practices will be captured by and integrated into existing organizational 
dynamics – i.e., unsuccessful transfer – than that the practices will change these dynamics in 
a way consistent with their objectives – i.e., successful transfer – depends on the extent of 
the misfit. In particular, when there is a large compatibility gap, it is likely that a recipient will 
try to corrupt the transferred practices or maintain its own practices (i.e., “co-optation” and 
“loose-coupling”, respectively).  
Considering the case of the Italian MNC, it could be observed that a large compatibility gap 
rose due to significant socio-cultural differences between the headquarters’ and Chinese 
unit’s context. With regard to the transfer approach, using Lozeau et al.’s (2002) terminology, 
the replication strategy sought by the headquarters during the first initiative can be labeled as 
transformation. In fact, the source tried to move the subsidiary towards lean practices and 
solutions as defined for the Italian context, introducing only minor modification. However, 
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considering actual results of the initiative, it can be interpreted as an example of loose-
coupling, which identifies a situation where a source attempts to faithfully transfer its 
practices, but they are superficially adopted by a recipient. For example, several 
misunderstandings and errors in using lean practices and presence of behaviors in contrast 
with lean, such as scarce participation in problem solving activities and no open 
communications, are an evidence of recipient’s poor understanding and slight 
implementation of lean. 
As suggested by Lozeau et al. (2002), it is likely that a recipient resists source’s practices 
when there is a large gap between source and recipient contexts; a main reason can be the 
recipient’s lack of conceptual understanding of the requirements underlying practices. In a 
similar way, Kostova and Roth (2002) observed that “ceremonial adoptions” occur when 
recipient subsidiaries use transferred practices to achieve legitimacy with their headquarters, 
but do not believe they are valuable for their organizations. The authors explained that this 
eventuality is likely to occur when practices are transferred across the world, since people 
can have different social and cultural understanding of practices and related benefits. 
Coherently, my case study provides evidence of problems related with Chinese employees’ 
poor understanding of lean practices during the first initiative. For example, there were 
misunderstandings during theoretical lessons which were only partially recognized by Italian 
managers, thus inevitably resulted in mistakes in practice implementation. As emerged by 
the interviews, external managers noticed that sometimes Chinese employees used lean 
practices in a “mechanical way”, i.e., they acted as taught but without properly understanding 
standards. In case of 5S standard, for example, they placed their equipments in a “non-
rational way”, leaving farther more used tools and vice versa placing nearest those less 
frequently used. As reported in documents on the cause-and-effect analysis the source did 
before launching the second initiative, the Italian managers eventually recognized the non-
acquisition of values underlying transferred lean practices as a major cause of superficial 
implementation during the first initiative. 
In contrast, the second initiatives launched by the Italian MNC followed a customization 
approach, i.e., the gap was closed by adapting source’s practices and solutions (without 
destroying their aims) as well as adjusting recipient organization. On the one hand, in fact the 
case shows that local employees’ behaviors gradually changed as the transfer process 
unfolded, becoming more consistent with the lean philosophy. For example, managers and 
operators actively contribute to problem-solving activities, communicate and cooperate even 
with employees of different hierarchical levels. As revealed by interviews, external managers 
also noted a significant shift in the recipient’s way of thinking (e.g., recipient employees’ 
understanding of the importance of lean behaviors such as participation to process 
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improvement initiatives with personal ideas and solutions, team work, etc.). Therefore, these 
results may be interpreted as a first major step toward the cultural change of the subsidiary – 
i.e., adjustment of the recipient’s organization. On the other hand, I found evidence of strong 
adaptations of source’s lean practices and solutions, such as adjustments of teaching 
method and time committed to problem-solving activities, modification of work instructions, 
definition of ad-hoc KPIs, etc..  
According to Ansari et al. (2010), adaptation allows to create a better fit between transferred 
practices and the recipient’s particular needs, thus increasing their acceptance. In a similar 
way, Lozeau et al. (2002) suggested that the shape of the change should be socially 
reconstructed with recipient’s employees, even though this process inevitably creates hybrid 
solutions and modification of the source’s practices. Coherently, in my case study 
headquarters’ representatives acknowledged that modifications defined according to local 
contingencies (e.g., use of several photos in more detailed work instructions, longer time for 
production meetings to stimulate discussion, ad-hoc KPIs and reword system, etc.) were 
fundamental to stimulate recipient employees’ cooperation and make them deeply 
understand lean practices and potential benefits deriving from their implementation. In other 
word, adaptation was a prerequisite for organizational movement toward lean, thus for 
successful transfer of lean. 
 
Although customization was eventually recognized as an effective approach for transferring 
lean knowledge, the first initiative, and its deep analysis, played an important role in its 
acknowledgment. This is in line with Inkpen’s (2008) observations about the NUMMI case. 
The author noted that the earlier initiatives in TPS transfer were characterized by a lack of 
understanding concerning the proper transfer approach, which in turn resulted in mistakes 
and poor knowledge transferred. However, the author highlighted that such an initial period 
of experimentation on the field was crucial for the definition of an effective process for lean 
knowledge transfer. Therefore, according to him, terming a first unsuccessful attempt to 
transfer lean “a failure” is too simplistic and ignores the challenge faced during the transfer 
process. As emerged from the case analysis, during the first initiative, the Italian managers 
struggled with recognizing or properly estimating the impacts that some Chinese employees’ 
behaviors and values could have had on lean implementation. For example, they 
underestimated the influence of the high power distance and related criticalities such as 
compliance problem. Only after the field experience and a  thoroughly cause-and-effect 
analysis of problems leading to final unsuccessful outcome, they were able to identify main 
problems and estimate their criticality, thus defining effective countermeasures. In other 
words, problem evaluation and resolution required that source’s resources were assigned to 
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the recipient subsidiary, worked side-by-side with recipient employees, thus deeply 
investigating and understanding socio-cultural differences and defining adaptations to fit 
them. This is also consistent with studies on transfer projects which underline the relevance 
of personal mechanisms, thus of a strong presence of source representatives in recipient’s 
unit, for effectively sharing organizational practices, especially those involving tacit/social 
dimensions such as soft lean practices (Kostova, 1999; Maritan and Brush, 2004). 
6.2.2 Managerial contributions 
My research on transferability of lean systems can also be of use to practitioners.  
On the one hand, managers are provided with a thorough description and a classification of 
main criticalities affecting cross-border lean transfer projects. First of all, my findings stress 
the fact that main transfer problems are related not only to traditional issues characterizing 
lean implementation within a single factory, but are also due to heterogeneity between 
contexts. Therefore, managers should keep in mind that the success in lean implementation 
within the source is a necessary but not sufficient condition for success in lean knowledge 
transfer.  
As emerged from the interviews, managers in charge of cross-border lean transfer projects 
are typically expert in lean. However, they frequently have little experience of recipient 
contexts; this can limit the ability of a source to appreciate and understand cultural 
differences, thus defining countermeasures to overcome problems related with such 
differences. In order to successfully transfer lean, my in-depth case study shows that it is 
crucial that the initial assessment of a recipient context is conducted by the source not only 
considering its technical specificities, but also carefully analyzing its social peculiarities. In 
addition, source managers should work side-by-side, day-after-day with recipient workers, 
especially when there is a high cultural difference; such close cooperation will help source 
recognize recipient’s cultural peculiarities as well as to promptly def ine effective 
countermeasures to problems caused by cultural differences.  
Moreover, my findings suggest that problems in lean knowledge transfer are context specific 
– i.e., similar within a context and different between various contexts –, and can affect 
different phases of a transfer project – i.e., introduction or implementation. These are 
important indications for managers in charge of transfer projects to overcome risks of failure 
associated with such initiatives. First of all, they warn MNCs to replicate solutions effective in 
a country in different subsidiaries without a deep analysis of recipients’ specificities. Second, 
these findings provide hints on resources needed to implement the various phases of 
different lean transfer projects. Thus, they can be particularly useful for MNCs that have to 
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coordinate limited resources among simultaneous projects towards different countries. 
On the other hand, another important managerial implication is that my research provides 
practitioners with a framework to understand the changes necessary in lean transfer projects, 
as they face different contexts. Solutions and lean practices that proved effective in the 
source context, or that have required small changes in some recipient contexts, can be 
ineffective for factories elsewhere. So as that lean implementation produces similar results in 
the various factories of a MNC, it is thus necessary to adapt source’s practices and solutions 
to vary degrees. My cross-case analysis shows that in general the level of adaptation can be 
affected by the extent of source-recipient difference and distinctive features of a recipient 
unit, as well as by the organizational culture characteristics of the source. My results also 
suggest that different solutions can be necessary to fit cultural specificities of a recipient 
context, thus increasing recipient’s understanding of the transferred practices and their 
values, and avoiding their superficial adoption. Effective countermeasures are offered to 
managers along with practical guidelines on critical elements upon which managers have to 
put emphasis and specific modifications necessary to adequate tools.   
Overall, these results can support decision making in lean knowledge transfer projects 
towards non-lean manufacturing factories.  
6.2.3 Limitations and future research  
Although my research on transferability of lean systems contributes to both theory and 
practice, there are some limitations that must be recognized. 
First, an important limitation is linked with the contexts analyzed. The in-depth case study 
focused on the initiatives launched by an Italian MNC to its Chinese subsidiary, while the 
multiple case study sample is limited to two types of recipient contexts – i.e., China and US – 
and only European sources. In order to increase the generalizability of the results, future 
studies should be directed towards testing my research findings within larger samples of 
firms, representative of a broader range of cultures. For example, future works can explore 
and compare problems as well as countermeasures used in polar versus more similar 
contexts. 
A second limit concerns the use of retrospective data. Although steps were taken to improve 
the reliability of retrospective reports (e.g., multiple informants interviewed, comparison of 
data from interviews with reports developed in real time as the implementation unfolded), 
potential inaccuracies and biases can be present. Thus I recommend longitudinal studies 
based on real-time data. 
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Findings from the multiple case study are somewhat limited also by the use of a static 
perspective. Therefore, in order to increase the understanding of lean knowledge transfer 
project, I suggest that future studies will employ a process view. 
Finally, my research focuses on the early phases of lean knowledge transfer evaluating 
transferring effectiveness in the short term. Instead, future research should extend the 
analysis to the following phases, evaluating the implications of early actions on subsequent 
initiatives and over a greater time frame.  
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7. Conclusions 
This doctoral thesis analyzed the role of culture in determining lean systems effectiveness 
and in affecting their transferability across factories in MNCs. In particular, the thesis 
addresses three sets of research questions, which guided the empirical research in Chapters 
3, 4, and 5. Chapter 6 discusses the findings, highlighting both academic and managerial 
contributions as well as presenting their limitations and opportunities for future research. In 
this chapter I will summarize the research questions and the answers to such questions 
based on the research findings, together with contributions.  
Lean implementation in a manufacturing unit: the role of organizational culture and 
soft lean practices 
Lean management is a managerial approach widely recognized as powerful in reducing 
waste and continuously improving production processes of a manufacturing unit (Shah and 
Ward, 2007). Many firms worldwide have implemented lean practices obtaining significant 
enhancement in operational performance. However, some lean projects failed to achieve 
such benefits (Liker and Rother, 2011). Over the years researchers have suggested several 
causes for lean projects failure; an inadequate organizational culture and the absence of lean 
soft practices are certainly among the most critical and widest acknowledged in the lean 
literature (e.g., Spear, 1999; Liker, 2004; Rother, 2009; Liker and Rother, 2011). Although 
scholars recognized that there is a relationship between lean, organizational culture and 
performance, and a significant amount of research has been conducted on such topic, the 
literature is lacking in providing a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon.  
Therefore, my research aimed to shed light on distinctive characteristics of successful lean 
factories, in terms of organizational culture dimensions and extent of use of soft versus hard 
lean practices. The following first set of research questions was empirically investigated: 
RQ1 Do successful lean factories show a peculiar organizational culture? 
 RQ1a What is the ideal organizational culture profile for lean? 
 RQ1b Do successful lean factories adopt soft lean practices more extensively 
compared to unsuccessful lean factories? 
Starting from the GLOBE model of culture, a wide set of both soft and hard lean practices 
(concerning people and relations versus technical and analytical tools, respectively), and 
most important operational performance, I defined a comprehensive model to analyze the 
role of culture and soft lean practices in successful lean implementation within a 
manufacturing unit. I developed and tested two hypotheses considering the difference 
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between successful and unsuccessful lean factories in terms of organizational culture values 
and the extent of adoption of soft practices. Data from the HPM research project, including 
317 manufacturing factories in 3 sectors and 10 countries, was used to test hypotheses 
through multi-group analysis method.  
Results indicate that successful and unsuccessful lean factories differ for some 
organizational culture dimensions, thus are characterized by a peculiar organizational 
culture. In particular, it emerges that while some organizational culture dimensions differ 
between lean adopters and non-lean adopters, thus are likely to influence the decision of 
whether to implement lean; others are peculiar only of successful lean factories, thus make 
the difference in the successful implementation of lean. More specifically, the ideal 
organizational culture profile for lean is characterized by higher institutional collectivism, 
future orientation and humane orientation, and lower assertiveness.  
In addition, findings show that successful and unsuccessful lean factories also differ for the 
extent of soft practices adoption. In particular, it emerges that while the level of  
implementation of hard lean practices differ between lean adopters and non-lean adopters, 
successful lean factories distinguish from unsuccessful lean factories for a greater level of 
adoption of soft lean practices. 
From a managerial perspective, the results indicate that, in order to implement lean 
successfully, practitioners have to go beyond lean technicalities by adopting soft practices 
and instilling appropriate organizational culture values in a factory. 
A first limitation of the work is related to the research sample (i.e., only three industries); thus 
future research should replicate the study in other sectors. Another important limitation 
concerns the cross-sectional nature of the data; future longitudinal study should examine 
how organizational culture evolves and interacts with soft practices over time. Finally, I 
analyzed the role of culture and soft lean practices within firms’ boundaries and in the 
immediate supply network, while future studies should extend the focus, involving the entire 
supply network. 
Lean knowledge transfer in MNCs: the role of culture 
In recent years a growing number of MNCs have sought to implement lean across factories 
located worldwide. The aim was to replicate benefits, such as waste reduction and 
production process improvement, achieved in headquarters and/or in historical local 
factories. However, the majority of cross-border lean transfer projects encountered problems, 
and some even failed. Indeed, lean knowledge transfer projects are particularly complex to 
be implemented; besides problems characterizing lean adoption within a factory, managers 
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have to deal with issues concerning the heterogeneity between contexts (Maritan and Brush, 
2003). Unlike the literature on lean implementation within a manufacturing unit, research on 
lean knowledge transfer within MNCs is scarce (Netland and Aspelund, 2014). In particular, it 
lacks a detailed examination of the role of culture in successful transfer of lean knowledge 
among units of MNCs.  
The aim of the thesis was to provide a twofold contribution to this research stream. First, I 
wanted to deeply examine the impact of cultural differences between an Italian MNC and its 
Chinese subsidiary on lean knowledge transfer process, and effectiveness of different 
transfer approaches. Second, I aimed to explain how effectively managing lean knowledge 
projects across a number of lean knowledge owners and recipients in MNCs. In particular, 
the following two sets of research questions were empirically investigated: 
RQ2 How do cultural differences between an Italian factory (lean source in a MNC) and a 
Chinese subsidiary (non-lean recipient) influence the transfer of lean management?  
 RQ2a How do cultural differences influence the effectiveness of lean knowledge 
transfer approach? Why do different lean knowledge transfer approaches lead 
to different outcomes? 
 RQ2b How should an Italian factory adapt its lean system to fit peculiarities of a 
Chinese subsidiary? 
 
RQ3 How can MNCs handle factories’ cultural differences in cross-border lean knowledge 
transfer projects? 
 RQ3a How do cultural contexts of the source and recipient influence cross-border lean 
knowledge transfer projects within MNCs? 
 RQ3b What are the main variables differentiating cross-border lean knowledge transfer 
projects within MNCs? 
 
In order to address the second set of research questions I conducted an in-depth case study. 
I examined a project recently launched by an Italian MNC to transfer lean to its non-lean 
Chinese subsidiary, which involved two consecutive initiatives: the first unsuccessful, and the 
second successful. Finally, I conducted a multiple case study to address the third set of 
research questions. I analyzed seven successful lean knowledge transfer projects at dyadic 
level. They concern four different European MNCs, and involved four different European 
sources together with their Chinese and U.S. non-lean recipients. Literal and theoretical 
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issues were assessed by ascertaining that similarities as well as differences regarding 
cultural characteristics of the sources as well as of the recipients. 
Results of my in-depth case study confirm that cultural differences can be a major hurdle in 
transferring a lean system overseas, and contribute to the literature by providing a detailed 
examination of the impact of cultural differences on lean transfer process. In particular, I 
shed light on major problems occurred during each phase of the transfer process between 
the Italian source and Chinese recipient. I observed that, if not properly managed, cultural 
differences can even preclude the successful transfer of lean knowledge overseas. In fact, 
from the analysis of the transfer project between the Italian headquarters and Chinese 
subsidiary emerged that the approach used by the source to transfer lean knowledge played 
a crucial role in determining the success/failure of the transfer initiative. By interpreting 
findings in light of the “compatibility perspective” theorized by Lozeau et al. (2002), the 
research also contributes in clarifying reasons underlying successful versus unsuccessful 
outcomes in lean transfer projects. In particular, strong adaptation turned out to be 
fundamental to effectively transfer a lean system when source and recipient are 
characterized by a high socio-cultural difference. In line with Ansari et al. (2010), in fact I 
found that adaptation helped to avoid and overcome transfer problems, such as recipient’s 
lack of conceptual understanding of lean practices and non lean behaviors, by creating a 
better fit between transferred practices and recipient’s particular needs and peculiarities.  
Findings from the lean transfer project between the Italian factory and Chinese subsidiary 
can also be useful for practitioners to overcome risks of failure associated with lean transfer 
initiatives. In particular, managers are advised to deeply analyze societal culture peculiarities 
of recipient, besides its technical specificities, when adapting a lean system. To this aim, 
source’s experience on the field while collaborating with recipient workers is important to 
properly identify criticalities due to cultural difference as well as define effective 
countermeasures to handle such problems. Moreover, the study offers specific solutions to 
overcome problems found. 
Generalizability of the findings is limited by the use of a single case study. Therefore, further 
research could be directed towards testing research findings within larger samples of firms, 
and with subsidiaries in different cultural contexts. Another limitation concerns the use of 
retrospective data. Although steps were taken to improve the reliability of retrospective data, 
potential inaccuracies and biases can be present. Thus, I recommend longitudinal studies 
based on real-time data. 
 
For what concerns my multiple case study, findings provide a further demonstration that 
cultural characteristics of a recipient country as well as the extent of cultural difference in 
109 
 
respect to the source (i.e., cultural differences) can be a major cause of problems in lean 
transfer projects. I found that main transfer problems are context-specific – i.e., similar within 
a context and different between China and U.S.. In addition, I suggested that problems can 
be effectively classified by considering the phase of the process in which they occurred. In 
particular, while main criticalities in U.S. are related with the introduction phase, main 
problems in China are related with implementation phase. 
Multiple case study also analyzed the impact of different source units’ organizational culture 
profiles on lean knowledge transfer, thus contributing to the literature by providing a wider 
perspective of the influence of culture on cross-border lean transfer projects within MNCs. 
My results show that source’s organization culture characteristics can affect the level of 
adaptation needed to effectively transfer a lean system overseas. In particular, I found that all 
transfer projects toward U.S. factories were essentially performed as planned, with few 
additional resources needed and minor delays in the scheduling (i.e., low adaptation), while 
in case of China the level of adaptation required was high or medium depending on level of 
power distance characterizing source’s organizational culture (i.e., high and low power 
distance, respectively). Therefore, my findings also contribute to the debate on practice 
adaptation by identifying an important determinant of project adaptation in lean practice 
transfer. 
Overall, this research attempts to develop a set of propositions which contributes to create a 
theory on lean knowledge transfer across lean knowledge owners and recipients in MNCs. 
However, results can also be of use to practitioners. In fact, suggestions for effectively 
manage different contexts are also deduced to support managers in reducing the risk of 
failure when transferring lean. 
Finally, it should be observed that my multiple case study is limited to a relatively small 
sample; only two types of recipient contexts and only European sources. Future studies 
should test research findings within larger samples of MNCs, representative of a broader 
range of cultural contexts. As in case of the in-depth case study, I used retrospective data. In 
order to avoid potential inaccuracies and biases due to the use of retrospective data, I 
recommend longitudinal studies based on real-time data. Finally, findings from the multiple 
case research are also somewhat limited by the use of a static perspective; thus, in order to 
increase the understanding of lean knowledge transfer project, I suggest that future studies 
will employ a process view. 
110 
 
111 
 
References 
Achanga, P., Shehab, E., Roy, R., Nelder, G., 2006. Critical success factors for lean 
implementation within SMEs. Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management, 17(4), 460-
471. 
Agarwal, R.,Green, R., Brown, P.J., Tan, H., Randhawa, K., 2013. Determinants of quality 
management practices: An empirical study of New Zealand manufacturing firms. 
International Journal of Production Economics, 142(1), 130-45. 
Aksu, M.B., 2003. TQM readiness level perceived by the administrators working for the 
central organization of the Ministry of National Education in Turkey. Total Quality 
Management & Business Excellence, 14(5), 591-604. 
Ansari, S.M., Fiss, P.C., Zajac, E.J., 2010. Made to fit: how practices vary as they diffuse. 
Academy of Management Review, 35(1), 67–92. 
Aoki, K., 2008. Transferring Japanese kaizen activities to overseas plants in China. 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 28(6), 518-539. 
Argote, L., Ingram, P., 2000. Knowledge transfer: A basis for competitive advantage in firms. 
Organizational behavior and human decision processes. 82(1),150-169. 
Atkinson, P., 2010. Lean is a cultural issue. Management Services, 54, 35-44. 
Baird, K., Hu, K., Reeve, R., 2011. The relationships between organizational culture, total 
quality management practices and operational performance. International Journal of 
Operations & Production Management, 31(7), 789-814. 
Baker, E.L., 1980. Managing Organizational Culture. Management Review, 69(7), 8-13. 
Bateman, N., 2005. Sustainability: the elusive element of process improvement. International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management, 25(3), 261-276. 
Bhasin, S., 2012. Prominent obstacles to lean. International Journal of Productivity and 
Performance Management, 61(4), 403-425. 
Boisnier, A., Chatman, J., 2002. The role of subcultures in agile organizations. Division of 
Research, Harvard Business School. 
Bollbach, M., 2012. Transfer of Lean Manufacturing to China–Lessons from Two German-
Chinese Production Plants. Applied Mechanics and Materials, 110, 2087-2093. 
Bortolotti, T., Danese, P., Romano, P., 2013. Assessing the impact of just-in-time on 
operational performance at varying degrees of repetitiveness. International Journal of 
Production Research, 51(4), 1117-1130. 
112 
 
Bozarth, C.C., Warsing, D.P., Flynn, B.B., Flynn, E.J., 2009. The impact of supply chain 
complexity on manufacturing plant performance. Journal of Operations Management, 27, 78-
93. 
Bright, K., Cooper, C.L., 1993. Organizational culture and the management of quality. 
Journal of Managerial Psychology, 8(6), 21-27. 
Browning, T.R., Ralph D.H.., 2009. Reconceptualizing the effects of lean on production costs 
with evidence from the F-22 program. Journal of Operations Management 27(1), 23-44. 
Byrne, B.M., 1998. Structural Equation Modeling: Basic Concepts, Applications, and 
Programming. Academy of Management Journal, 20(2), 343-378. 
Calvo-Mora, A., Picón, A., Ruiz, C., Cauzo, L., 2013. The relationships between soft-hard 
TQM factors and key business results. International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management, 34(1), 115 - 143. 
Challis, D., Samson, D., Lawson, B., 2005. Impact of technological, organizational and 
human resource investments on employee and manufacturing performance: Australian and 
New Zealand evidence. International Journal of Production Research, 43(1), 81-107. 
Chavez, R., Gimenez, C., Fynes, B., Wiengarten, F., Yu, W., 2013. Internal lean practices 
and operational performance: The contingency perspective of industry clockspeed. 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 33(5), 562 - 588.  
Chen, Z., Tan, K.H., 2013. The impact of organization ownership structure on JIT 
implementation and production operations performance. International Journal of Operations 
& Production Management, 33(9), 1202 - 1229. 
Child, J., Kieser, A., 1979. Organization and managerial roles in British and west German 
companies: an examination of the culture-free thesis. In: Lammers, C.J., Hickson, D.J. 
(Eds.). Organizations Alike and Unlike: International and Interinstitutional Studies in the 
Sociology of Organizations. London: Routledge/Kegan Paul, 251–271. 
Cohen, W.M., Levinthal, D.A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and 
innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 128-152. 
Colotla, I., Shi, Y., and Gregory, M.J., 2003. Operation and performance of international 
manufacturing networks. International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 
23 (10), 1184-1206.Cua, K.O., McKone, K.E., Schroeder, R.G., 2001. Relationships between 
implementation of TQM, JIT, and TPM and manufacturing performance. Journal of 
Operations Management, 19(6), 675-694. 
113 
 
Dabhilkar, M., Åhlström, P. 2013. Converging production models: the STS versus lean 
production debate revisited. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 
33(8), 1019 - 1039. 
Danese, P., Kalchschmidt, M., 2011. The role of the forecasting process in improving 
forecast accuracy and operational performance. International Journal of Production 
Economics, 131(1), 204-214. 
Danese, P., Romano, P., Bortolotti, T., 2012. JIT production, JIT supply and performance: 
investigating the moderating effects. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 112(3), 441-
465. 
Davies, P., 2006. What’s This India Business? Offshoring, Outsourcing and the Global 
Services Revolution. Nicholas Brealey International, London.  
Deal, T., Kennedy, A., 1982. Corporate Cultures: The Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life. 
Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA. 
Deming, W.E., 1986. Out of the Crisis. Mass, Cambridge, MA. 
Denison, D.R., Mishra, A., 1995. Toward a theory of organizational culture and effectiveness. 
Organization Science, 6(2), 204–223. 
Denison, D., Nieminen, L., Kotrba, L., 2012. Diagnosing organizational cultures: A 
conceptual and empirical review of culture effectiveness surveys. European Journal of Work 
and Organizational Psychology, 1-17. 
Detert, J., Schroeder, R.G., Mauriel, J., 2000. A framework for linking culture and 
improvement initiatives in organizations. Academy of Management Review, 25(4), 850-863. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989), “Building theories from case study research”, Academy of 
management review, 14, (4), 532-550. 
Evans, J.R., Lindsay, W.M., 2005. The Management and Control of Quality. (6th ed.) South-
Western College Pub., Cincinnati, OH. 
Ferdows, K. (2006), "POM Forum: Transfer of Changing Production Know‐How", Production 
and Operations Management, 15 (1), 1-9. 
Fey, C.F., Denison, D.R., 2003. Organizational culture and effectiveness: can American 
theory be applied in Asia? Organization Science, 14(6), 686–706. 
Flynn, B.B., Huo, B., Zhao, X., 2010. The impact of supply chain integration on performance: 
A contingency and configuration approach. Journal of Operations Management, 28, 58-71. 
114 
 
Flynn, B.B., Sakakibara, S., Schroeder, R.G., Bates, K.A., Flynn, E.J., 1995. Relationship 
between JIT and TQM: practices and performance. Academy of management Journal, 38(5), 
1325-1360. 
Flynn, B.B., Schroeder, R.G., Sakakibara, S., 1994. A framework for quality management 
research and an associated measurement instrument. Journal of Operations Management, 
11, 339-366. 
Fotopoulos, C.B., Psomas, E.L., 2009. The impact of “soft” and “hard” TQM elements on 
quality management results. International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management, 26(2), 
150-163. 
Friedman, T.L., 2006. The world is flat: A brief history of the twenty-first century, Straus and 
Giroux: Farrar. 
Fullerton, R.R., McWatters, C.S., 2002. The role of performance measures and incentive 
systems in relation to the degree of JIT implementation. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 27(8), 711-735. 
Galbraith, C.S., 1990. Transferring core manufacturing technologies in high tech firms. 
California Management Review, 32(4), 56-70. 
Gerhart, B., 2008. How Much Does National Culture Constrain Organizational Culture? 
Management and Organization Review, 5(2), 241–259. 
Ginevičius, R., Vaitkūnaite, V., 2006. Analysis of organizational culture dimensions impacting 
performance. Journal of Business Economics and Management, 7(4), 201–211. 
Gordon, G.G., DiTomaso, N., 1992. Predicting corporate performance from organizational 
culture. Journal of Management Studies, 29(6), 783–798. 
Ghoshal, S., and Bartlett, C.A., 1988. Creation, adoption, and diffusion of innovations by 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations. Journal of International Business Studies, 19, 365-
388. 
Gupta, A. K., and Govindarajan, V., 2000. Knowledge flows within multinational corporations. 
Strategic management journal, 21 (4), 473-496. 
Hair, J.F., Black, W.C., Babin, B.J., Anderson, R.E., Tatham, R.L., 2006. Multivariate Data 
Analysis (6th ed.), Pearson Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ. 
Henriksen, B., Rolstadås, A., 2010. Knowledge and manufacturing strategy–how different 
manufacturing paradigms have different requirements to knowledge. Examples from the 
automotive industry. International Journal of Production Research, 48(8), 2413-2430. 
115 
 
Herron, C., Hicks, C., 2008. The transfer of selected lean manufacturing techniques from 
Japanese automotive manufacturing into general manufacturing (UK) through change 
agents. Robotics and Computer-Integrated Manufacturing, 24 (4), 524-531. 
Hines, P., Holweg, M., Rich, N., 2004. Learning to evolve: A review of contemporary lean 
thinking. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 24(10), 994-1011. 
Hofer, A.R., Hofer, C., Eroglu, C., Waller, M.A., 2011. An institutional theoretic perspective 
on forces driving adoption of lean production globally: China vis-à-vis the USA. The 
International Journal of Logistics Management, 22(2), 148-178. 
Hofstede, G., 1980. Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-related 
Values. Sage, Beverly Hills, CA. 
Hofstede, G., Neuijen, B., Ohayv, D.D., Sanders, G., 1990. Measuring organizational 
cultures: A qualitative and quantitative study across twenty cases. Administrative science 
quarterly, 35, 286-316. 
Holweg, M., 2007. The genealogy of lean production. Journal of operations management, 
25(2), 420-437. 
House, R.J., Hanges, P.J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P.W., Gupta, V., 2004. Culture, 
Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies. Sage Publications, 
Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Hsu, C.C., Tan, K.C., Kannan, V.R., Leong, G.K., 2009. Supply chain management practices 
as a mediator of the relationship between operations capability and firm performance. 
International Journal of Production Research, 47(3), 836-855. 
Huang, X., Kristal, M.M., Schroeder, R.G., 2008. Linking learning and effective process 
implementation to mass customization capability. Journal of Operations Management, 26(6), 
714-729. 
Inkpen, A.C., 2008. Knowledge transfer and international joint ventures: the case of NUMMI 
and General Motors. Strategic Management Journal, 29 (4), 447-453. 
James, L.R., Demaree, R.G., Wolf, G., 1984. Estimating within-group interrater reliability with 
and without response bias. Journal of Applied Psychology, 69, 85-98. 
Jensen, R. and Szulanski, G., 2004. Stickiness and the adaptation of organizational practices 
in cross-border knowledge transfers. Journal of International Business Studies, 35, (6), 508-
523. 
Jöreskog, K.G., Sörbom, D., 1989. LISREL 7: A guide to the program and applications. 
SPSS Publications, Chicago. 
116 
 
Jung, T., Scott, T., Davies, H.T.O., Bower, P., Whalley, D., McNally, R., Mannion, R., 2009. 
Instruments for Exploring Organizational Culture: A Review of the Literature. Public 
Administration Review, 69(6), 1087-1096. 
Karahanna, E., Evaristo, J.R., Srite, M., 2005. Levels of Culture and Individual Behavior: An 
Integrative Perspective. Journal of Global Information Management, 13(2), 1–20. 
Karlsson, C., Åhlström, P., 1996. Assessing changes towards lean production. International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management, 16(2), 24-41. 
Kluckhohn, F., Strodtbeck, F., 1973. Variations in value orientation. Greenwood, Westport, 
CT. 
Kerrin, M., 1999. Continuous improvement capability: assessment within one case study 
organisation. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 19(11), 1154-
1167. 
Kogut, B., Zander, U., 1993. Knowledge of the firm and the evolutionary theory of the 
multinational corporation. Journal of International Business Studies, 24(4), 625. 
Kostova, T., 1999. Transnational Transfer of Strategic Organizational Practices: A Contextual 
Perspective. The Academy of Management Review, 24, (3), 308-324. 
Kotter, J.P., Heskett, J.L., 1992. Corporate Culture and Performance. New York: The Free 
Press. 
Kostova, T., Roth, K., 2002. Adoption of an Organizational Practice by Subsidiaries of 
Multinational Corporations: Institutional and Relational Effects. The Academy of Management 
Journal, 45(1), 215-233. 
Koufteros, X., Marcoulides, G.A., 2006. Product development practices and performance: A 
structural equation modeling-based multi-group analysis. International Journal of Production 
Economics, 103, 286-307. 
Kull, T.J., Wacker, J.G., 2010. Quality management effectiveness in Asia: The influence of 
culture. Journal of Operations Management, 28, 223–239. 
Kull, T.J., Yan, T., Liu, Z., Wacker, J.G., 2014. The moderation of lean manufacturing 
effectiveness by dimensions of national culture: Testing practice-culture congruence 
hypotheses. International Journal of Production Economics, 153, 1-12. 
Lagrosen, Y., Lagrosen, S., 2005. The effects of quality management-a survey of Swedish 
quality professionals. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 25(10), 
940-952. 
117 
 
Lander, E., Liker, J.K., 2007. The Toyota Production System and art: making highly 
customized and creative products the Toyota way. International Journal of Production 
Research, 45(16), 3681-3698. 
Lee, P.K.C., To, W.M., Yu, B.T.W., 2013. Team attributes and performance of operational 
service teams: An empirical taxonomy development. International Journal of Production 
Economics, 142(1), 51-60. 
Lee, B.H., Jo, H.J., 2007. The mutation of the Toyota Production System: adapting the TPS 
at Hyundai Motor Company. International Journal of Production Research, 45, (16), 3665-
3679. 
Lee, S.K.J., Yu, K., 2004. Corporate culture and organizational performance. Journal of 
Managerial Psychology, 19(4), 340–359. 
Li, S., Rao, S.S., Ragu-Nathan, T.S., Ragu-Nathan, B., 2005. Development and validation of 
a measurement instrument for studying supply chain management practices. Journal of 
Operations Management, 23(6), 618-641. 
Liker, J.K., 2004. The Toyota way. McGraw-Hill, New York, NY. 
Liker, J.K., Hoseus, M., 2008. Toyota Culture – The Heart and Soul of the Toyota Way. 
McGraw-Hill, New York, NY. 
Liker, J.K., Hoseus, M., 2010. Human resource development in Toyota culture. International 
Journal of Human Resources Development and Management, 10(1), 34-50. 
Liker, J.K., Rother, M., 2011. Why lean programs fail. Lean Enterprise Institute. 
Lim, B., 1995. Examining the organizational culture and organizational performance link. 
Leadership & Organization Development Journal, 16(5), 16–21. 
Liu, S., 2003. Cultures within Culture: Unity and Diversity of Two Generations of Employees 
in State-Owned Enterprises. Human Relations, 56(4), 387–417. 
Lozeau, D., Langley, A., Denis, J.-L., 2002. The corruption of managerial techniques by 
organizations. Human Relations, 55(5), 537-564. 
Lubke, G.H., Dolan, C.V., Kelderman, H., Mellenbergh, G.J., 2003. On the relationship 
between sources of within- and between-group differences and measurement invariance in 
the common factor model. Intelligence, 31(6), 543-566. 
Mackelprang, A.W., Nair, A., 2010. Relationship between just-in-time manufacturing 
practices and performance: A meta-analytic investigation. Journal of Operations 
Management, 28(4), 283-302. 
118 
 
Maheshwari, S.K. and Zhao, X., 1994. Benchmarking quality management practices in India. 
Benchmarking for Quality Management and Technology, 1, (2), 5-23. 
Mann, D., 2005. Creating a lean culture: tools to sustain lean conversion. Productivity Press, 
New York, NY. 
Maritan, C.A., Brush, T.H., 2003. Heterogeneity and transferring practices: implementing flow 
manufacturing in multiple plants. Strategic Management Journal, 24, (10), 945-959. 
Martınez-Costa, M., Choi, T.Y., Martınez, J.A., Martınez-Lorente, A.R., 2009. ISO 
9000/1994, ISO 9001/2000 and TQM: The performance debate revisited. Journal of 
Operations Management, 27, 495-511. 
Matsui, Y., 2007. An empirical analysis of just-in-time production in Japanese manufacturing 
companies. International Journal of Production Economics, 108(1-2), 153-164. 
McCutcheon, D. and Meredith, J.R. 1993. Conducting case study research in operations 
management. Journal of Operations Management, 11, 239-56. 
McKone, K.E., Schroeder, R.G., Cua, K.O., 2001. The impact of total productive 
maintenance practices on manufacturing performance. Journal of Operations Management, 
19(1), 39-58. 
McKone-Sweet, K., Lee, Y.T., 2009. Development and analysis of a supply chain strategy 
taxonomy. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 45(3), 3-24. 
Meredith, J., 1993. Theory building through conceptual methods. International Journal of 
Operations & Production Management, 13(5), 3-11. 
Mohr, J.J., Sengupta, S., 2002. Managing the paradox of inter-firm learning: the role of 
governance mechanisms. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 17(4), 282-301. 
Mollenkopf, D.A., Frankel, R., Russo, I., 2011. Creating value through returns management: 
Exploring the marketing–operations interface. Journal of Operations Management, 29(5), 
391-403.  
Moyano-Fuentes, J., Sacristán-Díaz, M., 2012. Learning on lean: a review of thinking and 
research. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 32(5), 551-582. 
Moyano-Fuentes, J., Sacristán-Díaz, M., Martínez-Jurado, P.J., 2012. Cooperation in the 
supply chain and lean production adoption: Evidence from the Spanish automotive industry. 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 32(9), 1075-1096. 
Nahm, A.Y., Vonderembse, M.A., Koufteros, X.A., 2004. The Impact of Organizational 
Culture on Time-Based Manufacturing and Performance. Decision Sciences, 35(4), 579-607. 
119 
 
Naor, M., Goldstein, S., Linderman, K.W., Schroeder, R.G., 2008. The Role of Culture as 
Driver of Quality Management and Performance: Infrastructure Versus Core Quality 
Practices. Decision Sciences, 39(4), 671-702. 
Naor, M., Linderman, K., Schroeder, R.G., 2010. The globalization of operations in Eastern 
and Western countries: Unpacking the relationship between national and organizational 
culture and its impact on manufacturing performance. Journal of Operations Management, 
28(3), 194-205. 
Narasimhan, Ram, Kull, T.J., Nahm, A., 2012. Alternative relationships among integrative 
beliefs, time-based manufacturing and performance. International Journal of Operations & 
Production Management, 32(4), 496-524. 
Netland, T.H., Aspelund, A., 2013. Company-specific production systems and competitive 
advantage: A resource-based view on the Volvo production system. International Journal of 
Operations & Production Management, 33(11/12), 1511-1531. 
Netland, T.H., and Aspelund, A., 2014. Multi-plant improvement programmes: A literature 
review and research agenda. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 
34(3), 390-418. 
Nikolic, M., Saciv, M., Cockalo, D., Vukonjanski, J., Jovanovic, D., 2011. The impact of 
organizational culture on economic indices – A study in Serbian companies. African Journal 
of Business Management, 5(11), 4622–4635. 
Ohno, T., 1988. Toyota Production System: Beyond Large-Scale Production. Productivity 
press, Cambridge, MA. 
Olhager, J., Prajogo, D.I., 2012. The impact of manufacturing and supply chain improvement 
initiatives: A survey comparing make-to-order and make-to-stock firms. Omega, 40(2), 159-
165. 
Oliff, M. P., Arpan, J.S., DuBois, F.L. 1989. Global manufacturing rationalizing: the design 
and management of international factory networks. In Ferdows, K. (Ed.), Managing 
International Manufacturing, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 41-65. 
Ouchi, W.G., 1981. Theory Z: how American business can meet the Japanese challenge. 
Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA. 
O’Reilly, C., Chatman, J.A., Caldwell, D.F., 1991. People and organizational culture: a profile 
comparison approach to assessing person-organization fit. Academy of Management 
Journal, 34(3), 487-516. 
Patel, P., Cardon, M., 2010. Adopting HRM practices and their effectiveness in small firms 
facing product-market competition. Human Resource Management, 49(2), 265-290. 
120 
 
Peters, T.J., Waterman, R.H., 1982. In search of excellence. Harper & Row, New York, NY. 
Pettigrew, A., 1979. On studying organizational cultures. Administrative science quarterly, 
24(4), 570-581. 
Ployhart, R.E., Oswald, F.L., 2004. Applications of Mean and Covariance Structure Analysis: 
Integrating Correlational and Experimental Approaches. Organizational Research Methods, 
7(1), 27-65. 
Porter, M., 1985. Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. 
Free Press, New York. 
Powell, D. 2013. ERP systems in lean production: new insights from a review of lean and 
ERP literature. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 33(11/12), 
1490-1510. 
Pavnaskar, S.J., Gershenson, J.K., Jambekar, A.B., 2003. Classification scheme for lean 
manufacturing tools. International Journal of Production Research, 41(13), 3075-3090. 
Prahalad, C.K., Doz, Y., 1987. The multinational mission: balancing local demands and 
global vision. New York, Free Press. 
Prajogo, D., McDermott, C., 2005. The relationship between total quality management 
practices and organizational culture. International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management, 25(11), 1101-1122. 
Prajogo, D., McDermott, C., 2011. The relationship between multidimensional organizational 
culture and performance. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 
31(7), 712–735. 
Quinn, R.E., Rohrbaugh, J., 1983. A spatial model of effectiveness criteria: Towards a 
competing valuess approach to organizational analysis. Management Science, 29, 363-377. 
Rahman, S., Bullock, P., 2005. Soft TQM, hard TQM, and organisational performance 
relationships: an empirical investigation. Omega, 33, 73-83. 
Ralston, D.A., Holt, D.H., Terpstra, R.H., Kai-cheng, Y., 1997. The impact of national culture 
and economic ideology on managerial work values: a study of the United States, Russia, 
Japan, and China. Journal of International Business Studies, 28(1), 177–207. 
Raykov, T., 2001. Testing multivariable covariance structure, means hypotheses via 
structural equation modeling. Structural Equation Modeling, 8(2), 224-256. 
Rao, S.S., Raghunathan, T.S. and Solis, L.E., 1999. The best commonly followed practices 
in the human resource dimension of quality management in new industrializing countries: the 
121 
 
case of China, India and Mexico”, The International Journal of Quality & Reliability 
Management, 16 (3), 215-26. 
Riusala, K., Suutari, V., 2004. International knowledge transfers through expatriates. 
Thunderbird International Business Review, 46(6), 743-770. 
Romano, P., Formentini, M., 2013. Designing and implementing open book accounting in 
buyer-supplier dyads: A framework for supplier selection and motivation. International 
Journal of Production Economics, 137(1), 68-83. 
Rother, M., 2009. Toyota kata: Managing people for improvement, adaptiveness and 
superior results. McGraw-Hill. 
Rother, M., Shook, J., 1998. Learning to See: Value Streem Mapping to Add Value and 
Eliminate Muda. The Lean Enterprise Institute, Brookline. 
Samson, D., Terziovski, M., 1999. The relationship between total quality management 
practices and operational performance. Journal of Operations Management, 17, 393-409. 
Schein, E.H., 1984. Coming to a new awareness of organizational culture. Sloan 
Management Review, 25(2),3-16. 
Schonberger, R., 2007. Japanese production management: An evolution—With mixed 
success. Journal of Operations Management, 25(2), 403-419. 
Schroeder, R.G., Flynn, B.B., 2001. High Performance Manufacturing: Global Perspectives. 
Wiley, New York. 
Shah, R., Ward, P.T., 2003. Lean manufacturing: context, practice bundles, and 
performance. Journal of Operations Management, 21, 129-149. 
Shah, R., Ward, P.T., 2007. Defining and developing measures of lean production. Journal of 
Operations Management, 25, 785-805. 
Shenkar, O., Ronen, S., 1987. Structure and importance of work goals among managers in 
the people’s republic of China. Academy of Management Journal, 30(3), 564–576. 
Shook, J., 2010. How to change a culture: Lessons from Nummi. MIT Sloan Management 
Review, 51(2), 63-68. 
Sim, K.L., Rogers, J.W., 2009. Implementing lean production systems: barriers to change. 
Management Research News, 32(1), 37-49. 
Sorbom, D., 1974. A general method for studying the differences in factor means and factor 
structures between groups. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 27, 
229-239. 
122 
 
Spear, S.J., 1999. The Toyota production system: An example of managing complex 
social/technical systems. 5 rules for designing, operating, and improving activities, activity-
connections, and flow-paths. Harvard University, United States- Massachusetts. 
Spear, S.J., Bowen, H.K., 1999. Decoding the DNA of of the Toyota Production System. 
Harvard Business Review, 77(9/10), 97-106. 
Strauss, A., Corbin, J. 1990. Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures 
and Techniques. Sage Publications, Newbury Park, CA. 
Stuart, I., McCutcheon, D.M., Handfield, R., McLachlin, R., Samson, D., 2002. Effective case 
research in operations management: a process perspective. Journal of Operations 
Management 20, 419–433 
Szulanski, G., 1996. Exploring internal stickiness: Impediments to the transfer of best 
practice within the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 17(Winter Special Issue), 27-43. 
Szulanski, G., 2000. The process of knowledge transfer: A diachronic analysis of stickiness. 
Organizational behavior and human decision processes, 82(1), 9-27. 
Tata, J., Prasad, S., 1998. Cultural and structural constraints on total quality management 
implementation. Total Quality Management, 9(8), 703-710. 
Taylor, W.A., Wright, G.H., 2006. The contribution of measurement and information 
infrastructure to TQM success. Omega, 34, 372-384. 
Tjosvold, D., 1986. The dynamics of interdependence in organizations. Human Relations, 
39(6), 517-540.  
Triandis, H.C., 1995. Individualism and collectivism. Westview Press, Boulder. 
Upton, D., 1998. Just-in-time and performance measurement systems. International Journal 
of Operations & Production Management, 18(11), 1101-1110. 
Voss, C., Tsikriktsis, N., Frohlich, M., 2002. Case research in operations management. 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 22(2), 195-219. 
Wallace, T., 2004. Innovation and hybridization: managing the introduction of lean production 
into Volvo do Brazil. International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 24 (8), 
801-819. 
Walton, R.E., 1975. The diffusion of new work structures: Explaining why success didn't take. 
Organizational Dynamics, 3(3), 3-22. 
Watson, J.G., Korukonda, A.R., 1995. The TQM jungle: a dialectical analysis. International 
Journal of Quality & Reliability Management, 12(9), 100-109. 
123 
 
Wincel, J., Kull, T., 2013. People, Process, and Culture: Lean Manufacturing in the Real 
World. Boca Raton: CRC Press. 
Womack, J.P., Jones, D T, 1996. Lean Thinking–Banishing Waste and Creating Wealth in 
Your Corporation. Simon and Schuster, New York. 
Womack, J.P., Jones D.T., Roos, D., 1990. The Machine that Changed the World. Rawson 
Associates New York. 
Yasin, M., Small, M., Wafa, M., 2003. Organizational modifications to support JIT 
implementation in manufacturing and service operations. Omega, 31, 213-226. 
Yin, R.K., 1989. Case Study Research, Design and Methods. Sage Publications, London. 
Yin, R.K., 1994. Case Study Research, Design and Methods (2nd ed.). Sage, Newbury Park, 
CA. 
Yin, R.K., 2003. Case Study Research: Design and Methods (3rd ed.). Sage Publications, 
Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Zhao, X., Maheshwari, S.K., Zhang, J., 1995. Benchmarking quality practices in India, China 
and Mexico. Benchmarking for Quality Management and Technology, 2, (3), 20-40. 
Zhao, X., Flynn, B.B. and Roth, A.V., 2006. Decision sciences research in China: a critical 
review and research agenda – foundations and overview. Decision Sciences, 37(4), 451-96. 
Zaheer, S., 1995. Overcoming the Liability of Foreignness. The Academy of Management 
Journal, 38(2), 341-363. 
 
124 
 
  
125 
 
Appendix 
Organizational culture 
Please indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following - (circle one number): 1 
– strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – slightly disagree, 4 – neutral, 5 – slightly agree, 6 – 
agree, and 7 – strongly agree 
a Reverse Code 
Power distance 
OC01 Managers in this plant believe in using a lot of face-to-face contact with shop floor 
employees.a 
OC02 This plant is a good place for a person who likes to make his own decisions.a 
OC03 My suggestions are never taken seriously around here. 
OC04 Our organization structure is relatively flat.a 
Institutional collectivism 
OC05 Generally, speaking, everyone in the plant works well together. 
OC06 Our supervisors encourage the people who work for them to work as a team. 
OC07 We work as a partner with our suppliers, rather than having an adversarial 
relationship. 
OC08 We believe that cooperative relationships will lead to better performance than 
adversarial relationships. 
OC09 We believe than an organization should work as a partner with its surrounding 
community. 
In-group collectivism 
OC10 I talk up this organization to my friends as a great organization to work for. 
OC11 I am proud to tell others that I am part of this organization. 
OC12 I am extremely glad that I chose this organization to work for, over others I was 
considering at the time I joined. 
OC13 For me, this is the best of all organizations for which to work. 
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Future orientation 
OC14 We pursue long-range programs, in order to acquire manufacturing capabilities in 
advance of our needs. 
OC15 We make an effort to anticipate the potential of new manufacturing practices and 
technologies. 
OC16 Our plant stays on the leading edge of new technology in our industry. 
OC17 We are constantly thinking of the next generation of manufacturing technology. 
Performance orientation 
OC18 Our incentive system encourages us to vigorously pursue plant objectives. 
OC19 The incentive system at this plant is fair at rewarding people who accomplish plant 
objectives. 
OC20 Our reward system really recognizes the people who contribute the most to our plant. 
Assertiveness 
OC21 
Our business strategy is implemented without conflicts between functions.a 
OC22 The functions in our plant cooperate to solve conflicts between them, when they 
arise.a 
OC23 Our managers do a good job of solving inter-functional conflicts.a 
OC24 Our managers communicate effectively with managers in other functions.a 
Uncertainty avoidance 
OC25 I believe that the scientific method provides a better input to decision making than 
intuition or opinion. 
OC26 In my view, organizations should use objective data as the basis for making 
decisions. 
OC27 In this organization, management is based on facts, not on intuition or tradition. 
Humane orientation 
OC28 I believe that our employees are good people. 
OC29 In my view, most employees are more concerned with personal gain than with 
helping our organization accomplish its goals.a 
OC30 Although there may be a few “bad apples,” most of our employees try to help our 
organization achieve its goals. 
OC31 Some of our employees are probably only out to get what they can from this 
organization.a 
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Hard-lean practices 
Please indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following - (circle one number): 1 
– strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – slightly disagree, 4 – neutral, 5 – slightly agree, 6 – 
agree, and 7 – strongly agree 
a Reverse Code 
Daily schedule adherence 
HLM01 We usually meet the production schedule each day. 
HLM02 Our daily schedule is reasonable to complete on time. 
HLM03 We usually complete our daily schedule as planned. 
HLM04 We cannot adhere to our schedule on a daily basis.a 
Equipment layout 
HLM05 We have laid out the shop floor so that processes and machines are in close 
proximity to each other. 
HLM06 The layout of our shop floor facilitates low inventories and fast throughput. 
HLM07 Our processes are located close together, so that material handling and part 
storage are minimized. 
HLM08 We have located our machines to support JIT production flow. 
Just in time delivery by suppliers 
HLM09 Our suppliers deliver to us on a just-in-time basis. 
HLM10 We receive daily shipments from most suppliers. 
HLM11 We can depend upon on-time delivery from our suppliers. 
HLM12 Our suppliers are linked with us by a pull system. 
HLM13 Suppliers frequently deliver materials to us. 
Kanban 
HLM14 Our suppliers deliver to us in kanban containers, without the use of separate 
packaging. 
HLM15 We use a kanban pull system for production control. 
HLM16 We use kanban squares, containers or signals for production control. 
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Setup time reduction 
HLM17 We are aggressively working to lower setup times in our plant. 
HLM18 We have converted most of our setup time to external time, while the machine is 
running. 
HLM19 We have low setup times of equipment in our plant. 
HLM20 Our crews practice setups, in order to reduce the time required. 
Process control 
HLM21 A large percent of the processes on the shop floor are currently under statistical 
quality control. 
HLM22 We make extensive use of statistical techniques to reduce variance in processes. 
HLM23 We use charts to determine whether our manufacturing processes are in control. 
HLM24 We monitor our processes using statistical process control. 
Cleanliness and organization 
HLM25 Our plant emphasizes putting all tools and fixtures in their place. 
HLM26 We take pride in keeping our plant neat and clean. 
HLM27 Our plant is kept clean at all times. 
HLM28 Our plant is disorganized and dirty.a 
Autonomous maintenance 
HLM29 Operators understand the cause and effect of equipment deterioration. 
HLM30 Basic cleaning and lubrication of equipment is done by operators. 
HLM31 Operators inspect and monitor the performance of their own equipment. 
HLM32 Operators are able to detect and treat abnormal operating conditions of their 
equipment. 
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Soft-lean practices 
Please indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following - (circle one number): 1 
– strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – slightly disagree, 4 – neutral, 5 – slightly agree, 6 – 
agree, and 7 – strongly agree 
a Reverse Code 
Top management leadership for quality 
SLM01 All major department heads within the plant accept their responsibility for quality. 
SLM02 Plant management provides personal leadership for quality products and quality 
improvement. 
SLM03 Our top management strongly encourages employee involvement in the production 
process. 
SLM04 Our plant management creates and communicates a vision focused on quality 
improvement. 
SLM05 Our plant management is personally involved in quality improvement projects. 
Supplier partnership 
SLM06 We maintain cooperative relationships with our suppliers. 
SLM07 We provide a fair return to our suppliers 
SLM08 We help our suppliers to improve their quality. 
SLM09 Our key suppliers provide input into our product development projects. 
Small group problem solving 
SLM10 During problem solving sessions, we make an effort to get all team members’ 
opinions and ideas before making a decision. 
SLM11 Our plant forms teams to solve problems. 
SLM12 In the past three years, many problems have been solved through small group 
sessions. 
SLM13 Problem solving teams have helped improve manufacturing processes at this plant. 
SLM14 Employee teams are encouraged to try to solve their own problems, as much as 
possible. 
SLM15 We don’t use problem solving teams much, in this plant.a 
 
 
 
130 
 
Continuous improvement 
SLM16 We strive to continually improve all aspects of products and processes, rather than 
taking a static approach.  
SLM17 If we aren’t constantly improving and learning, our performance will suffer in the 
long term.  
SLM18 Continuous improvement makes our performance a moving target, which is difficult 
for competitors to attack.  
SLM19 We believe that improvement of a process is never complete; there is always room 
for more incremental improvement.  
SLM20 Our organization is not a static entity, but engages in dynamically changing itself to 
better serve its customers. 
Training employees 
SLM21 Our employees receive training to perform multiple tasks. 
SLM22 Employees at this plant learn how to perform a variety of tasks. 
SLM23 The longer an employee has been at this plant, the more tasks they learn to 
perform. 
SLM24 Employees are cross-trained at this plant, so that they can fill in for others, if 
necessary. 
SLM25 At this plant, each employee only learns how to do one job.a 
Manufacturing-business strategy linkage 
SLM26 Our business strategy is translated into manufacturing terms. 
SLM27 Potential manufacturing investments are screened for consistency with our 
business strategy. 
SLM28 At our plant, manufacturing is kept in step with our business strategy. 
SLM29 Manufacturing management is not aware of our business strategy.a 
SLM30 Corporate decisions are often made without consideration of the manufacturing 
strategy.a 
Customer involvement 
SLM31 We frequently are in close contact with our customers. 
SLM32 Our customers give us feedback on our quality and delivery performance. 
SLM33 We strive to be highly responsive to our customers’ needs. 
SLM34 We regularly survey our customers’ needs. 
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Level of lean manufacturing implementation in respect to competitors  
Please circle the number that indicates your opinion about how your plant compares to its 
competition in your industry, on a global basis: 5 – superior, 4 – better than average, 3 – 
average or equal to the competition, 2 – below average, and 1 – poor or low 
LEAN Lean manufacturing 
 
Operational performance in respect to competitors 
Please circle the number that indicates your opinion about how your plant compares to its 
competitors in your industry, on a global basis: 5 – superior, 4 – better than average, 3 – 
average or equal to the competition, 2 – below average, and 1 – poor or low 
PER1 Unit cost of manufacturing 
PER2 Quality conformance 
PER3 On time delivery performance 
PER4 Fast delivery 
PER5 Flexibility to change product mix 
PER6 Flexibility to change volume 
 
I used the following formula to compute the performance score: 
Eq. (A.1) PER = (PER1 + PER2 + PER3 + PER4 + PER5 + PER6) / 6 
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